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"The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions."
-- Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in Roper v. Simmons1
"[T]his Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds
with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary,
we should not be surprised to find congruence between
domestic and international values, especially where the
international community has reached clear agreement-
expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of
individual countries-that a particular form of punishment is
inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At least, the
existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve
to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
American consensus." -- Justice O'Connor, discussing the
relevance of foreign sources of
law in her dissenting opinion
in Roper v. Simmons2
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1. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
2. Id. at 1215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"&]he basic premise of the Court's argument-that American
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought
to be rejected out of hand.... I do not believe that approval by
'other nations and peoples' should buttress our commitment to
American principles any more than (what should logically
follow) disapproval by 'other nations and peoples' should
weaken that commitment."
-Justice Scalia, dissenting in
Roper v. Simmons'
3. Id. at 1226, 1229 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
Should courts cite foreign law in U.S. constitutional cases? The
Supreme Court said "yes" last term in Roper v. Simmons,4 the land-
mark case that recently struck down the juvenile death penalty.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's dissent
both cited foreign law,5 even though they disagreed as to the consti-
tutionality of the juvenile death penalty.6 Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, forcefully dissented,
saying that foreign law is not relevant to the Court's constitutional
decision making.7
This issue first drew public notice two years ago in Lawrence v.
Texas.' That case struck down state laws against sodomy, in part,
by relying on decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.9 In
4. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
5. We consider foreign law to include statutes and cases of other countries arrived at
after American independence in 1776. We think the term includes the writings of foreign
jurists and scholars. Obviously, pre-1776 English law is not foreign law because the United
States was then part of England.
6. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-200; id. 1215-16 at (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
7. Justice Scalia further spoke of his view that "modern foreign legal materials can never
be relevant to an interpretation of-to the meaning of-the U.S. Constitution" in a keynote
address to the American Society of International Law. Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote
Address Before the American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the
Federal Courts (Apr. 2, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004). In his address,
Justice Scalia noted the few ways in which he found foreign law, other than historical English
law, to be relevant to Supreme Court decisions and stated that he feared "that the Court's use
of foreign law in the interpretation of the Constitution will continue at an accelerating pace."
Id. at 306-08. Using foreign law in constitutional cases is what Justice Scalia most strongly
opposes, but his opposition to the use of such sources is not absolute. Justice Scalia is very
open to considering foreign law in the interpretation of treaties, for example, and has stated
that the Court "can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret
treaty provisions." See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). He has explained that "[floreign constructions are evidence of the original shared
understanding of the contracting parties. Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to the parties
an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently." Id. Other
commentators have not been as clear in distinguishing between constitutional cases and
nonconstitutional cases, asserting instead that the Court should not consider foreign sources
in interpreting any American laws and arguing that the Court's use of such sources is
unprecedented. See, e.g., Hannity & Colmes: Interview with Constitution Party National
Committee Chairman Jim Clymen (Fox News television broadcast July 9, 2003).
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. Id. at 573, 576.
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the wake of Lawrence and Roper, the disagreement on the Court is
no longer about whether to cite foreign sources of law but about
when and how to cite them.1"
The Justices have taken the debate beyond their chambers. In
January of 2005, Justices Scalia and Breyer debated this issue
publicly at American University," with Justice Breyer expressing
support for citing foreign law and Justice Scalia disagreeing.12 Other
Justices have also made public statements about this issue. In a
10. The use of foreign law in Roper is especially interesting because the decision of the
Court ostensibly turned, at least in part, on whether there was a national consensus within
the United States against the execution ofjuvenile offenders. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94. For
insightful commentary on the use of foreign sources of law in Roper, see the Harvard Law
Review survey of the 2004 Supreme Court Term. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (arguing
for consideration of foreign sources of law and providing suggestions for using comparative
law); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129
(2005) (discussing the legitimacy of citing foreign law based on the law of nations); Ernest A.
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005) (clarifying
how foreign sources are used in cases such as Roper and cautioning about expanding the
denominator of foreign sources).
11. See Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American University
Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13,
2005) [hereinafter Scalia & Breyer Discussion] (transcript available at http://domino.
american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/O/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDo
cument).
12. Justice Scalia has actually referred to noted foreign sources of law in two of his
opinions. In his dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, Justice Scalia noted that
the foreign democracies of Australia, Canada, and England all have prohibitions against
anonymous campaigning, which he thought was relevant to the question whether prohibiting
anonymous campaigning "is effective in protecting and enhancing democratic elections." 514
U.S. 334, 381 (1995). In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that the Constitution
requires face-to-face cross examinations of child sexual assault victims. 487 U.S. 1012, 1020
(1988). In highlighting the history and importance of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation, Justice Scalia referred to both Roman law and the Bible. Id. at 1015-16. It is
debatable whether Roman law is a foreign law in our common law legal system. Justice Scalia
explained the origins and importance of a criminal defendant's right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." Id. at 1015-20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
This language "comes to us on faded parchment," with a lineage that traces back
to the beginnings of Western legal culture. There are indications that a right of
confrontation existed under Roman law. The Roman Governor Festus,
discussing the proper treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met
his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against
the charges."
Id. at 1015-16 (citations omitted). The earlier case of Greene v. McElroy noted this same
biblical story of Festus and the Roman roots of the right of confrontation. 360 U.S. 474, 496
n.25 (1959).
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2004 speech at Georgetown Law School, Justice O'Connor approved
of the citing of foreign law in U.S. courts, 3 a view that she has also
expressed elsewhere. 4 And, at a recent national convention of the
American Constitution Society, Justice Ginsburg took the same
position.'5
The use of foreign law is often thought to be an issue that divides
conservative and liberal Justices. 6 But, Chief Justice Rehnquist
once endorsed the use of foreign law in constitutional cases even
though he joined Justice Scalia's dissents in Lawrence and Roper.7
13. Associated Press, O'Connor Extols Role of International Law, ABC NEWS, Oct. 27,
2004, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/print?id=202974.
14. See, e.g., Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the American Society
of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. Socy INT, L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002). In her
separate opinion in United States v. Stanley, a case that involved a master sergeant in the
Army who had been secretly administered LSD, Justice O'Connor cited the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals. 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Brennan also discussed the Nuremberg trials, explaining that the United
States Military Tribunal developed the Nuremberg Code, which stated that the "voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential," to judge German scientists who
experimented on human subjects. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
15. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks Before the American Constitution Society,
Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication (Aug. 2, 2003), available at http://www.americanconstitutionsociety.org/pdf/
Ginsburg/o20transcript%2Ofinal.pdf. Justice Ginsburg's support for looking to foreign sources
of law was also apparent in her concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, where she noted
that "It]he Court's observation that race-conscious programs 'must have a logical end point'
accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action" and cited the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a
convention the United States ratified in 1994. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
16. Even the most conservative Justice on the Court, Clarence Thomas, has cited foreign
law on one occasion for comparative purposes. In Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas noted the
voting systems of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe
in his assessment of the extent of racial consciousness in the American voting system. 512
U.S. 874, 906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas has stated his general
opposition to reliance on foreign law in Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (denying certiorari).
17. He said: "Now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is
time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts
to aid in their own deliberative process." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional
Courts-Comparative Remarks, Address Before the German-American Conference Sponsored
by the Drager Foundation and the American Institute for Contemporary Studies (Oct. 1989),
in 14 GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
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Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist was also the author of a major
opinion in the assisted-suicide case, Washington v. Glucksburg,
which cited and discussed how the practice of assisted suicide has
led to abuses in the Netherlands. 8 Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined Glucksberg without commenting on its citation of foreign
legal practices on assisted suicide.'9
In addition, although the Court has cited foreign law in support
of liberal results banning the execution of juveniles and promoting
gay rights, citation of foreign law in other areas could lead to results
conservatives favor. Foreign law is more conservative than U.S.
constitutional law with respect to separation of church and state,
admission of illegally obtained evidence, and allowance of govern-
mental restrictions on speech. And, on the political hot-button issue
of abortion, many foreign nations have policies that are much more
restrictive overall of abortion rights than those in the United States.
Although most European nations do have legalized abortion, most
restrict its availability to approximately the first twelve weeks of
gestation, rather than allowing elective abortion into the second and
even third trimesters, as is the practice in the United States.2 ° In
fact, the United States is one of only six countries worldwide that
allows "abortion on demand until the point of viability."2
18. 521 U.S. 702,734 (1997); see infra Part IV.C.2. Additionally, in his opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited abortion-
related decisions of the West German constitutional court and the Supreme Court of Canada.
505 U.S. 833,945 n. 1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist also joined Justice Kennedy's dissent in Zadvydas v. Davis, which noted
that international law supported the view that detention of inadmissible aliens incident to
removal could not be "justified as punishment nor [could] the confinement or its conditions
be designed in order to punish." 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19. See 521 U.S. 702, 704 (1997).
20. Center for Reproductive Rights, The World's Abortion Laws, http://www.crlp.org/pub-
facabortion_laws.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2005). Of the countries that allow abortion
without restriction as to reason, most "impose a limit on the period during which women can
readily access the procedure." Id. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE
IN WESTERN LAW 145-54 (1987) (noting the differences in abortion laws of various Western
countries).
21. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1227 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Joan L.
Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a 'Wider Civilization". Lawrence and the
Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional
Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1320 (2004)).
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Legal scholars have played a big role in the debate so far over
whether to cite foreign law in constitutional cases.22 Yale Law Dean
Harold Koh has been at the "vanguard of the movement to encour-
age U.S. courts to pay more attention to international trends."23
Others have argued strongly against the practice, including Roger
P. Alford and Joan Larsen.24 The debate has not been left solely
to the Justices and to legal academics but has led to much public
discussion and has even led to the creation of interactive websites.25
One of us, Professor Calabresi, has written an article that calls on
Congress to reinstitute circuit riding in July when the Justices
currently go to Europe to soak up foreign constitutional law.26 And,
two Congressmen recently introduced a bill on the subject in the
House of Representatives entitled the "Reaffirmation of American
22. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion,
32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 421-23 (2004); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Winter 2006) (manuscript on file with authors);
Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 86-88 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INTL L. 69, 72-82 (2004).
23. Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution
and International Law: Editors'Introduction, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 42 (2004); Harold Hongju
Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 43-56 (2004).
24. See generally Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004) (outlining potential misuses of international and
foreign materials); Larsen, supra note 21, at 1309, 1315, 1318, 1326 (identifying weakness in
scholarly justifications for the use of foreign law).
25. At a recent conference entitled "Confronting the Judicial War on Faith," a few
conservative leaders even argued for the impeachment of Justice Kennedy due to his
philosophy, as shown by his opinion in Lawrence, which they claim "upholds Marxist,
Leninist, satanic principles drawn from foreign law." Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on
Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3. Similar criticisms appear on the
Internet. See, e.g., At the U.S. Supreme Court the "Euro Street" Counts, and American Voters
Don't Count, http://harkonnendog.blogspot.com/2005/03/at-us-supreme-court-euro-street-
counts.html (Mar. 1, 2005, 10:09 EST); Posting of McQ to http://www.qando.net/details.
aspx?Entry=-861 (Jan. 15, 2005). In his book Coercing Virtue, Robert Bork criticizes the
citation of foreign law and characterizes the appeal of internationalism as "insidious." ROBERT
H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 15-25, 135-39 (Am. Enter. Inst.
Press 2003) (2002); see also Will Baude, Low Opinion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 2005;
Cheryl K. Chumley, American Policy Center, The Supreme Court Has Abandoned the
Constitution, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.americanpolicy.orglun/abandoned. htm; Phyllis
Schlafly, Whom Is The Supreme Court Listening To? (Eagle Forum, Wash., D.C.) Nov. 10,
2004, http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2004/nov04/04-11-10.html.
26. Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reinstituting Circuit Riding, 90 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 2006).
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Independence Resolution."2 This bill would specifically provide that
"judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the
United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judg-
ments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the
original meaning of the laws of the United States."28
Advocates and opponents of reliance on foreign law disagree on
the question of whether the current Court's practice of citing such
law is unprecedented.29 Strikingly, however, the participants in this
debate have not yet stopped to examine closely just what exactly the
actual practice of the Supreme Court has been over the past two
hundred years of its history in citing foreign law. This Article fills
that gap by describing what the Supreme Court's practice has
actually been from 1789 to 2005 with respect to citing foreign law.
We will show that the Court's citation of foreign law in recent years
is not "unprecedented" as some critics have claimed,3 ° although
citation to such sources is increasing. We also show that there
have been some dramatic instances of the Court citing foreign law
historically. For example, foreign law is cited in concurring and
27. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); Congressman Tom Feeney, Should Americans Be
Governed by the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, or the European Union?, http://www.
house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
28. H.R. Res. 568. It should be noted that this resolution disapproved of federal courts
considering foreign law in all cases involving the laws of the United States, not just direct
constitutional issues. Id. A similar Senate Resolution recently introduced by Senator John
Cornyn does focus directly on cases involving the meaning of the United States Constitution.
See S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). The resolution expresses the "sense of the Senate that
judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should
not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such
foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning
of the Constitution ...." Id.
29. Julie E. Payne, Comment, Abundant Dulcibus Vitiis, Justice Kennedy: In Lawrence
v. Texas, an Eloquent and Overdue Vindication of Civil Rights Inadvertently Reveals What Is
Wrong with the Way the Rehnquist Court Discusses Stare Decisis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 969, 1004
(2004) (stating that "[c]ritics of Lawrence have decried the majority's reliance on foreign
jurisprudence as unprecedented"). Sean Hannity has said that what concerns him most is
"Justice Kennedy in particular, he's citing in his particular case foreign law, which is almost
unprecedented." Hannity & Colmes, supra note 7 (statement of Sean Hannity). Constitution
Party National Committee Chairman Jim Clymer responded to Hannity's statement, saying
"it is unprecedented. It's unprecedented in terms of citing a law, or using a law for basis of
overturning a state law as it's done here. I think the only other example was the case where
it was noted in a footnote. But in [Lawrence], they actually relied on foreign law." Id.
30. See supra note 29.
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dissenting opinions joined by six of the nine Justices in Dred Scott
v. Sandford"s and in the Court's opinion in the anti-polygamy case,
Reynolds v. United States." Foreign law is also cited in the Legal
Tender Cases"3 and the Selective Draft Law Cases,3 4 both of which
had big federalism implications. Moreover, we will show that the
debate over whether to cite foreign law in American court opinions
is not at all new. Indeed, the Justices debated the practice as early
as 1820 when Justice Livingston responded to Justice Story's use of
foreign law to provide a definition for the crime of piracy by stating
that "it is not perceived why a reference to the laws of China, or to
any other foreign code, would not have answered the purpose quite
as well as the one which has been resorted to." 5 Thus, Justice
Scalia's modern lament finds its echo from as long ago as 1820 in
the U.S. Reports.
This Article does not seek definitively to answer the question of
whether the Supreme Court ought to cite foreign law, a question
Professor Calabresi has addressed in another context.36 Rather, we
seek here to address the issue at a much more fundamental and
basic level, which is: what has been the Supreme Court's actual
historical practice in citing foreign law?37 The Article proceeds in the
following manner: Parts I through IV compile and examine some of
the most striking cases in which the Supreme Court has cited for-
eign law throughout its history. Each Part covers a time frame of
approximately fifty years, starting with the first half century under
the Constitution and ending with the modern period. These four
fifty-year Parts are then further subdivided according to the types
of cases that cite foreign law in each historical period. Thus, Part I
31. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 passim (1857). Six of the nine justices in Dred Scott-four in the
majority and the two in dissent-joined opinions citing foreign law. Id.
32. 98 U.S. 145, 164, 167 (1878).
33. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
34. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
35. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 181 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
36. Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court's
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097
(2004).
37. We researched this Article by several means, including running searches in legal
databases for terms related to foreign sources of law, including Anglo-American, civil law,
civilized world, civilized nations, Code Napoleon, Roman law, and Western nations; and
conducting searches for the names of prominent foreign scholars such as Bynkershoek and
Vattel.
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discusses several important cases in which the Supreme Court cited
foreign law prior to 1840. Part II compiles and discusses many
noteworthy cases that cited foreign law decided during the years
between 1840 and 1890, including Dred Scott and Reynolds. Part
III addresses Supreme Court opinions citing foreign sources of
law decided between 1890 and 1940. Part IV then concludes by
discussing many of the opinions of the Court from 1940 to the pres-
ent that cited foreign law. Our survey of the Court's practice shows
a steady escalation in the citation of foreign law with the modern
references to foreign sources of law being the most striking. Part V
of this Article then concludes by analyzing the cases discussed in
Parts I through IV and addressing some of the unifying themes.
Our analysis of the Court's practice leads us to several conclu-
sions. First, we believe that those political and journalistic
commentators who say that the Court has never before cited or
relied upon foreign law are clearly and demonstrably wrong. In fact,
the Court has relied on such sources to some extent throughout its
history. Second, the Court has cited foreign law with much more
frequency in far more important constitutional cases as the Court
has grown older and has increased significantly its use of such
sources in striking down legislation only since Trop v. Dulles in
1958.38 The phenomenon that Justice Scalia complains about is thus
a relatively new development. Third, the Court has tended to cite
foreign law in some of its most problematic opinions, such as several
of the concurring opinions in Dred Scott, and its opinions in
Reynolds and in Roe v. Wade.39 This suggests that Justice Scalia is
right to be wary of the Court's movement in this direction. Fourth,
the historical evidence suggests to us that citation of foreign law is
most (if at all) justifiable when the U.S. Constitution asks the
Justices to weigh whether a certain practice is reasonable, as it
does in the Fourth Amendment, or whether it is unusual, as it does
in the Eighth Amendment. In contrast, citing foreign law is least
justifiable when the Court is asked to determine whether an
unenumerated right is deeply rooted in American history and tradi-
tion, as was the case in Lawrence," or whether a federal statute
38. 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
39. 410 U.S. 113, 136-38 (1973).
40. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
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violates historically unique American federalism rules, as it was
asked to do in Printz v. United States.4 We suggest that in the over-
whelming majority of non-Fourth and non-Eighth Amendment
cases, it is inappropriate for the Court to cite foreign law. Citation
of such law can, in fact, be a sign that the Court is falling into
policymaking, as it did in Dred Scott, Reynolds, and Roe, and this,
in turn, suggests that the Justices are behaving illegitimately. We
thus substantially agree with the spirit, if not entirely all of the
substance, of Justice Scalia's warning against citing foreign law in
most U.S. constitutional cases.42
I. THE EARLY COURT
The Declaration of Independence speaks of giving a "decent Re-
spect to the Opinions of Mankind,"4" and at least one scholar has
claimed that this means the Supreme Court ought to take account
of foreign law." Federalist Number 63 says that an "attention to
the judgment of other nations is important to every government ....
[I]n doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may
be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the
presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best
guide that can be followed."4 It is thus not surprising that from its
earliest years the Supreme Court considered and cited foreign
sources of law.
We begin with two preliminary, large issues in the early Supreme
Court's treatment of foreign law: the law of nations and civil, espe-
cially Roman, law. We will then proceed to examine seven Supreme
41. 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). In these cases, we agree with Justice Scalia that the Court's
task is to interpret the original meaning of our Constitution and not to determine the current-
day reasonableness or unusualness of a legislative practice. See also Calabresi, supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2005).
43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
44. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 23, at 43-44.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 382 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The author, presumed to be Alexander Hamilton or James Madison,
wrote:
What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and
how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and
propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the
light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
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Court cases between the Founding and 1840 that rely on foreign
law.
A. The Law of Nations
There were frequent references to the term the "law of nations"
during the early days of American history. John Jay, the nation's
first Chief Justice and one of the three authors of the Federalist
Papers, said in Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793 that the newly formed
country "had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth,
become amenable to the laws of nations."46 One of the nation's earli-
est attorneys general, Edmund Randolph, argued that the 'law of
nations, although not specially adopted by the [C]onstitution or any
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land.""' In addi-
tion, the Constitution itself speaks directly of the law of nations
when, in the Offenses Clause, it gives Congress the power to "define
and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations.""
46. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793). Chief Justice Jay wrote in Henfield's Case that the
"laws of the United States admit of being classed under three heads of descriptions." 11 F.
Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). He first listed treaties; second, the law of
nations; and third, the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Id. at 1101. Jay wrote
that the laws of nations are the "laws by which nations are bound to regulate their conduct
towards each other, both in peace and war." Id. at 1102. In Ware v. Hylton, Justice Wilson
stated that "[w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive
the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281
(1796).
47. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792). Chief Justice Marshall wrote in The Nereide that,
absent an act directing otherwise, "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of
the law of the land." 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Consider, as examples, and in addition to the cases
discussed further in this Article, the following cases addressing the law of nations: Mitchel
v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 734 (1835) (stating, for example, that
by the law of nations, the inhabitants, citizens, or subjects of a conquered or
ceded country, territory, or province, retain all the rights of property which have
not been taken from them by the orders of the conqueror, or the laws of the
sovereign who acquires it by cession, and remain under their former laws until
they shall be changed);
United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 469 (1826) (addressing the law of nations
in the context of ambassadors and holding that the criminal prosecution at issue in the case
was not one "affecting a public minister" for the purposes of the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 388 (discussing the law of nations
regarding the condemnation of ships and cargo); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795)
(discussing the law of nations and capture of vessels on the high seas).
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The question then arises, especially in the context of the issue
addressed in this Article, what precisely were these principles that
composed the "law of nations" that the early United States adopted
as its own laws? 49 How far did the Offenses Clause go as a matter
of its original meaning in allowing Congress to legislate with respect
to foreign law? Although some have attempted to equate the
term "law of nations" with international law,5° we think it is highly
unlikely that the Founders considered the phrase to be synonymous
with what we think of today as international law. Instead, the law
of nations more probably referred to a rather discrete and limited
"species of universal law"' that allowed, for example, the punish-
ment of piracy and other extraordinary and heinous crimes.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to define precisely what the law of
nations meant to early American jurists, in part because subsequent
scholars and judges did not always use the phrase consistently to
describe the same thing.
52
One of the few recent Supreme Court opinions to discuss the law
of nations is Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,5 which summarized the
subject matters thought to be covered by the phrase.5 4 First, the law
of nations included "the general norms governing the behavior of
national states with each other"; that is, it covered "'the science
which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states,
and the obligations correspondent to those rights."'55 Second, the
law of nations involved a "body of judge-made law regulating the
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries and
consequently carrying an international savor."56 The law of nations
in this area encompassed commercial questions, admiralty issues,
prize law, and disputes regarding matters such as shipwrecks and
49. One scholar's answer to this question can be found in Edward Dumbauld's article John
Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 38, 38 (1955).
50. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations,"42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 (2000).
51. See Dumbauld, supra note 49, at 38.
52. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REv. 819, 821 (1989).
53. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
54. Id. at 2755-56.
55. Id. at 2756 (emphasis omitted) (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
Preliminaries § 3 (Joseph Chitty trans. & ed., Edward 0. Ingraham ed., 1883)).
56. Id.
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hostages.57 Finally, the law of nations encompassed a "sphere in
which these rules binding individuals for the benefit of other indi-
viduals overlapped with the norms of state relationships., 58 The law
of nations in this realm was often criminal in nature, and can be
seen in early prohibitions of piracy as defined in foreign law and the.
protection of the rights of ambassadors.5 9
A more thorough analysis of the original meaning of the phrase
"the law of nations" is beyond the scope of this Article, and the topic
is one that has been addressed in other scholarly works.6 ° For the
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient that we note that a reference
to the law of nations, itself, is not assumed to be merely a reference
to international law. The early Supreme Court, in discovering the
rules and original meaning of the law of nations, often considered
the following: first, the laws and practices of other nations, espe-
cially those on the European continent; second, the views of foreign
scholars, including writers on the civil law; and third, the decisions
of English judges in cases arising after American independence in
1776. A follower of Justice Kennedy's approach to citing foreign law
might argue that these references are significant citations to foreign
laws and provide evidence that the early Court was fully amenable
to considering foreign law in reaching its decisions and developing
its opinions.
A follower of Justice Scalia's argument, on the other hand, could
claim that the law of nations is not foreign law in the sense that
modern debates use the term "foreign." Because the law of nations
is expressly recognized by the Constitution and arguably applied to
the United States following independence by virtue of its acceptance
into the community of nations, the law of nations might be viewed
as truly a form of domestic law. The content of this species of domes-
tic law, the argument might run, depends to some extent on the
practices of foreign nations and the reasoning of foreign writers, but
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Dumbauld, supra note 49, at 38; Jay, supra note 52, at 821; see also Harry
A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994)
(asserting that the Supreme Court has in recent years failed to respect and adhere to
international laws); Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as a Sword or Shield? Early
American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 7 (1999).
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the Constitution itself literally "domesticates" this body of law. Uses
by the Court of the law of nations, one could conclude, are
completely different from the use of post-1788 developments in
foreign countries to inform the meaning of constitutional language
.that does not expressly tie domestic law to foreign sources.
The question of just how pertinent these early references to the
law of nations are to the current debate is one best left, at least at
this time, to the reader. However, at minimum, in examining early
Supreme Court cases that include such references, it becomes clear
that the early Court, as well as other important entities in the early
American government, 61 were unquestionably willing to at least
reflect on the views of the world outside the borders of our own
nation.
B. Civil and Roman Law and the Early Supreme Court
Due to the importance of the law of nations and natural law theo-
ries to the newly formed American legal system, many references
were made by the early U.S. Supreme Court to the civil law in gen-
eral and to Roman law in particular. As with the law of nations, it
is unclear to what extent these references really constitute reliance
on foreign sources of law in a manner relevant to modern debates.
On the one hand, Roman law seems like a foreign source to the
common law tradition of the early Court; common law systems in
England and the United States are not at all founded upon Roman
law as civil law systems are. 2 On the other hand, to the extent that
federal courts in the early years of the United States sought to un-
cover (or fashion) federal common law, it is not surprising that they
would draw upon Roman and civil law sources-no more than it
would be surprising for a common law court in England or Massa-
chusetts to consider, for example, the Roman law of property or
agency.
61. This group includes political actors, commentators, and scholars, among others. See
Jay, supra note 52, at 825 (stating that, in addition to judges, 'leading political figures, and
commentators commonly stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United
States").
62. See Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 681, 740 (1997) (describing the influence of Roman law on common law systems).
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Yet, Roman law certainly exerted an influence over the Supreme
Court during its early, as well as later, years. Caleb Cushing, a well-
remembered Attorney General of the United States, described the
influence of the civil law on American jurisprudence in 1820 as
follows:
The common, civil, and customary law of Europe have each pre-
cisely the same force with us in this branch; that is, our courts
study them all, and adopt from them whatever is most applica-
ble to our situation, and whatever is on the whole just and expe-
dient, without considering either of course obligatory. If
Mansfield, Scott, or Ellenborough, is cited with deference or
praise, so likewise are Bynkershoek, Valen, Cleirac, Pothier, and
Emerigon. The authority of a decision or opinion, emanating
from either of these sources, is rested on exactly the same foun-
dation, viz. its intrinsic excellence."3
The civil and Roman law did have a significant influence on legal
education and legal writers from "the colonial period to the time of
the Dred Scott decision."' Addressing the importance of the Roman
law as a guidepost during this time period, Justice Story said:
Where shall we find such ample general principles to guide us in
new and difficult cases, as in that venerable deposite of the
learning and labors of the jurists of the ancient world, the Insti-
tutes and Pandects of Justinian. The whole continental jurispru-
dence rests upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom; and
the English common law, churlish and harsh as was its feudal
education, has condescended slightly to borrow many of its best
principles from this enlightened code .... "
Lawyers and jurists in cases of maritime disputes and commercial
law referenced civilian sources for principles and doctrines in Amer-
ican cases most frequently; for example, they looked to cases dealing
63. PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HIsTORIcAL
ESSAYS 429 (1988) (quoting Caleb Cushing, On the Study of the Civil Law, 11 N. AM. REV. 407,
412 (1820)); see also Smith, supra note 62, at 738-43 (discussing the impact of the Roman law
on the United States' legal system).
64. Smith, supra note 62, at 738.
65. Id. at 740 (quoting Joseph Story, Address Before the Suffolk Bar (Sept. 4, 1821), in 1
AM. JURIST 1, 13-14 (1829)).
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with negotiable instruments, rules of trade, and agency law.66 The
reliance on such sources in admiralty law arose because this area of
the law originally evolved from the civil and international mercan-
tile law.67
It appears that early American lawyers did regard civil and
Roman law as "aids to understanding the overall structure of the
law." 8 In addition, they viewed references to civil law as a means of
demonstrating that our own law was logical in its composition.69 It
was this vision of the important role that Roman and civil law could
play in the early years of our system of justice that likely led Justice
Story to state that the fact that a rule of American law was
"'approved by the cautious learning of Valin, the moral perspicacity
66. R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American Jurisprudence,
66 TuL. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (1992).
67. Id. "[Tihe general maritime law of the United States has strong roots in international
custom. In extending judicial power 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' the
framers of the Constitution apparently had English admiralty practice in mind, itself based
on the civil law of continental Europe." James A.R. Nafziger, The Evolving Role of Admiralty
Courts in Litigation Related to Historic Wreck, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 251, 266 (2003) (citations
omitted).
68. Helmholz, supra note 66, at 1651. Helmholz also notes that civil law, including Roman
law, appeared in various cases
involving the law of evidence, in disputes over real and personal property, in
cases involving procedural rules, in questions relating to the law of agency and
partnership, in pleas raising the statute of limitations, in criminal prosecutions,
in disputes about principles of statutory construction, on questions relating to
the law of damages, and in many probate matters.
Id. at 1662-63 (citations omitted). Justice Joseph Story said along the same lines that
[t]he law with regard to personal or movable property, and contracts, (often
called in the language of common law, choses in action) is in substance that of
England .... except that the American law on these subjects is more expansive
and comprehensive, and liberal, borrowing freely from the law of Continental
Europe, and more disposed to avail itself of the best principles of commerce,
which can be gathered from all foreign sources not excluding even the civil law.
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 443 (2000). Perillo obtained this quotation from an
article by Justice Story entitled American Law that was published in Germany in a German
translation. Id. at 443 n. 104. According to Perillo, the original English-language text appears
in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Sketch of American Law, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 3 (1954).
Perillo, supra, at 443 n.104.
69. See Michael Lobban, Blackstone and the Science of Law, 30 HIST. J. 311, 321 (1987)
(arguing that Blackstone employed Roman law to demonstrate that English law had a logical
structure).
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of Pothier, and the practical and sagacious judgment of Emerigon"'
was a significant recommendation of that rule.7°
We turn now to seven specific Supreme Court opinions between
1789 and 1840 that actually cited foreign law, so the reader can
get a better sense of the form and substance of these citations.
We begin, of course, with opinions written by the legendary Chief
Justice John Marshall who served from 1801 to 1835.
C. Opinions of Chief Justice Marshall
In his lengthy tenure on the United States Supreme Court, Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote several important opinions that re-
ferred to foreign law.7' When employing foreign law, Chief Justice
Marshall often looked to contemporaneous (i.e., post-1776) decisions
of the English courts for guidance, and on more than one occasion
he specifically referred to the decisions and opinions of Sir William
Scott of the English High Court of Admiralty.72 Although admiralty
cases (and law of nations cases) are not traditionally seen as raising
direct constitutional issues, there is a constitutional component to
them, as each area is, at least in some way, based upon and derived
from the Constitution. Admiralty law, for example, is grounded
upon constitutional law in that the foundation for its development
is its specific inclusion within the judicial power of the federal
courts in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which states that
"[t]he judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction."" Similarly, law of nations cases also have a
constitutional root. The Constitution, in the Offenses Clause, gives
Congress power to "define and punish ... Offenses against the Law
of Nations."74
70. Helmholz, supra note 66, at 1681-82 (citing Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 19 F. Cas.
98, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 10905)).
71. Chief Justice Marshall considered foreign law in the 1812 case of The Schooner
Exchange u. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). Because the Court found the
case to explore "an unbeaten path" it "found it necessary to rely much on general principles,"
and turned to the concurrence of the civilized world, as well as the writings of Vattel and
Bynkershoek, for guidance. Id. at 136, 137, 143-46.
72. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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Neither admiralty law nor the law of nations, however, is an area
of constitutional law in the same sense as more traditional areas of
constitutional law that are discussed in this Article, such as Eighth
Amendment and substantive due process cases. A big difference is
that in both admiralty and law of nations cases it could be argued
that the Constitution invites the Court to involve itself in some
consideration of foreign law. Thus, Article III of the Constitution
arguably delegates to the Court the power to formulate a common
law of admiralty, which would build upon English and even civil law
traditions and would allow the Court to consider foreign sources of
law in choosing the appropriate standards to govern U.S. admiralty
law. Both admiralty law and the law of nations may have been
thought of in the early years as areas where a brooding omnipres-
ence of general law made reliance on foreign legal writings pecu-
liarly appropriate. But, if the text of the Offenses Clause or the
Admiralty Jurisdiction Clause invites reference to foreign law, why
does the use of the word "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment,
or of "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment, not do the same thing?
This question, too, we leave to the reader. In any event, the first
Marshall opinion referring to foreign law was Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy.75
1. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy/Talbot v. Seeman
In 1804, a mere fifteen years after the Constitution was ratified
and in effect, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy.76 This case gave rise to the so-called
"Charming Betsy" canon of statutory construction, which has been
reaffirmed and utilized throughout the history of the Court, and has
been the subject of limited, although increasing, scholarly debate.77
75. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that congressional statutes should not be
construed so as to violate the law of nations). Today, references to this canon of statutory
construction often equate Marshall's reference to the law of nations with international law.
See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 211-14 (1993).
76. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 115.
77. For an example of a more recent Supreme Court case reaffirming the Charming Betsy
canon, see, for example, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993). For
more on the relevant scholarly commentary and debate on the issue, see, for example, Ralph
G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,
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This canon provides that an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other construction is
possible.78 The canon has gained such preeminence that it is em-
bodied in the prominent Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. 79 Its existence constitutes a clear accep-
tance by the Marshall Court of the background importance of
foreign sources of law. It suggests that the Supreme Court should
exercise its constitutional grant of power to interpret federal
statutes by taking account of foreign law.
One important question before the Court in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy was whether the Charming Betsy, a ship, was "sub-
ject to seizure and condemnation for having violated a law of the
United States?"8 In answer to this question, Chief Justice Marshall
first stated, as a principle "believed to be correct" and one that
"ought to be kept in view in construing the act now under consider-
ation," the canon of statutory construction often referred to as the
Charming Betsy canon.81 Chief Justice Marshall said that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains." 2 Marshall added that
this consequently meant that an act "can never be construed to
violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country." 3
43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1112-15 (1990); Turley, supra note 75, at 211-17; see also Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive
Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 482 (1998). It should also be noted that, although
the canon is most often referred to as the Charming Betsy canon, it was actually first
established by the Court three years earlier in the case of Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
1, 43 (1801). Chief Justice Marshall also wrote the Talbot opinion, id. at 1, although he made
no reference to the Talbot holding in the Charming Betsy opinion, see Charming Betsy 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) at 64. The Court stated that "the laws of the United States ought not, if it be
avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations, or the
general doctrines of national law." Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 43. For more on the Talbot
opinion as the basis for the Charming Betsy canon, see Bradley, supra, at 485-86.
78. See supra note 77.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1987) (stating that "[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as
not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United
States").
80. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (emphasis omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The Court eventually concluded that the Charming Betsy, by virtue
of being "the bona fide property of a Danish burgher," was not
forfeitable under the congressional statute prohibiting all com-
mercial intercourse between the United States and France.' The
Marshall Court, in now famous dicta, thus endorsed the notion that
American statutes should be construed to comport with the law of
nations.85 What this means, in practice, is that when American
courts exercise their constitutional power to interpret statutes, they
must exercise that constitutional power by giving legal weight to
foreign sources of law.
2. Rose v. Himely
A second Marshall opinion that endorsed reference to foreign law
is Rose v. Himely,s6 decided in 1808, a mere nineteen years into the
history of the Republic. This case involved a question of jurisdiction
and a seized vessel, here a ship carrying a cargo of coffee that had
been condemned by a French tribunal sitting in Santo Domingo.8"
The question posed by Rose v. Himely which led to the invocation of
foreign sources of law was, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote, whether
the United States Supreme Court could "examine the jurisdiction
of a foreign tribunal."8 In this case, it was the French tribunal sit-
ting in Santo Domingo. Chief Justice Marshall first considered the
underlying assumption, saying:
Upon principle, it would seem that the operation of every judg-
ment must depend upon the power of the court to render that
84. Id. at 121 (emphasis omitted).
85. Exactly how the Court used the law of nations, or international law, in reaching its
conclusion in this case is not clear from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, if the law of nations
even truly influenced the Court's decision. See Bradley, supra note 77, at 487. Some scholars
have argued, however, and it seems rather apparent, that the decision and the maxim of
statutory construction "became the bedrock for a series of later decisions involving
international law and judicial construction." See Turley, supra note 75, at 213. Others have
found that, despite its initially apparent simplicity as a principle of statutory interpretation,
the Charming Betsy canon "hides a deep and characteristic complexity that goes to the heart
of how international law should be applied in the courts of the United States." Steinhardt,
supra note 77, at 1113.
86. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
87. Id. at 268.
88. Id.
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judgment; or in other words, on its jurisdiction over the subject-
matter which it has determined .... Upon principle, then, it would
seem that, to a certain extent, the capacity of the court to act
upon the thing condemned, arising from its being within, or
without their jurisdiction, as well as the constitution of the
court, may be considered by that tribunal which is to decide on
the effect of the sentence.89
Moving from principle to authority, Chief Justice Marshall then
considered several foreign law decisions of the courts of England
rendered after 1776, on the grounds that the United States Supreme
Court was "best acquainted with them" and because he found these
decisions to "give to foreign sentences as full effect as are given to
them in any part of the civilized world."90 Rose v. Himley is thus a
second clear example of the Marshall Court giving legal weight to
foreign-in this case, English-law.
The status given to foreign law by the courts of England, accord-
ing to Chief Justice Marshall, was that the "sentence of a foreign
court is conclusive with respect to what it professes to decide," quali-
fied, however, by the limitation that the foreign court "has, in the
given case, jurisdiction of the subject-matter."'" In support of this
statement, Chief Justice Marshall discussed four cases from the
English High Court of Admiralty, all decided between the years
1799 and 1804.92 It is important to point out that, because these
English cases were decided after 1776, they are foreign sources of
law rather than common law precedent adopted from English case
law predating the Declaration of Independence.
The first foreign law case, Flad Oyen,93 was decided in 1799,
twenty-four years after American independence, by Judge Sir
William Scott. It involved a vessel that was condemned by a "bellig-
erent court sitting in a neutral territory" and the whole objection to
the enforcement of the sentence was based "entirely on the defect in
the constitution of the court."9 4 The next foreign (English) case Chief
89. Id. at 269.
90. Id. at 270.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 270-71.
93. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 124, 1C. Rob. 134 (High Ct. AdmIty).
94. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270.
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Justice Marshall cited, The Christopher," was also decided by Sir
William Scott in 1799. In The Christopher, the Court affirmed the
jurisdiction of the foreign court passing sentence; however, "no
doubt seems to have been entertained, at the bar, or by the judge
himself, of his right to decide the question, whether a court of admi-
ralty sitting in the country of the captor could take jurisdiction of a
prize lying in the port of an ally."96 Chief Justice Marshall next
referred to the 1799 English case of The Henrick and Maria97 in
which the right to "inquire whether the situation of the thing, the
locus in quo, did not take it out of the jurisdiction of the court, was
considered as unquestionable."98 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall
discussed the 1801 foreign (English) law case of The Helena99 in
which a British vessel was captured and transferred by a foreign
court.'00 In The Helena, Sir William Scott, affirming the title of the
purchaser of the vessel, "expressed no doubt of the right of the court
to investigate the subject."'0'1
Following this rather lengthy discussion of post- 1776 English case
law, Chief Justice Marshall adopted the position that American
courts should follow the English law and should examine the
jurisdiction of foreign courts. He summarized his findings by stating
that
[t]he manner in which this subject is understood in the courts of
England, may then be considered as established on
uncontrovertible authority. Although no case has been found in
which the validity of a foreign sentence has been denied, because
the thing was not within the ports of the captor, yet it is appar-
95. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 291, 2C. Rob. 209 (High Ct. Admlty).
96. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270. Chief Justice Marshall also cited to the English case
of The Kierlighett, (1800) 165 Eng. Rep. 399, 3C. Rob. 96 (High Ct. Admlty), decided by Sir
William Scott, as well, on May 22, 1800, as establishing the same principle as The
Christopher. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270.
97. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 129, 1C. Rob. 146 (High Ct. Admlty). Sir William Scott also
decided this case, determining that "a condemnation, by the court of the captor, of a vessel
lying in a neutral port, was conformable to the practice of nations, and therefore valid." Rose,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270.
98. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270. The Comet, (1804) 165 Eng. Rep. 778 5C. Rob. 285
(High Ct. Admlty), an English case decided October 10, 1804, was also cited as standing on
the same principles as The Henrick and Maria. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 271.
99. (1801) 165 Eng. Rep. 515, 4C. Rob. 3 (High Ct. Admlty).
100. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 271.
101. Id.
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ent that the courts of that country hold themselves warranted in
examining the jurisdiction of a foreign court, by which a sen-
tence of condemnation has passed, not only in relation to the
constitutional powers of the court, but also in relation to the
situation of the thing on which those powers are exercised; at
least so far as the right of the foreign court to take jurisdiction
of the thing is regulated by the law of nations and by treaties.
There is no reason to suppose that the tribunals of any other
country whatever deny themselves the same power. It is, there-
fore, at present, considered as the uniform practice of civilized
nations, and is adopted by this court as the true principle which
ought to govern in this case.102
Rose v. Himely thus clearly relies on foreign-post-1776 British
-- case law in deciding an American admiralty case involving a ques-
tion of jurisdiction. In it, the foreign law is adopted by Chief Justice
Marshall as the new American rule of law. Admittedly, this case is
an example of the Supreme Court borrowing a rule in an admiralty
case from a country closely related to the United States and not
one of the Court being influenced by the mores of France or
Germany. Nonetheless, we think the existence of Rose v. Himely and
Charming Betsy is at least a little disturbing for the thesis that the
Supreme Court ought never to look to foreign sources of law. John
Marshall at least seemed to think he could look to foreign law to
determine whether to inquire into a foreign tribunal's jurisdiction
or to construe a congressional statute.
3. Brown v. United States
Foreign sources of law surfaced again in the Marshall Court's
1814 decision in Brown v. United States.1°' Chief Justice Marshall
wrote for a majority of the Court in Brown, addressing the War
Clause of the Constitution and invalidating an executive branch
seizure of British property, a cargo of pine timber, which had been
bought by U.S. citizens prior to the War of 1812.1°4 The question
before the Court was whether "enemy's property, found on land at
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
104. Id. at 121-22, 129.
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the commencement of hostilities, [may] be seized and condemned as
a necessary consequence of the declaration of war." °5 The Court
looked at the War Clause, which gave Congress the power to "make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,"'0 6 and found that
the clause would not allow the president to seize enemy property
without congressional authorization, even property that was within
the United States during a time of war.10 7 The Court thus stated
that the executive seizure was not proper, as it appeared to the
Court that under the Constitution "the power of confiscating enemy
property is in the legislature, and that the legislature has not yet
declared its will to confiscate property which was within our terri-
tory at the declaration of war."'0 8
Strikingly, in reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall
cited and wrote about the views of many famous foreign jurists and
writers, including Bynkershoek, Vattel, and Chitty.' s After taking
into account the analyses of these foreign scholars, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that the "modern rule then would seem to be, that
tangible property belonging to an enemy and found in the country
at the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confis-
cated."10 Although he found that the rule at first seemed to be to-
tally incompatible with the idea that war itself vested property in
the enemy government, he wrote that it "may be considered as the
opinion of all who have written on the jus belli, that war gives the
right to confiscate, but does not itself confiscate the property of the
105. Id. at 123.
106. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
107. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 126.
108. Id. at 129.
109. Id. at 124-25. Bynkershoek was a Dutch writer on international law in the early
1700s; Vattel, a Swiss philosopher and jurist of the same era; and Chitty, a leading English
scholar of the early nineteenth century. See Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law:
Why Nations Observe 17 DICK. J. INTL L. 287, 295, 310 (1999) (discussing Bynkershoek and
Vattel); Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case of Ex Parte Lange (or How the Double Jeopardy
Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb"), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1999) (describing Chitty as a
prominent criminal law commentator of the nineteenth century).
110. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125. Jus belli is Latin for the "law of war" and is defined
by Black's Law Dictionary as "[tihe law of nations as applied during wartime, defining in
particular the rights and duties of the belligerent powers and of neutral nations." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
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enemy.""'1 In respect to the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall
then declared:
The constitution of the United States was framed at a time when
this rule, introduced by commerce in favor of moderation and
humanity, was received throughout the civilized world. In ex-
pounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be
admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in
this country it does not possess elsewhere, and which would fetter
that exercise of entire discretion respecting enemy property,
which may enable the government to apply to the enemy the
rule that he applies to us." 2
Chief Justice Marshall thus construed the U.S. Constitution so
that it would accord with the law of nations, just as he said statutes
should be so construed in Charming Betsy. Both opinions provide
solid evidence that even very early on in our history, the Court rec-
ognized and gave weight to foreign law.
Justice Story's dissent rebutted Chief Justice Marshall with a
lengthy discussion of the views of foreign jurists, including
Puffendorf, Vattel, Grotius, and Bynkershoek, to indicate that
the principles of the British courts, which would have upheld the
seizure, did not depart from the law of nations."3 According to
Justice Story, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek were good
authority, while Bynkershoek was "the highest authority.""' 4 While
claiming to withhold an opinion "of the character of Vattel as a
jurist," Justice Story wrote that if Vattel "was singly to be opposed
to the weight of Grotius and Puffendorf, and, above all,
Bynkershoek, it [would] be difficult for him to sustain so unequal a
contest.""' 5 In defense of his citation of foreign jurists, Justice Story
stated:
I have been led into this discussion of the doctrine of foreign
jurists, farther than I originally intended; because the practice
of this Court in prize proceedings must, as I have already inti-
111. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 132-35 (Story, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 140.
115. Id. at 140-41.
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mated, be governed by the rules of admiralty law disclosed in
English reports, in preference to the mere dicta of elementary
writers. I thought it my duty, however, to notice these authori-
ties, because they seem generally relied on by the Claimant's
counsel.116
In addressing the jurisdiction of the Court over matters of prize,
Justice Story considered foreign law as well as the opinions of for-
eign jurists. In finding that the Court did have "prize jurisdiction of
the admiralty," Justice Story took into account the fact that "in
other countries, and especially in France, upon whose ancient prize
ordinances the administration of prize law seems, in great measure,
to have been modelled, the jurisdiction has uniformly belonged to
the admiralty.""' 7 Justice Story also stated that this "exercise of
jurisdiction is settled by the most solemn adjudications" and cited
numerous post-1776 English cases as support for this proposition,"18
including The Rebeckah,"9  The Cape of Good Hope,20  The
Gertruyda,"21 The Island of Trinidad,'22 The Stella del Norte,2 ' and
The Maria Francoise. 1
24
Brown v. United States was again an admiralty case, and it is
theoretically possible that the Framers meant for admiralty cases
to be decided according to foreign law while reserving the meaning
of "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment solely to domestic law
sources. We think this argument should be made, if it can be, by
reference to originalist sources. Brown v. United States seems to us
to provide some support for looking at foreign law in the Eighth
Amendment context.
125
116. Id. at 135.
117. Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 139.
119. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 158, IC. Rob. 227 (High Ct. Admlty).
120. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 314, 2C. Rob. 274 (High Ct. Admlty). The case is also referred
to as The Cape of Good Hope and Its Dependencies. 2 CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY; COMMENCING WITH THE
JUDGMENTS OF THE RIGHT HON. SIR WILLIAM SCOTT, MICHAELMAS TERM 1798, at 274 (1801).
121. (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 292, 2C. Rob. 211 (High Ct. Admlty).
122. (1804) 165 Eng. Rep. 799, 5C. Rob. 92 (High Ct. Admlty).
123. (1805) 165 Eng. Rep. 801, 5C. Rob 349 (High Ct. Admlty).
124. (1806) 165 Eng. Rep. 932, 6C. Rob 282 (High Ct. Admlty).
125. Another Marshall opinion that looks to foreign sources of law as being relevant is
M'Coul v. Lekamp'sAdministratrix. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 111 (1817). In a footnote at the end of
this 1817 case, Chief Justice Marshall described foreign law regarding the evidentiary
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admission of account books of merchants and traders. Id. at 117 n.a. An important issue arose
when Albert Lekamp, who had filed suit against Neil M'Coul to recover money owed to him,
died before the suit was resolved. Id. at 112. When Lekamp died the suit was revived in the
name of his administratrix. Id. The question for the Marshall Court was whether it was an
error to permit an entry from one of Lekamp's account books regarding merchandise sold and
delivered to M'Coul to be entered into evidence and submitted to the jury when testimony as
to the originality of the account book came from Lekamp's clerk, rather than the deceased
plaintiff himself. Id. at 115-17. The Court found that the account was "taken from the original
entries made at the time of delivery" and therefore admissible. Id. at 117. At the end of the
opinion, in a striking footnote, Chief Justice Marshall wrote of the laws of other nations
regarding the use of merchants' books of account as evidence:
Whatever might have been the doctrine of the civil, or Roman law, on this
subject, it is certain that by the codes of the nations of the European continent,
which are founded on that law, the books of merchants and traders are, under
certain regulations, evidence against those with whom they deal. Thus, by the
law of France, the books of traders, regularly kept, may be admitted as evidence,
in commercial matters, between persons engaged in trade. So, also, the books of
tradesmen make a semi-proof against all persons dealing with them, the oath of
the party being added to this imperfect evidence afforded by the books.
Id. at 117 n.a (first two emphases added) (citation omitted). In regard to the law of France
concerning such books, Chief Justice Marshall cited directly to a French law from the Code
de Commerce. See M'Coul, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 117 n.a. (citing, specifically, CODE DE
COMMERCE, liv. 1, tit. 2, art. 12 (Fr.)). He then took note of the writings of French jurist Robert
Pothier on the subject, stating:
To which Pothier adds, that the tradesman must enjoy the reputation of probity;
that the books must be regularly kept; that the action must be commenced
within a year from the time the article are delivered; that the amount be not too
great; and that there is nothing improbable in the demand arising from the
circumstances and wants of the debtor.
Id. (citing DES OBLIGATIONS §§ 719, 721). After discussing the notions of the civil law on the
issue of books of account, Chief Justice Marshall turned to the English law, stating that under
the common law of England:
[B]ooks of account, or shop books, are not allowed, of themselves, to be given in
evidence for the owner; but a clerk, or servant, who made the original entries,
may have recourse to them to refresh his memory, as to other written
memoranda, made at the time of the transaction. So if the clerk or servant who
made the entries be dead, the books may be admitted in evidence, to show the
delivery of the articles, on producing proof of his hand-writing. But if the clerk
be living, though absent without the jurisdiction of the court, the entries are
inadmissible.
Id. at 118 (citations omitted). Chief Justice Marshall cited several English cases, including
Cooper v. Marsden, (1793) 170 Eng. Rep. 261, 1 Esp. (K.B.) 1. M'Coul, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at
118.
Finally, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that most of the United States, at that time, adhered
to the English rule of general inadmissibility of books of account, but pointed specifically to
those other states, including New York and Pennsylvania, where the rule had been changed
"by usage ... of the courts founded theron, or by positive statutes" to allow for greater usage
of such books. Id. By pointing to the rules of these states, as well as the rules of other foreign
nations, Chief Justice Marshall provided additional confirmation that the decision of the
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4. The Antelope
The fourth and final Marshall opinion we would like to discuss is
The Antelope,'26 a well-known 1825 case regarding the slave trade.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in this case demonstrated not only
the early Court's devotion to positive law over sentiment, 27 but also
its willingness to look at the views of the world beyond America's
borders. At issue in the case was whether a ship that had been
captured illegally importing slaves into the United States, the
Antelope, should be returned to its Spanish and Portuguese owners
along with the slaves it was carrying. 2 ' Chief Justice Marshall de-
livered the opinion of the Court,19 finding that, although slavery is
"contrary to the law of nature, '"'3 the slaves should be returned to
their "owners" based upon the belief that "positive law overruled the
natural law principle.''
In regard to the slave trade, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
the "Christian and civilized nations of the world, with whom we
have the most intercourse, have all been engaged in it.' 32 He noted
that it was "sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all nations
who possess distant colonies, each of whom has engaged in it as a
common commercial business which no other could rightfully inter-
rupt."'3 3 Chief Justice Marshall claimed that due to "long usage" and
Court to admit the account entry into evidence was not an erroneous or illogical conclusion.
Here again, we seem to have a plain reliance by Chief Justice Marshall on foreign sources of
law, albeit not a reliance with respect to a hotly contested moral or constitutional issue like
gay rights or the juvenile death penalty.
126. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
127. Justice Marshall stated early in the opinion that "this Court must not yield to feelings
which might seduce it from the path of duty, and must obey the mandate of the law." Id. at
114.
128. Id. at 114, 123-24.
129. Id. at 114. No dissent was written in The Antelope; Supreme Court historians believe,
however, that Justices Story, Thompson, and Duvall dissented from the Court's holding. See,
e.g., Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams and the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade:
The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 33 n.109 (2000).
130. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 120.
131. Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
191, 202 n.34 (2003).
132. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 114-15.
133. Id. at 115.
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"general acquiescence," the trade "could not be considered as con-
trary to the law of nations. 134
However, Chief Justice Marshall also noted the fact that when
the American states acquired the right of self-government most of
them forbade the traffic of slaves.135 He also spoke of British move-
ment in the early nineteenth century to abolish slavery, stating:
In the beginning of this century, several humane and enlight-
ened individuals of Great Britain devoted themselves to the
cause of the Africans; and, by frequent appeals to the nation, in
which the enormity of this commerce was unveiled, and exposed
to the public eye, the general sentiment was at length roused
against it, and the feelings of justice and humanity, regaining
their long lost ascendency, prevailed so far in the British parlia-
ment as to obtain an act for its abolition. The utmost efforts of
the British government, as well as of that of the United States,
have since been assiduously employed in its suppression. It has
been denounced by both in terms of great severity, and those
concerned in it are subjected to the heaviest penalties which law
can inflict. In addition to these measures operating on their own
people, they have used all their influence to bring other nations
into the same system, and to interdict this trade by the consent
of all.'3
Chief Justice Marshall continued by noting that public sentiment in
the United States and Britain had "kept pace with the measures of
the government" and that the opinion that the slave trade ought to
be suppressed was "extensively, if not universally entertained.' 37
Public opposition to the slave trade in Britain in 1825 was not un-
like public opposition to the juvenile death penalty in Western
Europe today. If the one is relevant, perhaps the other is as well.
Chief Justice Marshall also made considerable reference to sev-
eral post-1776 decisions from the British High Court of Admiralty.
First, he cited The Amedie"38-decided on March 17, 1810, thirty-
four years after American independence--in which Sir William
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 115-16.
137. Id. at 116.
138. (1810) 12 Eng. Rep. 92, 1 Acton 240 (P.C.).
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Grant found that, because Great Britain had prohibited the slave
trade, principles of universal law gave a claimant no right to claim
restitution in a prize court for human beings carried as slaves. 139
The Court next discussed The Diana,140 decided by Sir William
Scott on May 21, 1813,'141 thirty-seven years after American inde-
pendence, in which a Swedish vessel carrying slaves was captured
by a British cruiser but was ordered returned by the British court
"on the principle that the [slave] trade was allowed by the laws of
Sweden.' 4' And, the Court concluded its exposition of post-1776
foreign, English law by examining an 1817 British High Court of
Admiralty case, Le Louis,143 in which a French vessel was captured
on a slaving voyage prior to purchasing any slaves.144 In the opinion,
again written by Sir William Scott, the English court held that the
act of trading in slaves was not piracy, nor could it be pronounced
contrary to the law of nations. 4 1 Chief Justice Marshall quoted
directly from the opinion as follows:
A Court, in the administration of law, cannot attribute criminal-
ity to an act where the law imputes none. It must look to the
legal standard of morality; and, upon a question of this nature,
that standard must be found in the law of nations, as fixed and
evidenced by general, and ancient, and admitted practice, by
treaties, and by the general tenor of the laws and ordinances,
and the formal transactions of civilized states; and, looking to
139. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 116-17. According to Sir William Grant, the only
way that the claimant in The Amedie could receive restitution was if he could show that some
right was violated by the capture of his slaves, and, as he was unable to show that his country
allowed the property right that he claimed, he had no right of restitution. Id. at 117. Marshall
also cited The Fortuna, (1811) 165 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1 Dods. 81 (High Ct. Admlty), decided on
March 12, 1811 by Sir William Scott, as affirming the same principle as The Amedie. The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 117.
140. (1813) 165 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1 Dods. 95 (High Ct. Admlty).
141. Id.
142. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 117. Chief Justice Marshall stated that a common
principle of the British cases was that
the legality of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, depends on the
law of the country to which the vessel belongs. If that law gives its sanction to
the trade, restitution will be decreed; if that law prohibits it, the vessel and
cargo will be condemned as good prize.
Id. at 118.
143. (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 2 Dods. 210 (High Ct. Admlty).
144. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 118.
145. Id. at 118-19.
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those authorities, [he found] a difficulty in maintaining that the
transaction was legally criminal.146
Next, discussing the question of whether the slave trade was
prohibited by the law of nations, Chief Justice Marshall stated that,
although the trade is contrary to the law of nature, 147 slavery had
existed "from the earliest times" as the result of a right of war that
"the victor might enslave the vanquished.' 14' Thus, the slave trade
could not be prohibited by the law of nations because "[t]hat which
has received the assent of all, must be the law of all.1 49 Although,
according to the Chief Justice's statement that "[t]hroughout
Christendom, this harsh rule has been exploded," the transforma-
tion had not been universal. 0 Speaking of Africa, he stated that the
"parties to the modern law of nations do not propagate their princi-
ples by force; and Africa has not yet adopted them. Throughout
the whole extent of that immense continent, so far as we know its
history, it is still the law of nations that prisoners are slaves.''
Chief Justice Marshall then questioned whether citizens of the
United States could continue to participate in the slave trade. He
asked, "[c]an those who have themselves renounced this law, be
permitted to participate in its effects by purchasing the beings who
are its victims?"'152 In answering the question, he recognized that a
jurist must search for a legal solution, not a moral one, in "those
principles of action which are sanctioned by the usages, the national
acts, and the general assent, of that portion of the world of which he
146. Id. at 119 (quoting from Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. at 1477, 2 Dods. at 249-50).
Regarding the bracketed text: In the original case, Sir William Scott stated "I find," Le Louis,
165 Eng. Rep. at 1477,2 Dods. at 249, and Chief Justice Marshall quoted the language as "he
found." Chief Justice Marshall also noted that Sir William Scott stated in Le Louis that if a
French ship laden with slaves was brought in, he would "without hesitation," restore the
possession which was unlawfully divested. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 119 (quoting
from Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. at 1479). According to Sir William Scott, no evidence was shown
that the French had, as of the time of Le Louis, forbidden the slave trade. Id. at 120.
147. Id. Chief Justice Marshall explained that "every man has a natural right to the fruits
of his own labour." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 121.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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considers himself as a part, and to whose law the appeal is made."'53
Thus, considering international law, Marshall stated:
If we resort to this standard as the test of international law, the
question, as has already been observed, is decided in favour of
the legality of the trade. Both Europe and America embarked in
it; and for nearly two centuries, it was carried on without opposi-
tion, and without censure. A jurist could not say, that a practice
thus supported was illegal, and that those engaged in it might
be punished, either personally, or by deprivation of property.1 64
Chief Justice Marshall found that traffic in slaves remained lawful
to those whose governments had not forbidden it'55 and stated that
it followed that "a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade,
captured ... and brought in for adjudication, would be restored."1 56
Unlike the three prior Marshall opinions we discussed, The
Antelope does involve a hot-button moral issue-slavery-that is
akin to gay rights and the juvenile death penalty, and here we find
Chief Justice Marshall having waded into a thicket of references to
foreign sources of law to support his holding in the case-a case that
Justice Scalia might say was not one of Marshall's finest moments.
Maybe the lesson to be drawn from the citation of foreign sources of
law in The Antelope is that if one finds oneself heavily citing foreign
sources of law, as opposed to domestic ones, perhaps one ought to
entertain the possibility that one is mistaken. In any event,
Marshall's extensive reliance on foreign sources of law in The Ante-
lope may provide some support for Justice Kennedy's and Justice
O'Connor's reliance on those sources in Roper.'57  If so,
153. Id.
154. Id. at 121-22.
155. Id. at 122.
156. Id. at 123.
157. Another famous Marshall opinion that is based on foreign law is the 1823 case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). This case was the first instance in which
the Supreme Court addressed a federal Indian question, see Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The
United States Supreme Court and American Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
465, 465 (1999) (reviewing DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1998)), and is another example of Chief Justice
Marshall using foreign sources of law to justify and support a decision of the Court.
Johnson involved foundational questions of American property law and is thus relevant to
the meaning of the word "property" in the Fifth Amendment. It is thus arguably relevant to
a question of constitutional meaning. At issue in Johnson was whether private purchases of
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Indian lands from the chiefs of certain Indian tribes would be recognized in U.S. courts.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571-72. In ruling that the federal courts would not recognize
the validity of land titles obtained through such purchases, Chief Justice Marshall
emphasized the right of discovery, holding, essentially, that a European discovering sovereign
had an exclusive right to extinguish the Indians' title, if not their right of occupancy, in their
lands. Id. at 573-74. In support of the Court's holding, Chief Justice Marshall made
considerable use of the practices and legal philosophies of the European nations that first
discovered and settled on the American continent. See id. at 572-84. This use of foreign law
was of foreign law prior to 1776 when the United States became independent. It is thus a use
of foreign law to illuminate the original meaning of the Constitution and the rights the U.S.
government succeeded to. It is not like a reference to post-1776 foreign law to illuminate
constitutional meaning, as occurred in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
Chief Justice Marshall discussed the necessity of a development of a uniform principle of
ownership among the numerous European nations seeking territory in America and implied
that international law applied only within the realm of the European world, the so-called
"civilized" nations. Jonathan Shafter, Note, Original Intentions and International Reality:
States, Sovereignty, and the Misinterpretation of Alienage Jurisdiction in Matimak v. Khalily,
39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 729, 754 n.75 (2001). Marshall stated:
[I]t was necessary ... in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent
war with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as
the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be
regulated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and
establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could
interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion
of which, by others, all assented. Those relations which were to exist between
the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights
thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
The Chief Justice considered the conduct and reasoning of individual foreign nations in
Europe in their conquest of the American continent to support the notion that the principle
of a right of discovery had received "universal recognition." Id. at 574. First, Chief Justice
Marshall addressed Spain, stating that the nation "did not rest her title solely on the grant
of the Pope. Her discussions respecting boundary, with France, with Great Britain, and with
the United States, all show that she placed it on the rights given by discovery." Id. The Court
noted that Portugal also "sustained her claim to the Brazils by the same title." Id. The Court
then discussed the actions of France. Id. at 574-75.
Chief Justice Marshall also considered the law and practice of yet another foreign nation
that had made acquisitions in America, the States of Holland, who "sustained their right on
the common principle adopted by all Europe," id. at 575, that is, alleging that they acquired
title by virtue of its discovery by Henry Hudson, sailing under orders of the Dutch East India
Company, id. at 575-76. Marshall noted that the English had contested the claim, "not
because they questioned the title given by discovery, but because they insisted on being
themselves the rightful claimants under that title." Id. at 576.
At this juncture, the Court addressed the adoption of the principle of the right of discovery
by England, id., which is the only European nation whose early legal practices were in any
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foreign law has been used to protect both slavery and sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old murderers-something many would say is
hardly a cause for celebration.
D. Opinions of Justice Story
Justice Story also wrote noteworthy majority opinions that re-
ferred to foreign sources of law and wrote the previously discussed
dissent in Brown v. United States.'58 As we have shown, Justice
Story was quite fond of and knowledgeable about the civil law, as
well as of the writings and opinions of foreign jurists and scholars.159
It is thus not at all surprising that these sources quite naturally
found their way in to some of his opinions. In addition to serving on
the Supreme Court, Justice Story was also a highly esteemed aca-
demic, with a simultaneous appointment as a professor at Harvard
Law School.60 His lengthy discussions of foreign law in his opinions
thus read much like a scholarly work or academic lecture, and even
include citations to the foreign sources in their original language,
without provision of an English translation.
way originally adopted as American legal precedent after the formation of the new nation.
Chief Justice Marshall stated that none "of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to [the
principle of the right of discovery] more unequivocally than England." Id. at 576. Only after
a very lengthy discussion of the English recognition of this principle and of the struggles
among the European nations, most prominently England, regarding claim to American lands,
id. at 576-84, did the Court finally address whether the "American States [had] rejected or
adopted this principle." Id. at 584. Chief Justice Marshall found that our nation had acted in
such a manner as to "recognise and elucidate the principle which has been received as the
foundation of all European title in America." Id. at 587. Marshall concluded:
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad
rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and
assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all
others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest ....
Id. (emphasis added).
Once again, we find Chief Justice Marshall looking to foreign sources of law for
guidance-this time on a foundational issue of American property law. Defining the scope of
property rights pre-1776 in the U.S. is critical to understanding the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process and Takings Clauses. Johnson v. M'Intosh is thus ultimately of
constitutional dimensions.
158. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 114-24.
160. See Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189,2190 (2001) (explaining that Story
"moonlighted" as a Harvard law professor during his time on the Court).
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1. United States v. Smith
The 1820 case of United States v. Smith, 6' which involved the
Offenses Clause of the Constitution, provides the current Supreme
Court with a precedent for citing foreign sources of law in criminal
law cases with constitutional law underpinnings.162 Smith also con-
tains a disagreement between Justice Story, in his majority opinion,
and Justice Livingston, in dissent, over the propriety of references
to foreign sources of law.'63 This exchange shows that the debate
between Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Lawrence and in Roper is
far from new.
Smith concerned an 1819 federal statute that provided that
if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, upon the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and
such offender or offenders shall be brought into, or found in the
United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon con-
viction ... be punished with death."
Specifically, the Smith case involved some American citizens who
had captured and robbed a Spanish ship and, upon their own cap-
ture, were tried in U.S. courts for the crime of piracy.'65 The key
question presented when the case reached the Supreme Court was
whether the statutory outlawing of piracy, as defined by the law of
nations, was a sufficiently precise definition of the crime of piracy,'66
which was punishable by death.' 7 Lurking in the background of this
case is therefore a constitutional question about the adequacy of the
notice that defendants received that their conduct was unlawful.
Thus the issue the Court was addressing was not simply how the
law of nations defined piracy, but whether definition of a crime by
reference rather than explicit provision was certain enough to pass
constitutional muster. 68 Counsel for the alleged pirates argued that
161. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
162. See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
164. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 157.
165. Id. at 154.
166. Id. at 160.
167. Id. at 154 n.a.
168. The Court considered "whether the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations
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Congress was obliged to define piracy in more definite terms than
simple reference to so vague a concept as the law of nations."9 He
claimed it was unconstitutional simply to leave the definition of
piracy to be ascertained by judicial interpretation of the law of na-
tions. 171 Counsel further argued that, as the "writers on public law
do not define the crime of piracy with precision and certainty," it
was necessary for Congress to define, "in terms," the crime before
proceeding to punish it.'
7
'
In resolving the case, the majority and dissenting opinions in
Smith made it clear that, by 1820, debate regarding judicial and
congressional reference to foreign sources of law was not a new
phenomenon. Writing for the majority, Justice Story found the law's
reference to the law of nations for a definition of the crime of piracy
to be sufficiently definite to be acceptable' 72 and the argument that
Congress was bound to define in terms the offense "too narrow a
view of the language of the constitution."'73 The Court in Smith then
turned to foreign sources of law to uphold the congressional statute
that otherwise might have been found unconstitutional. Justice
Story wrote that the law of nations on the subject of piracy "may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by
judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law."'74 Justice
Story claimed that "[t] here is scarcely a writer on the law of nations,
who does not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determi-
nate nature; and whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in
with reasonable certainty." Id. at 160. As one author has pointed out:
Early 19th-century jurisprudence had accepted the principle that crimes had to
be statutorily defined and their elements set forth with precision, yet Congress
had felt free to define piracy by reference to "the law of nations," with no further
particularization. Congress seemed to have assumed that even though a
domestic crime would be unpunishable if the perpetrator's offense had not been
precisely defined, a crime on the high seas could be "defined by the law of
nations." Story endorsed this view in Smith.
G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 727, 733 (1989).
169. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 156-57 (describing counsel's arguments).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 157.
172. Id. at 162.
173. Id. at 158.
174. Id. at 160-61.
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other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or forc-
ible depredations upon the sea ... is piracy."'175 Justice Story then
included a lengthy footnote with citations to foreign jurists and
scholars and international practice that he "believed to be sufficient"
to show that "piracy is defined by the law of nations."'76 In this foot-
note, Justice Story spent several pages surveying the views of a
variety of foreign legal scholars and jurists.177 He quoted extensively
from Grotius, entirely in Latin with no English translation provided.
He found passages that showed Grotius's opinion was that "piracy
by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law"
and that, while Grotius did not explicitly define the crime, there was
"no doubt" that in his view pirates were "robbers or plunderers on
the sea.' 78 Justice Story also reflected on "the definitions of the civil
law and maritime writers.'1 79 He addressed the views of Calvinus,'°
M. Bonnemant,' l8 Valin, Straccha, Casaregis, Dr. Brown, Beawes,
Molloy, Lord Coke, Sir Leoline Jenkins, and Targa,"' among others,
supporting the proposition that piracy involves, in essence, "robbery
upon the sea."'8 3 In conclusion, Justice Story stated that the collec-
175. Id. at 161.
176. Id. at 163 n.a.
177. Id. at 163-80.
178. Id. at 166.
179. Id. at 170.
180. Id. at 171 (citing Calvinus's work LEXICON JURIDICUM).
181. Id. at 172 (citing CHAVALIER D'ABREU, TRAITE' JURIDICE-POLITIQUE SURLES PRIZES
MARITIMES (Bonnemant trans., 1802)).
182. Id. at 173-75.
183. Id. at 173. Justice Story stated that "Comyn's (Dig. Admiralty, E. 3.) defines piracy
thus: 'Piracy is when a man commits robbery upon the sea."' Id. Justice Story then stated that
"[c]itations from civilians and maritime writers to the same effect might be multiplied; but
they would unnecessarily swell this note." Id. at 176. Justice Story wrote that all that
remained was to "notice the doctrines which have been held by the tribunals of Great Britain,
and asserted by her common law writers on the subject of piracy." Id. In doing so, Justice
Story recognized that at common law piracy was not a felony but rather was "only punishable
by the civil law" and noted the writings of Hawkins and Blackstone. Id. He also made note
of the state trials for piracy in Britain during the reign of King William III when it was stated
that "piracy is only a sea term for robbery." Id. at 177 (citing Rex v. Dawson, 8 William III.
1696, reprinted in 13 State Trials 451 (1742)). Finally, Justice Story referred to Erskine's
Institutes of the Law of Scotland (Scotland being at least in part a civil law jurisdiction), in
which the author stated that "piracy is that particular kind of robbery which is committed on
the seas." Id. at 180 (quoting JOHN ERSKINE, AM. INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, bk. 9,
tit. 4965).
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tion of doctrines confirmed the opinion of the Court and provided
the reader with an aid to his future research.' 4
Justice Livingston, in dissent, disagreed with the proposition that
the law of nations could provide a sufficiently precise definition of
piracy to allow the statute to pass constitutional review in a capital
case."8 5 He argued that the Framers of the Constitution, in giving
Congress the power to define and punish piracies in the Offenses
Clause, must have intended for Congress to provide a more con-
crete definition of piracy and to remedy the uncertainty that existed
in the law of nations.'86 Justice Livingston maintained that it was
Congress's duty to incorporate definitions of important terms, such
as piracy, into its statutes.8 7 He also took issue with the majority's
use of foreign law to establish the parameters of a criminal offense
and its references to foreign authors to ascertain the meaning of the
law of nations. Justice Livingston wrote:
Although it cannot be denied that some writers on the law of
nations do declare what acts are deemed piratical, yet it is cer-
tain, that they do not all agree; and if they did, it would seem
unreasonable to impose upon that class of men, who are the
most liable to commit offences of this description, the task of
looking beyond the written law of their own country for a defini-
tion of them. If in criminal cases every thing is sufficiently cer-
tain, which by reference may be rendered so, which was an argu-
ment used at bar, it is not perceived why a reference to the laws
of China, or to any other foreign code, would not have answered
the purpose quite as well as the one which has been resorted to.
It is not certain, that on examination, the crime would not be
found to be more accurately defined in the code thus referred to,
than in any writer on the law of nations; but the objection to the
reference in both cases is the same; that it is the duty of Con-
184. Justice Story wrote that the "foregoing collection of doctrines, extracted from writers
on the civil law, the law of nations, the maritime law, and the common law, in the most ample
manner confirms the opinion of the Court in the case in the text." Id. at 180. The doctrines
were also "submitted to the learned reader to aid his future researches in a path, which,
fortunately for us, it has not been hitherto necessary to explore with minute accuracy." Id.
185. Id. at 164-83 (Livingston, J., dissenting). His dissent in Smith was one of the only
eight dissents Justice Livingston recorded in his seventeen-year tenure on the Court. White,
supra note 168, at 734.
186. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 166-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 182.
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gress to incorporate into their own statutes a definition in terms,
and not to refer the citizens of the United States for rules of
conduct to the statutes or laws of any foreign country, with
which it is not to be presumed that they are acquainted."s
Justice Livingston's debate with Justice Story in Smith thus
seems to foreshadow Justice Scalia's debate with Justice Kennedy
in Roper v. Simmons. Both Smith and Roper involved the criminal
law and capital punishment. In both cases, the majority exten-
sively refers to foreign sources of law. And, in both cases, the dissent
complains that those references to foreign sources of law are illegiti-
mate. The biggest difference between the two cases may be that the
first was decided by Justice Story in 1820 and the second by the
Court in 2005. It is, of course, theoretically possible that the
Offenses Clause authorizes the Supreme Court to rely on foreign
law, while the Eighth Amendment does not. But, no one has ever
shown that. Originalists who reject reliance on foreign law ought to
show why such reliance is allowed in cases like Charming Betsy and
Smith but not in Eighth Amendment cases.
2. Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby
Justice Story also spent considerable time reviewing and address-
ing foreign jurisprudence on the admiralty law question of the law
of general average"' in Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v.
Ashby.'9 ° Once again, it is theoretically possible that the original
meaning of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III includes
a power to rely on foreign law while the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment does not. But no one has shown this. Thus, this
case is arguably precedent for Roper.
188. Id. at 181-82 (first emphasis added).
189. General average is defined as an "[a]verage resulting from an intentional partial
sacrifice of ship or cargo to avoid total loss." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (8th ed. 2004).
Liability arising from the sacrifice "is shared by all parties who had an interest in the voyage."
Id. at 145-46.
190. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331 (1839). Justice Gray, in the 1895 case of Ralli v. Troop, cited this
case as stating "the leading limitations and conditions, as recognized by all maritime nations,
to justify a general contribution." 157 U.S. 386, 394 (1895). In Ralli, the Court stated that the
law of general average came down from "remote antiquity" and "derived from the law of
Rhodes, through the law of Rome." Id. at 393.
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The question before the Court in Ashby was "whether the volun-
tary stranding of a ship in a case of imminent peril, for the preser-
vation of the crew, the ship, and cargo, followed by a total loss of the
ship, constitutes a general average, for which the property saved is
bound to contribution."'' Justice Story found that the "maritime
jurists of continental Europe" were not in agreement upon the an-
swer, and that American admiralty case law reached "conflicting
adjudications."'92 Thus, Justice Story wrote, it was the duty of the
Court to examine and weigh the opposing opinions on the issue,
including those of foreign nations, to determine the "true principle
which ought to govern us on the present occasion."'93 Foreign law
therefore provided Justice Story with guidance in ascertaining the
appropriate manner in which to resolve the conflict in American
jurisprudence and in settling on the appropriate rules for deciding
the case.
Justice Story began his review of the commentary and opinions
upon the issue by discussing the origin of the rule as to general
average, stating that it was "derived to us from the Rhodian law, as
promulgated and adopted in the Roman jurisprudence."'94 Justice
Story examined the Roman law on the issue and concluded that
the Roman law does not proceed upon any distinction as to the
property sacrificed, whether it be ship or cargo, a part or the
whole; but solely upon the ground that the sacrifice is voluntary,
to avert an imminent peril; and that it is in the event successful
by accomplishing that purpose. 195
Regarding his discussion of Roman law, Justice Story wrote that
such
remarks seem proper to be made in order to meet the sugges-
tions thrown out at the argument, with reference to the actual
bearings of the Roman law on the question before the Court; and
191. Ashby, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 337.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 337-38.
195. Id. at 339.
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they may also serve in some measure to explain the true princi-
ples by which the question ought to be decided.
196
Justice Story next addressed the opinions of foreign jurists, includ-
ing those of the leading French authority on commercial law,
Emerigon. Justice Story's analysis of the foreign jurists found "far
less disagreement among them than ha[d] been generally supposed,"
and that all of them "admit that a voluntary stranding of a ship
constitutes a case of general average, if there is not a total loss of
the ship.' 97 Justice Story reviewed Emerigon's statement of the
doctrine, even remarking that Emerigon's passage on general aver-
age cited a French ordinance, and noting his disagreement with
some of Emerigon's views.' Justice Story stated his disagreement
with Emerigon's opinion that for a general average to apply the ship
must "be again set afloat":99
Surely the question of contribution cannot depend upon the
amount of the damage sustained by the sacrifice; for that would
be to say, that if a man lost all his property for the common ben-
efit, he should receive nothing; but if he lost a part only he
should receive full compensation. No such principle is applied to
the total loss of goods sacrificed for the common safety: why then
should it be applied to the total loss of the ship for the like pur-
pose?"°
After voicing this disagreement with Emerigon, Justice Story then
concluded that "Emerigon stands alone among the foreign jurists,
in maintaining the qualification that it is necessary to a general
average that the ship should be got afloat again after a voluntary
stranding."' ' He found that Valin's writings would not support such
a conclusion, nor would the Consolato del Mare, "one of the earliest
and most venerable collections of maritime law."20 2 Justice Story
found further support against Emerigon's view in the Roman law,
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 339-40.
201. Id. at 340.
202. Id. at 340-41.
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"where it is said, without referring to the manner and extent of the
damage, that the whole damage voluntarily done to the ship for the
common good, must be borne by a common contribution.""° After
further analysis of leading foreign jurists on the issue, including an
opinion by some Amsterdam maritime judges, °4 Justice Story con-
cluded that, based on the Court's review of "some of the leading
opinions in foreign jurisprudence, brief and imperfect as it is, it
seems to us that the weight of the authority is decidedly in favour
of the present claim for general average.""2 '
Only after this detailed analysis of foreign law and scholarship
did Justice Story turn to the "domestic authorities" that had already
addressed the same issue, albeit reaching conflicting conclusions."'
First, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of New York had
held in a similar case that a general average does not exist where a
ship is totally lost after being voluntarily run ashore.0 7 Although
the Supreme Court of New York grounded its opinion in its own
exposition of Rhodian and Roman law and the authority of foreign
jurists, Justice Story disagreed with its conclusion as to the "true
interpretation of the Roman text, and of the continental jurists.""20
Justice Story then discussed other American courts that had
reached conclusions opposite to those of the Supreme Court of New
York, including an opinion by Justice Washington in Caze v.
Reilly,2"9 which included the "most extensive research into foreign
jurisprudence," and an opinion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia.210 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court then reached its
final conclusion on the issue of general average, stating:
We have examined the reasoning in these opinions, and are
bound to say that it has our unqualified assent: and we follow
203. Id. at 341.
204. The opinion of the Amsterdam judges arises from Bynkershoek's treatment of the
issue. Id.
205. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Id. (referring to Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)).
208. Id. at 342-43. The Court stated that it was not "satisfied that the doctrine of the
Supreme Court of New York can be maintained; for the general principle certainly is, that
whatever is sacrificed voluntarily for the common good, is to be recompensed by the common
contribution of the property benefited thereby." Id. at 343.
209. 5 F. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 2538).
210. Ashby, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 343.
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without hesitation the doctrine, as well founded in authority and
supported by principle, that a voluntary stranding of the ship,
followed by a total loss of the ship, but with a saving of the
cargo, constitute when designed for the common safety a clear
case of general average.21'
This case, then, along with the Smith case and Justice Story's dis-
sent in Brown, clearly shows that Justice Story was willing in some
cases to cite foreign sources of law at some length.212 Admittedly, the
Ashby case involved issues of admiralty law where the Supreme
Court arguably has more of a free hand in devising rules than it
does in Eighth Amendment U.S. constitutional cases; however,
Justice Story's references still show the willingness of the early
Court to look extensively at foreign sources of law. Ashby also sug-
gests that, where the Court is concerned with adopting a rule of
reasonableness-as in admiralty law-the early Court thought ref-
erences to foreign law to be perfectly appropriate. This may be
relevant to Fourth and Eighth Amendment cases where the
Constitution speaks directly of reasonableness and of what is un-
usual.
E. Opinion of Justice Johnson
Lest it be thought that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story
were the only members of the early Court to rely on foreign law in
their opinions, one should also consider the case of The Rapid, in
which Justice Johnson referred to foreign law in reaching a decision
on an issue of prize law.
1. The Rapid
The Rapid,21 a case involving the law of prize, a category of the
law of nations, is often noted for its focus on the distinction between
reason and sentiment in legal analysis.214 However, the case is also
211. Id.
212. Justice Story also made considerable use of foreign sources of law in his circuit opinion
in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie. 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
213. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814).
214. The Rapid is often cited for the Court's statement that "it is the unenvied province of
this Court to be directed by the head, and not the heart. In deciding upon principles that must
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one in which the Court looked to sources of law and practice beyond
those established by American law. Justice Johnson was faced with
deciding whether an American ship that had purchased goods in
England before the United States declared war on England during
the War of 1812, but had brought them back to the United States
after the declaration of war, had violated a prohibition against trad-
ing with the enemy and was thus subject to capture. 215 Addressing
the rights of war against the property of a citizen, the Court consid-
ered the relationship between citizens of warring nations, and the
ban on intercourse between the two, finding that the "individuals
who compose the belligerent states, exist, as to each other, in a state
of utter occlusion. If they meet, it is only in combat., 216 The Court
stated that "[o]n this point there is really no difference of opinion
among jurists: there can be none among those who will distinguish
between what it is in itself, and what it ought to be under the influ-
ence of a benign morality and the modern practice of civilized na-
tions.
' 2 11
The Court then considered the consequence of a citizen's breach
of the duty to "acknowledge every individual of the other nation as
his own enemy" and to refrain from commercial dealings with such
individuals. 2"8 The Court found that the property of a citizen ac-
quired through such trade was subject to condemnation as a prize
of war, and provided additional support for its conclusion as follows:
This liability of the property of a citizen to condemnation as
prize of war, may be likewise accounted for under other consider-
ations. Every thing that issues from a hostile country is, prima
facie, the property of the enemy; and it is incumbent upon the
claimant to support the negative of the proposition. But if the
claimant be a citizen or an ally at the same time that he makes
out his interest, he confesses the commission of an offence
which, under a well known rule of the civil law, deprives him of
define the rights and duties of the citizen and direct the future decisions of justice, no latitude
is left for the exercise of feeling." Id. at 164. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment:
The Moral Worlds and Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1179
(1999) (reviewing PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1997)).
215. The Rapid 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 159-60.
216. Id. at 160-61.
217. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 161-63.
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his right to prosecute his claim. This doctrine, however, does not
rest upon abstract reason. It is supported by the practice of the
most enlightened (perhaps we may say of all) commercial na-
tions.
211
After stating the support of "the most enlightened ... commercial
nations" for the proposition that condemnation was acceptable un-
der the law of prize, the Court then confirmed that this was the 'law
of England before the revolution, and therefore constitutes a part of
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred on this Court in
pursuance of the constitution.""22 The case of The Rapid, therefore,
includes a briefer reference to the civil law and the law of nations
than Justice Story was prone to make, but it does-in fact refer to
both of those foreign sources of law. 221 Again, it is theoretically pos-
sible that the Framers meant for the Court to refer to foreign law in
admiralty or law of nations cases and not in Eighth Amendment
cases. Again, if so, no one on either side of the debate in Roper has
shown that this is the case.
We thus conclude that in the first fifty years of Supreme
Court history there were references to foreign sources of law by
three Justices-Marshall, Story, and Johnson. Justice Bushrod
Washington, George Washington's nephew, referred to foreign
sources of law in a circuit court opinion, as well.222 Justice Breyer,
and other supporters of the Court's reliance on foreign sources of
law, might cite these cases to support their position, pointing to
them as evidence that the early Court referred to foreign sources of
law in its opinions. Certainly, the cases citing foreign law from this
219. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. Other cases from this era that should be considered include Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 133, 159-60 (1795) (Iredell, J., concurring) (stating that "all piracies and trespasses
committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against,
in any nation") and Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 434, 437 (1808) (discussing the
English rule on an issue and stating that
[i]t is a well established rule in England, that the judgment, sentence, or decree
of a court of exclusive jurisdiction directly upon the point, may be given in
evidence as conclusive between the same parties, upon the same matter coming
incidentally in question in another court for a different purpose. It is not only
conclusive of the right which it establishes, but of the fact which it directly
decides).
222. Crawford v. William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 781, 783-84 (C.C.D. N.J. 1819) (No. 3373) (citing
European cases discussing the law of nations).
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time period pose a problem for those who claim that the use of such
sources by the Court is "unprecedented" and that foreign sources
should never be referred to by federal courts.
II. CASES INCLUDING FOREIGN LEGAL REFERENCES IN THE YEARS
BETWEEN 1840 AND 1890
Supreme Court opinions referring to foreign law in the fifty years
between 1840 and 1890 come from a rather eclectic mix of cases that
includes some of the most controversial cases the Court has ever
decided. Those who favor Supreme Court reliance on foreign law
might cite for support a trilogy of cases decided in the 1880s, the
Head Money Cases,223 Whitney v. Robertson,224 and the Chinese Ex-
clusion Case,225 which "established that treaties are on equal footing
with federal statutes and that, where a treaty and statute cannot be
reconciled, the later in time is controlling." '226 Of greater relevance
to the debate, however, are two Supreme Court cases involving im-
portant and contentious social issues in American constitutional
law: Dred Scott v. Sandford227 and Reynolds v. United States.22 It
was also during this time period that Justice Matthews famously
wrote, in a constitutional case, that "as it was the characteristic
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every foun-
tain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply
have been exhausted."'229 This statement has since been invoked
by some writers to support the argument that the United States
Supreme Court can and should consider foreign law in reaching its
decisions.23 °
223. 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
224. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
225. 130 U.S. 581, 600, 602-03 (1889).
226. Blackmun, supra note 60, at 40.
227. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
228. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
229. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
230. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 22, at 424-25 (using this statement to illustrate his
argument that international sources can be useful as a "source of good ideas").
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A. Social Issue Cases
Little introduction is necessary for two very familiar social issue
cases decided in this era, Dred Scott v. Sandford and Reynolds v.
United States. Though the holdings and significance of these cases
are well known to most lawyers, the significance of the citation of
foreign law in these opinions has not, as of yet, been as well recog-
nized. The Court's opinion in Reynolds makes substantial reference
to foreign legal case law and opinion,"' and several concurring and
dissenting opinions in Dred Scott extensively consider foreign law.232
Of course, anyone who argues that it is legitimate for the Supreme
Court to consider foreign law in constitutional cases because four of
the concurring Justices did so in Dred Scott must prepare to meet
with derisive laughter.233
Some believe the Reynolds case was also wrongly decided.234 We
suspect Justice Scalia would say that the citation of foreign law by
the concurring Justices in Dred Scott and the Court in Reynolds
proves the point that the Court refers to such sources when it is, in
fact, making policy instead of doing what it ought to do, which is to
interpret the original meaning of the Constitution. We thus believe
Justice Scalia might well look to references to foreign law in the
Justices' opinions in these cases, and say they prove exactly how
dangerous the use of foreign sources of law in constitutional inter-
pretation can be.
231. See infra Part II.A.2.
232. See infra Part II.A.1.
233. See Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271-72 (1997) (discussing the voluminous
criticism of the Dred Scott opinion, including statements that the decision was the "worst ever
rendered by the Supreme Court" and "the worst atrocity in the Supreme Court's history"
(citations omitted)).
234. See Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 822-
26 (1958) (stating that the "Reynolds case is wrong"); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of
the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are
Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 710 (2001) (stating
that Reynolds "demonstrates the degree to which even the Supreme Court was in the grip of
anti-Mormon hysteria and was willing to ignore constitutional concepts of fundamental
fairness in trials against Mormons").
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1. Dred Scott v. Sandford
In the famous 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,235 the Supreme
Court held that Dred Scott, a slave of African descent, was not a
citizen of Missouri and thus the Court did not have diversity juris-
diction over his complaint, which asserted the "title of himself and
his family to freedom." '236 Despite the brevity of the Court's actual
holding, the opinions of the Court go on at great length, spanning
well over two hundred pages in the U.S. Reports.237 In addition to its
great length, the case is also quite significant because six of the nine
Justices, four joining concurring opinions and the two in dissent,
make considerable reference to foreign law, including citing foreign
scholars, Roman law, post-1776 English decisions, and the law of
Europe.238
It must be noted at the outset that the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Taney in Dred Scott explicitly rejected the consideration of
foreign law on the issues of constitutional construction that were
before the Court. Chief Justice Taney wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion
or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized
nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to
give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction
in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instru-
ment was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be alto-
gether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If
any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode pre-
scribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but
while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was
understood at the time of its adoption.239
235. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
236. Id. at 400.
237. Id. at 393-633. The opinion of Justice Taney begins on page 399 and the final
dissenting opinion, that of Justice Curtis, does not end until page 633. See id.
238. Id. passim. Chief Justice Taney briefly pointed to international sources of law in the
1860 case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 99-100 (1860). Regarding asylum for
fugitives of political offenses, Taney noted that the policy of different nations, with respect to
exceptions for political fugitives, was collected along "with the opinions of eminent writers
upon public law" in Wheaton on the Law of Nations. Id. Chief Justice Taney also noted the
practice of the English Government. Id. at 100.
239. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426.
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Despite this statement disapproving consideration of foreign public
opinion in Taney's opinion, six justices wrote or joined opinions in
Dred Scott that referred to foreign law. In fact, three Justices re-
ferred to foreign law in the separate concurrences and a fourth
Justice joined one of those concurrences. For example, Justice
Nelson, in a separate concurrence in Dred Scott, referred to the
doctrine of Huberus, because the plaintiffs counsel had cited the
doctrine as having some bearing on the issue before the Court.24 °
However, Justice Nelson then said that the doctrine of Huberus had
no real impact on the issue at hand and noted that Huberus's views
regarding the law of one's domicile accompanying him wherever he
might go had neither been entirely admitted to in the practice of
nations, nor been "sanctioned by the most approved jurists of inter-
national law. 24'
Justice Nelson, along with several other members of the Court,
also discussed at length the 1827 English case of Ex parte Grace,242
a case also referred to as The Slave, Grace.2 41 In Grace, an opinion
written by Lord Stowell of the British High Court of Admiralty on
November 6, 1827, fifty-one years after American independence, the
English court was faced with the question of whether "slavery was
so divested by landing in England that it would not revive on a
return to the place of birth and servitude.2 44 The High Court of
Admiralty found that, although no dominion could be exercised over
the slave while in England because that nation had abolished slav-
ery, the right to exercise such dominion was revived upon return to
the place of the slave's original birth and servitude.245 Justice Nel-
son stated that
the case before Lord Stowell presented much stronger features
for giving effect to the law of England in the case of the slave
Grace than exists in the cases that have arisen in this country
.... Yet, on the return of the slave to the colony, from a temporary
240. Id. at 461-62. (Nelson, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 462.
242. Id. passim.
243. (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 2 Hagg. 94 (High Ct. AdmIty).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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residence in England, he held that the original condition of the
slave attached. 6
Justice Nelson's concurring opinion also quoted from correspondence
between Lord Stowell and Justice Story regarding Lord Stowell's
decision in The Slave, Grace. Justice Nelson included the following
exchange in his opinion:
Lord Stowell, in communicating his opinion in the case of the
slave Grace to Judge Story, states, in his letter, what the ques-
tion was before him, namely: 'Whether the emancipation of a
slave brought to England insured a complete emancipation to
him on his return to his own country, or whether it only oper-
ated as a suspension of slavery in England, and his original
character devolved on him again upon his return." He observed,
"the question had never been examined since an end was put to
slavery fifty years ago," having reference to the decision of Lord
Mansfield in the case of Somersett; but the practice, he observed,
"has regularly been, that on his return to his own country, the
slave resumed his original character of slave." And so Lord
Stowell held in the case.247
Justice Story, in his letter in reply, observes:
"I have read with great attention your judgment in the slave
case.... Upon the fullest consideration which I have been able to
give the subject, I entirely concur in your views. If I had been
called upon to pronounce a judgment in a like case, I should
have certainly arrived at the same result." Again he observes:
"In my native State, (Massachusetts,) the state of slavery is not
recognised as legal; and yet, if a slave should come hither, and
afterwards return to his own home, we should certainly think
that the local law attached upon him, and that his servile char-
acter would be redintegrated." '24 8
Justice Daniel discussed the case of The Slave, Grace in his sepa-
rate concurrence as well.24 9 Justice Daniel also considered the views
246. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 468.
247. Id. at 467.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 486 (Daniel, J., concurring).
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of the international community when he addressed the opinions of
the nations of Europe, stating that there are certain
truths which a knowledge of the history of the world .. compels
us to know-that the African negro race never have been ac-
knowledged as belonging to the family of nations; that as
amongst them there never has been known or recognised by the
inhabitants of other countries anything partaking of the charac-
ter of nationality, or civil or political polity; that this race has
been by all the nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture
or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic; and that the
introduction of that race into every section of this country was
not as members of civil or political society, but as slaves, as
property in the strictest sense of the term.25°
Justice Daniel then embarked on an extensive discussion of the
views of Vattel, a Swiss jurist and writer on the law of nations. 1 He
quoted at length from the works of Vattel, including several para-
graphs with statements from the author, such as the following:
By this same writer [Vattel] it is also said: "The citizens are the
members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain
duties, and subject to its authority; they equally participate in
its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those
born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society can-
not perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citi-
zens, those children naturally follow the condition of their par-
ents, and succeed to all their rights."'252
Justice Daniel stated that it must follow that "with the slave, with
one devoid of rights or capacities, civil or political, there could be no
pact; that one thus situated could be no party to, or actor in, the
association of those possessing free will, power, discretion." '253
250. Id. at 475 (first two emphases added).
251. See Shen, supra note 109.
252. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 476-77. Justice Daniel referred to Vattel repeatedly
throughout his opinion. He also considered a work by Chancellor Kent that collated "the
opinions of Grotius, Heineccius, Vattel, and Rutherford" and set forth the positions of "these
and other learned publicists." Id. at 484.
253. Id. at 477 (emphasis omitted).
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Justice Daniel also devoted a significant portion of his
opinion-more than two pages-to a discussion of the Roman law on
the issue of slavery.254 He considered the Roman law because he
analogized the institution of slavery, as it existed in the United
States, to the practice as it existed in ancient Rome, finding that the
American form of slavery had "a closer resemblance to Roman slav-
ery than it [did] to the condition of villanage, as it formerly existed
in England." '255 Justice Daniel argued that under Roman law eman-
cipation of a former slave did not confer the status of citizenship
upon him, rather he took on the status of the "lower grades of native
domestic residents," '256 known in Rome as "freedmen." '257 As author-
ity for his discussion of Roman law, Justice Daniel cited Edward
Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.25 He also stated
that his account of Roman slavery was in "strictest conformity with
the Institutes of Justinian" and quoted several passages of the
Institutes.259
Justice Campbell, also writing in concurrence, wrote of European
public law, stating that it "formerly permitted a master to reclaim
his bondsman, within a limited period, wherever he could find
him. ' 26" He also stated that one of the ordinances of Charlemagne
established the following:
[W]heresoever, within the bounds of Italy, either the runaway
slave of the king, or of the church, or of any other man, shall be
found by his master, he shall be restored without any bar or
prescription of years; yet upon the provision that the master be
a Frank or German, or of any other nation (foreign;) but if he be
a Lombard or a Roman, he shall acquire or receive his slaves by
254. Id. at 477-80.
255. Id. at 478 (emphasis omitted). Regarding villanage, Justice Daniel stated that there
"were peculiarities, from custom or positive regulation, which varied it materially from the
slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any time period within the United States." Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 478-79. Justice Daniel also noted that it was only in the decline of the Roman
Empire that the rights of citizenship were extended, resulting in the gradual abolition of "the
proud distinctions of the republic." Id. at 478.
258. Id. at 479 n.* (citing 3 EDWARD GIBBON, HIsTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE ch. 44, at 183 (1825)).
259. Id. at 479.
260. Id. at 495 (Campbell, J., concurring).
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that law which has been established from ancient times among
them.26'
Justice Campbell did add that, "[w]ithout referring for precedents
abroad, or to the colonial history, for similar instances, the history
of the Confederation and Union affords evidence to attest the exis-
tence of this ancient law," and proceeded to examine early American
practices.262
Justice Campbell also referred to the work of sixteenth-century
jurist Bodin regarding the French law on the subject of slavery. He
quoted Bodin as follows:
In France, although there be some remembrance of old servi-
tude, yet it is not lawful here to make a slave or to buy any
one of others, insomuch as the slaves of strangers, so soon as
they set their foot within France, become frank and free, as was
determined by an old decree of the court of Paris against an
ambassador of Spain, who had brought a slave with him into
France."3
Justice Campbell further reviewed the writings of Bodin regarding
the French cases establishing the freedom of slaves upon arriving
in the French city of Toulouse; he even included a direct quotation
in Latin from the ordinance of Toulouse.264 However, Justice
Campbell then qualified these decisions by saying that they were
"made upon special ordinances, or charters, which contained posi-
tive prohibitions on slavery, and where liberty had been granted as
a privilege. 265 In addition, he stated that "the history of Paris fur-
nishes but little support for the boast that she was a 'sacro sancta
civitas,' where liberty always had an asylum.2 66
The two dissenting Justices in Dred Scott relied heavily upon
foreign sources of law, a fact Justice Breyer might want to cite.
261. Id. at 495-96.
262. Id. at 496.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 497.
265. Id.
266. Id. Finally, Justice Campbell joined the several other Justices who discussed the
English case of The Slave, Grace. He found the case to be of value in reaching a decision in
Dred Scott, as he saw no "distinguishable difference between the case before [the Court] and
that determined in the admiralty of Great Britain." Id. at 500.
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Justice McLean referred to the civil law of Europe and Roman law
regarding the issue of the locality of slavery:
The civil law throughout the Continent of Europe, it is believed,
without an exception, is, that slavery can exist only within the
territory where it is established; and that, if a slave escapes, or
is carried beyond such territory, his master cannot reclaim him,
unless by virtue of some express stipulation. There is no nation
in Europe which considers itself bound to return to his master
a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations. On the
contrary, the slave is held to be free where there is no treaty
obligation, or compact in some other form, to return him to his
master. The Roman law did not allow freedom to be sold. An
ambassador or any other public functionary could not take a
slave to France, Spain, or any other country of Europe, without
emancipating him. A number of slaves escaped from a Florida
plantation, and were received on board of ship by Admiral
Cochrane; by the King's Bench, they were held to be free.267
Justice McLean also addressed the case of The Slave, Grace in his
dissent, arguing that it had not actually overruled the earlier
English case of Somersett, as had been declared by the the two con-
curring Justices-Nelson and Daniel-who cited it.268 The case of
Somersett was an important one to Justice McLean because it was
decided by Lord Mansfield before the American Revolution, when
the United States was a part of the British Empire.269 According to
Justice McLean, that case was a "thoroughly examined"'27 judgment
of the King's Bench, in which Lord Mansfield said:
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by
positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons,
occasion, and time itself, from whence it was created, is erased
from the memory; it is of a nature that nothing can be suffered
to support it but positive law.271
267. Id. at 534 (McLean, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 535.
269. Id. at 534-35.
270. Id. at 534.
271. Id. at 535.
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Last, Justice Curtis, writing in dissent, also considered foreign
law in his individual opinion. He too considered the 1827 English
case of The Slave, Grace, but viewed its holding less conclusively
than did the concurring Justices. 2 He argued that if "there had
been an act of Parliament declaring that a slave coming to England
with his master should thereby be deemed no longer to be a slave"
a judge would not have arrived at Lord Stowell's conclusion.273
Justice Curtis also inquired into broader rules of international law.
He considered the proscription of these rules regarding the change
of status of the plaintiff.
It is generally agreed by writers upon international law, and the
rule has been judicially applied in a great number of cases, that
wherever any question may arise concerning the status of a per-
son, it must be determined according to that law which has next
previously rightfully operated on and fixed that status. And,
further, that the laws of a country do not rightfully operate upon
and fix the status of persons who are within its limits in itinere,
or who are abiding there for definite temporary purposes, as for
health, curiosity, or occasional business; that these laws, known
to writers on public and private international law as personal
statutes, operate only on the inhabitants of the country. Not that
it is or can be denied that each independent nation may, if it
thinks fit, apply them to all persons within their limits. But
when this is done, not in conformity with the principles of inter-
national law, other States are not understood to be willing to
recognise or allow effect to such applications of personal stat-
utes.274
Justice Curtis further stated that he could not assent to the major-
ity's opinion, as he felt it was "in conflict with its previous decisions,
with a great weight of judicial authority in other slaveholding
States, and with fundamental principles of private international
law.275
There can thus be no question that six of the nine Justices, in-
cluding the two dissenters, in Dred Scott relied on foreign law.
272. Id. at 591-92 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 595 (emphasis omitted).
275. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Dred Scott raised pure issues of constitutional law. It is
thus noteworthy that Dred Scott is one of the earliest constitutional
law cases to turn on foreign law.
2. Reynolds v. United States
"Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and west-
ern nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of
African people." '276 Chief Justice Waite made this statement refer-
ring to the views of other nations when discussing the constitution-
ality of a statute forbidding polygamy in another famous case from
the second half century of our constitutional history, Reynolds v.
United States,277 decided in 1878. Even more strikingly, Chief Jus-
tice Waite referred at length to an 1868 British decision in his opin-
ion for the Court in the Reynolds case.
Reynolds is quite well-known for its holding that a federal statute
prohibiting polygamy in the territories was perfectly constitutional,
even though that statute seemed to infringe on the right of various
members of the Mormon Church to exercise their religion freely.278
One key question for the Court, according to Chief Justice Waite,
was whether an individual is guilty of a crime when he "knowingly
violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a
religious belief that the law is wrong." '279 The Court stated that it
was certain Congress could not pass a statute that prohibited the
free exercise of religion in the territories, as "[t]he first amendment
to the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation."28 However,
as Chief Justice Waite pointed out, "[t]he word 'religion' is not de-
fined in the Constitution.""2 Thus, the Court turned to the history
276. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 166. For more on the significance of Reynolds, see, for example, Richard A.
Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate
Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 225 (2001).
279. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment to determine
exactly what religious freedom it guarantees.8 2
Upon reviewing the historical origins of the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of religion, including the views of Madison
and Jefferson, the Court concluded that "Congress was deprived of
all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order. 283 Having concluded that actions that violated social duties
or were dissident in nature were able to be regulated and even able
to be condemned by Congress, the Court examined the character
and history of polygamy, at which point Chief Justice Waite noted
the relatively widespread disapproval of the practice of polygamy
among the peoples of northern and western Europe.21 After consid-
ering this disapproval of polygamy in European civilization, the
Court found that "there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by
some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the
power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion," and
thus the federal statute prohibiting polygamy in the territories was
"within the legislative power of Congress. 285
At this point, there was still one question remaining before the
Court, "whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion
are excepted from the operation of the statute.,286 The Court found
that such individuals were not excepted, as "[1]aws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices., 2 7 To provide
additional support for the logic of the Court's holding on this point
and to develop further its finding, Chief Justice Waite discussed the
difference between a positive act and an omission of action based
upon religious beliefs. He pointed to an 1868 British case from the
282. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious
freedom which has been guaranteed." Id.
283. Id. at 164.
284. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 276.
285. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
286. Id.
287. Id. Chief Justice Waite also wrote that creating such an exception would introduce a
"new element into criminal law," as those who practice polygamy based upon religious beliefs
would be acquitted and go free, whereas those who practiced it for other reasons may be found
guilty and punished. Id.
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Central Criminal Court, Regina v. Wagstaffe,288 which involved the
prosecution of two parents of a sick child who refused to call in med-
ical attention for her due to their religious conviction that God
would heal the sick.2"9 The Court stated:
In Regina v. Wagstaff [sic], the parents of a sick child, who omit-
ted to call in medical attendance because of their religious belief
that what they did for its cure would be effective, were held not
to be guilty of manslaughter, while it was said the contrary
would have been the result if the child had actually been starved
to death by the parents, under the notion that it was their reli-
gious duty to abstain from giving it food. But when the offense
consists of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be
dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punishment
because he religiously believed the law which he had broken
ought never to have been made. No case, we believe, can be
found that has gone so far."9°
The Reynolds case seems to us to be closely on par with the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, although in
Reynolds the Court looked to foreign law to uphold a statute,
whereas in Lawrence the Court considered such law in striking
down a statute.291 Both Reynolds and Lawrence involved the hot-
button social issues of their day and both cases resolved those issues
by referring to the beliefs and practices of the peoples of northern
and western Europe.292 Both cases decidedly rejected appeal to the
practices of peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Islamic world where
polygamy is legal, contrary to Reynolds, and where gay rights are
288. Id. at 167 (citing Regina v. Wagstaffe, reprinted in 10 REPORTS OF CASES IN CRIMINAL
LAW ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF ENGLAND 530 (Edward W. Cox. ed., 1846))
[hereinafter CRIMINAL CASES].
289. Id. at 167.
290. Id. (citation omitted). In regard to the distinction between withholding medical
treatment and withholding food, the English criminal court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Wiles, stated that there is a "very great difference between neglecting a child in respect to
food, with regard to which there could be but one opinion, and neglect of medical treatment,
as to which there might be many opinions." CRIMINAL CASES at 533.
291. See infra note 673 and accompanying text.
292. Of course, the cases differ in that Reynolds involved the First Amendment and the
Free Exercise Clause, while Lawrence was a substantive due process decision. Also, Reynolds
upheld a statute while Lawrence struck one down. Compare Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145, with
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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nonexistent, contrary to Lawrence. Since the Justices who decided
Lawrence might well be very uncomfortable knowing they are in
the same company as the Justices who decided Reynolds, we think
the parallel between these two cases suggests Justice Scalia is on
to something in his complaints about citation of foreign law in
Lawrence. In fact, the Court seems to look to such law when it
senses it is at sea in the policy-making realm and it is no longer
interpreting the Constitution. This practice implies that the Court
ought not to have cited foreign law in either Reynolds or Lawrence.
B. Civil and Roman Law and the Supreme Court in the Mid-1800s
Citations to Roman and civil sources of law continued to find their
way into many Supreme Court opinions during this time period. For
example, in Osborn v. Nicholson,293 a case involving the sale of a
slave and the Contract Clause of the Constitution, the Court de-
clared:
All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of
the sovereign, and the exercise of such power is never under-
stood to involve their violation, and is not within that provision
of the National Constitution which forbids a State to pass laws
impairing their obligation. The power acts upon the property
which is the subject of the contract, and not upon the contract
itself.294
The Court supported this statement by noting that this rule "also
is the rule of the French law and such was the Roman law. 295
The Court cited the work of Domat for the proposition that a "seller
is not bound to warrant the buyer against ... the act of the
sovereign,"'2 96 and Justinian's Digest for the proposition that '[a]fter
the bargain is completed the purchaser stands to all losses.' 297
293. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1871).
294. Id. at 660.
295. Id.
296. Id. (quoting 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITs NATURAL ORDER, pt. 1, bk. 1, tit. 2,
§ 10).
297. Id. (quoting Digest 2, 14, 77 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 615 (Thomas Cooper ed.,
1812)). The Court noted that this case "is one in which the maxim applies Res perit suo
domino." Id. (citing Paine v. Meller, (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 1088, 6 Vesey 349 (High Ct. Ch.);
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In the 1871 case of Ex parte McNiel,298 the Court considered
Roman and civil law in upholding a New York State statute which
governed the subject of pilotage, even though it was a regulation of
commerce. The issue raised was whether laws governing pilotage
were regulations of commerce that might be invalidated under the
dormant Commerce Clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Swayne
pointed to the fact that the obligation of a captain to take a pilot was
"prescribed in the Roman law." '299 He further stated that the require-
ment of a pilot was also found in the Hanseatic ordinances, and the
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maritime laws of Sweden,
France, and England, as well as in the Pays Bas, the maritime code
of the Netherlands. 00 Prior to its examination of these foreign laws,
the Court noted that there was "nothing new" in the provisions of
the New York statute, and presumably looked to these sources as
evidence to that effect.301 Justice Swayne wrote that such statutes
existed from early times and "are to be found in the laws of most
commercial states."30 2 Notwithstanding this conclusion that state
BALTHAZARD-MARIE EMERIGON, A TREATISE ON INSURANCES 419 (Samuel Meredith ed. &
trans. 1850)).
298. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1871). In Place v. Norwich & New York Transportation Co.,
another admiralty case decided in 1886, Justice Bradley discussed at great length the "history
of opinion amongst maritime writers" on whether owners who abandon their ship to creditors
are obliged to abandon the insurance on the ship. 118 U.S. 468, 496-502 (1886). Although
Justice Bradley did not specifically address the Roman law, he discussed in detail the civil law
and the laws of nations founded on this law. In fact, Justice Bradley devoted several pages of
the opinion to discussing the views of foreign scholars of maritime law, such as Valin and
Emerigon, "two great French jurists," as well as the maritime law and practices of both
France and Germany during the 1800s. Id. After looking to these foreign sources of law,
Justice Bradley wrote that it appeared, "therefore, that the disposition of our statute is in
conformity with the general maritime law of Europe." Id. at 502.
299. Exparte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 239.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. In the tort case of Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882) (finding
that the owner of timber stolen by an intentional trespasser should receive the increased
value of cordwood), Justice Miller wrote of the difference between the rights of an individual
who purchases commodities from an unintentional trespasser as opposed to an intentional
trespasser and noted that such was "the distinction taken in the Roman law." Id. at 436.
Justice Miller cited THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 297, lib. II, tit. I., § 34. Id. In
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885), Justice Miller again remarked on the Roman law, in
this instance regarding the property law doctrine of prescription. Justice Miller noted that,
although the doctrine was "mainly applied to incorporeal hereditaments" in England, "in the
Roman law, and the codes founded on it, [it] is applied to property of all kinds." Id. at 622.
Justice Miller noted that the doctrine was historically called proescripto in the Roman law.
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laws regulating pilotage were regulations of commerce as suggested
by foreign law, the Court concluded that in this case the New York
statute did not so burden commerce that it should be struck down
under the dormant Commerce Clause.
C. Other Cases from the Second Half Century of Our
Constitutional History
The other cases decided between 1840 and 1890 that refer to
foreign law are a varied lot. Two cases speak to the legitimacy of the
Court's consideration of international and foreign law and address
the status of such law in American courts. °3 Two other cases, Knox
v. Lee and Juilliard v. Greenman, upholding the constitutionality of
paper money refer explicitly to foreign law.30 4 And Ker v. Illinois. 5
used foreign case law to "provide respected and significant confirma-
tion for [the Court's] own conclusions" ' 6 in much the same way as
the Court did more than one hundred years later in Roper v.
Simmons."°7
1. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren,"' an 1876 case growing
out of the Civil War, was the only statement by the Waite Court on
the laws of war-a branch of international law.30 9 Chief Justice
Waite's majority opinion refused to review the judgment of a state
court regarding the effect of the Civil War on a contract for life in-
surance, finding that the Court had no jurisdiction over the issue.310
The Court held that there was no federal question presented by the
case, but rather that it presented "questions of general law alone."31'
Id. at 623.
303. See infra Part II.C.1-2.
304. See infra Part II.C.3.
305. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
306. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005); see infra Part II.C.4.
307. See infra Part IV.B.7.
308. 92 U.S. 286 (1876).
309. See Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal
Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 427 (1997).
310. N.Y Life Ins., 92 U.S. at 286-87.
311. Stephens, supra note 309, at 427-29 (quoting N.Y Life Ins., 92 U.S. at 286). Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, has argued it is "[t]he nonfederal nature of the law of nations,"
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Justice Bradley, in dissent, attacked the majority's conclusion,
arguing that when a citizen claims exemption from a contractual
obligation based upon a war between his government and the other
parties to the contract, "the claim is made under the laws of the
United States," which forbid trade with the enemy. 12 Accordingly,
Justice Bradley thought there was a federal question present in
New York Life. Justice Bradley argued that the states could not
prevent such contractual intercourse, but rather, only the federal
government had the ability and prerogative to do so.3 13 In his dis-
sent, Justice Bradley spoke of the relationship between interna-
tional law, specifically the laws of war, and the laws of the United
States, stating:
It is in accordance with international law, it is true; but interna-
tional law has the force of law in our courts, because it is
adopted and used by the United States. It could have no force
but for that, and may be modified as the government sees fit. Of
course, the government would not attempt to modify it in mat-
ters affecting other nations, except by treaty stipulations with
them: if it did, it would prepare itself to carry out its resolutions
by military force. But, in many things that prima facie belong to
international law, the government will adopt its own regula-
tions: such as the extent to which intercourse shall be prohib-
ited; how far property of enemies shall be confiscated; what shall
be deemed contraband, [etc]. All this only shows that the laws
which the citizens of the United States are to obey in regard to
intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at war
are laws of the United States. These laws will be the unwritten
international law, if nothing be adopted or announced to the
contrary; or the express regulations of the government, when it
sees fit to make them. But in both cases it is the law of the
United States for the time being, whether written or unwrit-
ten. 14
which encompasses the laws of war, that explains the Court's holding that it lacked
jurisdiction. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2770 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. N.Y Life Ins., 92 U.S. at 287 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (stating "a separate State cannot wage war: that is the prerogative of the general
government").
314. Id. at 287-88 (second emphasis added).
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Justice Bradley's dissent then referred to foreign, i.e., international,
sources of law and seemed to suggest that law was incorporated
into American law much as Justices Kennedy and O'Connor might
argue.
315
2. Hurtado v. California
In Hurtado v. California,"6 the Supreme Court was asked to
affirm the proposition that "indictment or presentment by a grand
jury, as known to the common law of England, is essential to that
'due process of law,' when applied to prosecutions for felonies, which
is secured" by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.1 7
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Matthews, refused to find
that the grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment was made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather
held that proceeding by information was a constitutionally accept-
able procedure for initiating a felony prosecution.318
The idea that foreign law can help determine what rights from
the Bill of Rights are so fundamental that they are incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment is often associated with Palko v.
Connecticut."9 But, the Court's statements in Hurtado, decided
some fifty years earlier, make exactly the same point. Considering
the flexibility of the notion of due process, Justice Matthews sug-
gested looking to the laws and practices of other nations for sources
of ideas for our own legal system, much as Justice Breyer proposes
315. Of course, Justice Scalia can easily riposte that Justice Bradley's opinion was only a
dissent and that he was thus not speaking for the Court.
316. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
317. Id. at 520.
318. Id. at 538. The Court stated:
[Wie are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by
a grand jury of the proceeding by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant,
with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of
the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law.
Id.
319. 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 & n.3 (1937) (holding that allowing a new trial after a
prosecutor's appeal is consistent with due process).
320. See Neuman, supra note 22, at 83.
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today.32' Considering the possible inspiration to be drawn from
foreign law, Justice Matthews wrote:
The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true,
by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of
English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and
expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered
from many nations and of many tongues. And while we take just
pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we
are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurispru-
dence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not
unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the absolutism of conti-
nental governments, is not alien to that code which survived the
Roman Empire as the foundation of modern civilization in Eu-
rope, and which has given us that fundamental maxim of distrib-
utive justice-suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in Magna
Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and
law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of
every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the com-
mon law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice,
we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been
exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and
various experiences of our own situation and system will mould
and shape it into new and not less useful forms.322
Of course, in Hurtado, unlike in Roper, the reference to foreign
sources of law is arguably dicta because the Court finds no constitu-
tional right to indictment by a grand jury after referring to the ab-
sence of such a right in the civil law nations of western Europe.323
Nonetheless, Hurtado is a leading nineteenth-century criminal law
case, and it certainly seems to treat European civil law as if it were
binding on American courts.
Hurtado thus provides some support for Justice Kennedy's and
Justice O'Connor's reliance on foreign law in Roper and on Justice
Kennedy's reliance on foreign law in Lawrence. Hurtado, like
Lawrence, is styled as a case in which the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes a requirement of reasonableness on the states and assess-
321. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530-31.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 538.
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ments of reasonableness are often made with references to for-
eign law. We think the Court was wrong to make a reasonableness
inquiry in both Lawrence and Hurtado"4 However, if the reason-
ableness of laws or procedure were the proper test of their constitu-
tionality under the Fourteenth Amendment, looking to the practices
in foreign jurisdictions would make more sense. Since we do not
believe the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to have a
reasonable law of criminal procedure or reasonable substantive
morals laws, we remain unconvinced that the Court was correct in
consulting foreign law in either case.
3. The Legal Tender Cases: Knox v. Lee and Juilliard v.
Greenman
During the Civil War, Congress passed the Legal Tender Act of
1862 which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 150
million paper dollars, officially known as United States Notes,
which soon became known to the public as "greenbacks" because
they were printed with green ink.325 Several cases, which later came
to be known as the Legal Tender Cases, challenged the constitution-
ality of the greenbacks on different grounds in the decades following
the passage of this Act." 6 In the second of these legal tender
cases, Knox v. Lee, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the
constitutionality of the legal tender greenbacks as payment for both
future and preexisting debts, largely because the Act creating them
was the result of an extreme emergency-the Civil War.327 In so
holding, the Court specifically considered the practice of France,
stating that her "assignats, issued at the commencement and during
the Revolution, performed the same office as our Continental bills;
and enabled the nation to gather up its latent strength and call out
its energies." '328 The Court further stated that "[a] lmost every nation
of Europe at one time or another, has found it necessary, or expedi-
324. Professor Calabresi has argued that the Court was wrong to make a reasonableness
inquiry in Lawrence. See Calabresi, supra note 36.
325. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 458 (1870).
326. See, e.g., id.
327. Id. at 541. The Court decided Knox in conjunction with Parker V. Davis. Id. at 457.
328. Id. at 569.
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ent, to resort to the same method of carrying on its operations or
defending itself against aggression." '329
In the 1884 legal tender case of Juilliard v. Greenman,33 ° the
Supreme Court addressed a subsequent issuance of greenbacks that
was not made as the result of an emergency, as the prior issuances
had been. The Court found this issuance of greenbacks to be consti-
tutional because it said the power to issue paper money was inher-
ent in the concept of sovereignty.331 In so holding, the Supreme
Court referred to foreign law as follows:
The power ... of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality
of being a legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a
power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe
and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the
Constitution of the United States. The governments of Europe,
acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the
distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had
and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of
stamping coin. This power has been distinctly recognized in an
important modern case, ably argued and fully considered, in
which the Emperor of Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained
from the English Court of Chancery an injunction against the
issue in England, without his license, of notes purporting to be
public paper money of Hungary.332
Thus, in both of these legal tender cases, the Supreme Court upheld
congressional statutes that provided for the issuance of the contro-
versial greenbacks, in part by looking to foreign law for evidence
that sovereign governments throughout Europe had taken similar
action and that the power to issue paper money was universally
viewed as a power of a sovereign. The legal tender cases are striking
nineteenth-century examples of the Supreme Court relying upon
foreign law to uphold federal legislation.
329. Id.
330. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
331. Id. at 447.
332. Id. (citing Austria v. Day (1861) 66 Eng. Rep. 263, 2 Gift. 628 (High Ct. Ch.); Austria
v. Day (1861) 45 Eng. Rep. 861, 3, Deg. F. & J. 216, 219 (K.B.)).
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4. Ker v. Illinois
In Ker v. Illinois, 3 3 decided in 1886, the Supreme Court held that
the forcible abduction of a criminal defendant from a foreign
country, by itself, was not enough to defeat the jurisdiction of the
Court over that defendant. 3 4 On appeal from his Illinois conviction
for larceny, Ker, a resident of Peru who had been forcibly seized and
transferred to Illinois to stand trial, argued that he had, by virtue
of his residence in Peru and the extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru, acquired a positive right that he could only
be forcibly removed from Peru to Illinois in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty.335 The Court, in a unanimous opinion writ-
ten by Justice Miller, rejected Ker's argument, stating that
[t]here is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made
by this country on the subject of extradition, of which we are
aware, which says in terms that a party fleeing from the United
States to escape punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled
to an asylum in the country to which he has fled.336
Justice Miller noted that the Court found no protection guaranteed
in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States against
forcible seizure and transfer that would allow a defendant to resist
trial in state court.3 7 In support of its decision, the Court stated
that
[t]here are authorities of the highest respectability which hold
that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party
should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the
court which has the right to try him for such an offence, and
presents no valid objection to his trial in such court.3
333. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
334. Id. at 444.
335. Id. at 441.
336. Id. at 442.
337. Id. at 444.
338. Id.
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The Court listed as "[almong the authorities which support the
proposition," two nineteenth century cases from England339 : Exparte
Scott,34° decided by Lord Tenterden in 1829, and Lopez & Sattler's
Case,34' decided in 1858. Again, it is important to note that, since
these English cases were decided more than fifty years after the
signing of the Declaration of Independence, they are foreign sources
of law rather than possible domestic law precedents for the Court.
In both cases, the English court held that improper and illegal
apprehension of a defendant in a foreign nation did not deprive the
court of jurisdiction to try the defendant for his alleged offenses. 342
By including reference to these foreign cases, the Court sought to
bolster its demonstration of the inherent logic of its own decision,
using the English cases as evidence that other learned judges, in a
legal system that evolved from the same foundation as our own, had
reached a similar conclusion. This seems very similar to what the
Justices were trying to do in Roper and Lawrence where foreign
sources of law were used to validate the Court's decisions to strike
down the juvenile death penalty and laws against sodomy.
III. CASES INCLUDING FOREIGN LEGAL REFERENCES IN THE YEARS
1890 TO 1940
Two significant developments occurred during the years between
1890 and 1940 that have had a considerable impact on the Supreme
Court's practice of referring to foreign sources of law. The first came
in 1900 when the Supreme Court said of customary international
law in its prominent statement in The Paquete Habana that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law." '343 It is impossible to overem-
phasize the importance that writers addressing the current debate
over the legitimacy of considering foreign sources of law have placed
on this lone statement.344 For example, Yale Law School Dean
Harold Koh has suggested that by making this statement the
339. Id.
340. (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 166, 9 B. & C. 446 (K.B.).
341. Regina v. Benito Lopez & Christian Sattler, (1858) 169 Eng. Rep. 1105, 1 Dears. & Bell
528 (Q.B.).
342. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; Scott, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. at 166-67, 9 B. & C. at 446-48.
343. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
344. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 23.
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Court in The Paquete Habana was implying that American courts
should not decide cases without, in the words of the Declaration
of Independence, "paying 'a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind.""'34 Justice Blackmun, a champion of the transnationalist
position on the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts,34 found the
import of The Paquete Habana to be clear: "[c]ustomary interna-
tional law informs the construction of domestic law, and, at least in
the absence of any superseding positive law, is controlling." '347 The
second significant development during the third half century of our
constitutional history was the advent of the Brandeis brief, which
directed the Court's attention toward social and scientific data rele-
vant to the issues before it. As we shall see, once the Court decided
to pay attention to domestic empirical data, it was only natural that
the Court became interested in empirical data from foreign legal
experiments, as well. The Court also referred to the Roman law
frequently in the early part of this time period, and there are sev-
eral other cases that made significant use of foreign law that will be
addressed below.
A. The Paquete Habana
The Paquete Habana,34 decided in 1900, arose out of the capture
of two Spanish fishing vessels on the coast of Cuba by United States
warships during the Spanish-American War.349 The issue before the
Court, as stated by Justice Gray, was whether "the fishing smacks
were subject to capture by the armed vessels of the United States
during the recent war with Spain."35 In reaching a decision on the
issue, the Court first noted that "[b]y an ancient usage among civi-
lized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into
a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their
345. Id. at 43-44.
346. Id. at 53. Koh writes that a transnationalist jurisprudence "assumes America's
political and economic interdependence with other nations operating within the international
legal system," and contrasts it with a "national jurisprudence, which rejects foreign and
international precedents and looks for guidance primarily to national territory, political
institutions, and executive power." Id.
347. Blackmun, supra note 60, at 40.
348. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
349. Id. at 678-79.
350. Id. at 686.
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vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized
as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of
war."'51 The Court reached this conclusion after spending extensive
time tracing the history of the rule,352 the more recent practices of
nations, and the wisdom of international scholars. The Court dis-
cussed, among other historically relevant details, the first govern-
mental acts on the subject that emanated from England, the fact
that "herring fish[ing] was permitted, in time of war, by French and
Dutch edicts in 1536," and the practice of France until the end of the
seventeenth century of "alleviating the evils of war in favor of all
coast fishermen. 3 3 The Court also noted the rule's familiarity in
the United States since "the time of the War of Independence. 354
As illustrative of more contemporary international practice,
the Court gave as an example the practices of France during the
Crimean War in 1854 and Germany during the Franco-Prussian
War in 1870, forbidding "her cruisers to trouble the coast fisheries,
or to seize any vessel or boat engaged therein, unless naval or mili-
tary operations should make it necessary. 355 The Court stated that,
since 1810, "no instance has been found in which the exemption
from capture of private coast fishing vessels, honestly pursuing
their peaceful industry, has been denied by England, or by any other
nation. '3 56 The Court also noted contemporaneous practice in Japan,
stating that
the Empire of Japan, (the last State admitted to the rank of
civilized nations,) by an ordinance promulgated at the beginning
of its war with China in August, 1894, established prize courts,
and ordained that "the following enemy's vessels are exempt
from detention"-including in the exemption "boats engaged in
coast fisheries," as well as "ships engaged exclusively on a voy-
age of scientific discovery, philanthropy or religious mission." '357
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id. at 679-86. The Court stated that it was "worth the while to trace the history of the
rule, from the earliest accessible sources, through the increasing recognition of it, with
occasional setbacks, to what we may now justly consider as its final establishment in our own
country and generally throughout the civilized world." Id. at 686.
353. Id. at 686-88.
354. Id. at 689.
355. Id. at 699.
356. Id. at 700.
357. Id. (quoting S. TAKAHASHI, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING CHINO-JAPANESE
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In examining scholarly statements of international law, the Court
referred to several sources, including General Halleck's 1861 work
International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in
Peace and War, Wharton's Digest of International Law of the United
States, and Ortolan's fourth edition of the Regles Internationales et
Diplomatie de la Mer, published in 1864.358 The Court also found it
"convenient" to refer to leading French treatises on international
law that addressed the issue before the Court, "not as one of the law
of France only, but as one determined by the general consent of
civilized nations." '359 The Court also noted that "modern German
books on international law ... treat the custom, by which the vessels
and implements of coast fishermen are exempt from seizure and
capture, as well established by the practice of nations."60 Finally, as
there were "writers of various maritime countries, not yet cited, too
important to be passed by without notice," the Court discussed their
views as well.3
61
At the end of its lengthy examination of foreign sources of law,
the Court reached the following conclusion:
WAR 11, 178 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1899)).
358. Id. at 697-702. Justice White repeatedly cited scholarly writings on international law,
especially Halleck's, in his concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298-344
(1901), which was decided just one year after The Paquete Habana. Justice Gray also
considered international sources of law extensively in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893). He quoted Wharton's International Digest for the proposition that '"[t]he
control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are
dangerous to the peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of
sovereignty to be seriously contested."' Id. at 707 (quoting 2 A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 at 518 (Francis Wharton ed., Wash., D.C., Gov't Printing
Office 1886). He also discussed "statements of leading commentators on the law of nations,"
including Vattel, Ortolan, Phillimore, and Bar. Id. at 707-09.
359. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 701. The Court thus discussed the writings of many
French scholars, including Calvo, "who, though writing in French, [was] a citizen of the
Argentine Republic." Id. at 703.
360. Id. at 704.
361. Id. at 706-08. The Court noted the opinions of the following writers: "Jan Helenus
Ferguson, Netherlands Minister to China;" Ferdinand Attlmayr, "Captain in the Austrian
Navy" and author of a manual for naval officers; 'Ignacio de Negrin, First Official of the
Spanish Board of Admiralty, in his Elementary Treatise on Maritime International Law;"
Carlos Testa, a captain in the Portuguese Navy and a naval professor; and the writings of"the
distinguished Italian jurist" Pasquale Fiore. Id.
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This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject
appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present
day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world,
and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is
an established rule of international law, founded on consider-
ations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and
of the mutual convenience of belligerent States, that coast fish-
ing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and
crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as
prize of war. 62
In the course of the Court's opinion, Justice Gray described the
value of international law in American courts as follows:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted
to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evi-
dence of what the law really is. 63
Because the Court had established that international law prohibited
the capture of fishing boats as prizes of war, it found the capture of
the two Spanish boats by U.S. warships to be unlawful and without
probable cause."' Thus, the Court ordered that proceeds from the
sale of the vessels and cargo be restored to the original owners.365
362. Id. at 708 (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Fuller stated that he was "unable to
conclude that there is any such established international rule." Id. at 715 (Fuller, J.,
dissenting).
363. Id. at 700 (majority opinion).
364. Id. at 686, 714.
365. Id. at 714.
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Justice Fuller, in dissent, anticipated Justice Scalia's dim view of
citation of foreign sources of law. Fuller took issue with the discus-
sion of foreign law and the views of international writers in the
Court's opinion directly, stating:
I am not aware of adequate foundation for imputing to this coun-
try the adoption of any other than the English rule.... It is need-
less to review the speculations and repetitions of the writers on
international law. Ortolan, De Boeck and others admit that the
custom relied on as consecrating the immunity is not so general
as to create an absolute international rule; Heffter, Calvo and
others are to the contrary. Their lucubrations may be persua-
sive, but are not authoritative."
The Paquete Habana thus provides some support for the majority's
reliance on foreign sources of law in Roper;36 however, Justice
Scalia might dispute this support by noting that it is far more legiti-
mate for the Court to look to foreign sources of law in determining
the law of prize than in determining the meaning of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
B. Reasonableness Cases
During the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court built on
its belief, expressed in Hurtado, that the Constitution mandated a
reasonable state law of criminal procedure, and it concluded more
broadly that all state exercises whatsoever of the police power
had to be reasonable whenever liberty-broadly understood-was
infringed upon.368 This style of decision making reached full flower
in, and is associated with, the landmark 1905 case of Lochner v.
New York.369 Lochner-style reasonableness review resulted in two
notable cases where at least some members of the Court referred
to foreign sources of law for guidance in determining what was
reasonable.37 ° Since determinations of reasonableness are inher
366. Id. at 719-20 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
367. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-200 (2005).
368. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); see also Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
369. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
370. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 66, 71
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ently open-ended, it is not surprising that cases involving such de-
terminations would lead to references to foreign sources of law. The
Court made these references to provide both legal and factual infor-
mation about what practices were prevalent in foreign jurisdictions,
and to obtain guidance in determining the reasonableness, or lack
thereof, of regulations before it. 371 In examining both Lochner v. New
York and Muller v. Oregon, the focus is often on disagreement with
the Court's claim in these cases that it has the power to review, de
novo, the reasonableness of the state statute before the Court. Thus,
scholars often overlook the fact that a dissenting opinion in Lochner
and the Court's opinion in Muller make reference to foreign factual
and legal evidence 2.3 " Nonetheless, both Justice Harlan's dissent in
Lochner and Justice Brewer's opinion in Muller cited and made
reference to factual information about foreign law.
1. Lochner v. New York (Harlan Dissent)
In his dissent in Lochner v. New York,373 Justice Harlan, joined
by Justices White and Day, looked to statistical information from
foreign countries to bolster his factual support for the proposition
that the New York statute limiting the hours of laborers in bakeries
and confectionaries to ten hours per day, and sixty hours in any one
week, was a reasonable decision within the power of the State to
enact. 74 In considering the New York statute's ten-hour limit,
Justice Harlan examined the average workday in other nations, and
found as follows:
Statistics show that the average daily working time among
workingmen in different countries is, in Australia, 8 hours; in
Great Britain, 9; in the United States, 9 %; in Denmark, 9 3; in
Norway, 10; Sweden, France, and Switzerland, 10 2; Germany,
10 14; Belgium, Italy, and Austria, 11; and in Russia, 12 hours."'
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
371. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 & n.1; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 66, 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
372. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-15 (1980).
373. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65.
374. Id. at 45-46; id. at 66, 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
375. Id. at 71.
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Using these figures, Justice Harlan placed New York State's
attempt to limit bakers' hours to ten per day in an international
empirical perspective. He stated that the Court "judicially know[s]
that the question of the number of hours during which a workman
should continuously labor has been, for a long period, and is yet, a
subject of serious consideration among civilized peoples, and by
those having special knowledge of the laws of health." '376 Justice
Harlan then gave as an extreme example a statute that would pro-
hibit labor in bakeries and confectionaries for eighteen hours per
day, and stated that "[n]o one ... could dispute the power of the State
to enact such a statute."'377 Justice Harlan also pointed out that the
New York statute at issue did not embrace such "extreme or excep-
tional cases. 3 78 Rather, he stated in reference to the statistics from
foreign nations, the statute's restriction of labor to ten hours per day
"may be said to occupy a middle ground in respect of the hours of
labor. 3 79 Thus, Justice Harlan would have employed foreign sources
of law as a means of upholding the New York statute at issue.
Such a reference to foreign legal regimes for factual, empirical
proof of what other countries thought reasonable would make per-
fect sense if the majority in Lochner had been right in its basic
presupposition that the Fourteenth Amendment banned unreason-
able exercises of the police power. In fact, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only fundamental rights deeply rooted in our
nation's history and tradition. ° For this reason, we find the refer-
ence to foreign empirical data in Justice Harlan's Lochner dissent
to be problematic. We do think, however, that the dissent provides
support for the Court looking to foreign sources of law in Roper
because there, the issue was whether the juvenile death penalty was
unusual.3 ' We think determinations of unusualness for Eighth
Amendment purposes are a form of reasonableness review that the
text of the Constitution actually mandates. We thus think the Roper
Court and Justice O'Connor in her dissent ought to be able to cite
376. Id. (emphasis added).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 71-72.
379. Id.
380. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1099 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-
21 (1997) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986)).
381. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187, 1198-200 (2005).
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Justice Harlan's Lochner dissent as authority for their own citation
of foreign law.
2. Muller v. Oregon
In 1908, just three years after the Lochner decision, the Court
held in Muller v. Oregon382 that an Oregon statute imposing maxi-
mum hours of employment for women was constitutional due, in
large part, to the physical differences between men and women.
38 3
In. the Muller opinion, the Court formalized the early twentieth-
century approach of examining social science and empirical data as
a means of aiding the decision-making process by considering,
rather extensively in the "margins," a brief filed by future Supreme
Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis.3" The Brandeis brief relied on by
the Court as "general knowledge" worthy of judicial cognizance315
included not only reference to legislation of the states regarding
restrictions upon the hours of women's labor, it also incorporated
extensive citation to foreign laws and empirical practices in its opin-
ion which upheld the Oregon statute at issue.3' The Court in Muller
thus picked up on the reliance on foreign sources of law in Harlan's
Lochner dissent and wrote such analysis into a majority opinion of
the Supreme Court.
382. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
383. Id. at 416-17, 421-23.
384. Id. at 419-20 & n. 1. For more on the emergence of the Brandeis brief and social science
data as a significant factor in Court decisions, see Martha F. Davis, International Human
Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 423-24
(2000). Davis argues:
The Muller v. Oregon Court accepted this social science data not because it was
necessary to reach a decision, but because a decision which took this data into
account would be better-more defensible as a matter of public policy, and
responsive to the growing public expectation that decisions by all branches of
government would reflect the growing body of social science knowledge as well
as logical reasoning. Of course, Muller created a new (and still thriving) cottage
industry in developing social science evidence to submit for judicial
consideration.
Id. at 423.
385. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419-21.
386. Id. at 416-17, 419-20 & n.1; see Davis, supra note 384, at 424 (noting the "little
discussed fact" that Muller v. Oregon and the Brandeis brief submitted in the case included
extensive citation to foreign laws).
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In Muller, Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court, stated
that "[i]t may not be amiss, in the present case, before examining
the constitutional question, to notice the course of legislation as well
as expressions of opinion from other than judicial sources., 38 7 He
stated that the Brandeis brief contained a "very copious collection
of all these matters""38 and included "an epitome of which is found
in the margin. 38 9 In a footnote, Justice Brewer compiled some of
what he found to be appropriate information from the Brandeis
brief, citing first the legislation of the states, and then the foreign
laws on the issue of restricted hours of labor for women, including
relevant laws from Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria,
Holland, Italy, and Germany.39 ° Justice Brewer cited foreign laws
and reports from Europe in the footnote, explaining:
In foreign legislation Mr. Brandeis calls attention to these stat-
utes: Great Britain: Factories Act of 1844, chap. 15, pp. 161, 171;
Factory and Workshop Act of 1901, chap. 22, pp. 60, 71; and see
1 Edw. VII, chap. 22. France, 1848; Act Nov. 2, 1892, and March
30, 1900. Switzerland, Canton of Glarus, 1848; Federal Law
1877, art. 2, § 1. Austria, 1855; Acts 1897, art. 96a, §§ 1-3. Hol-
land, 1889; art. 5, § 1. Italy, June 19, 1902, art. 7. Germany,
Laws 1891.
Then follow extracts from over ninety reports of committees,
bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of
factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that
long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because
of their special physical organization. The matter is discussed in
these reports in different aspects, but all agree as to the danger.
It would of course take too much space to give these reports in
detail. Following them are extracts from similar reports discuss-
ing the general benefits of short hours from an economic aspect
of the question. In many of these reports individual instances
are given tending to support the general conclusion. Perhaps the
general scope and character of all these reports may be summed
up in what an inspector for Hanover says: "The reasons for the
reduction of the working day to ten hours-(a) the physical orga-
nization of women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing
387. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
388. Id.
389. Id. (citation omitted).
390. Id. at 419 n.1.
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and education of the children, (d) the maintenance of the
home-are all so important and so far reaching that the need for
such reduction need hardly be discussed. ' 91
Justice Brewer then addressed the importance of the legislation
and opinions, both foreign and domestic, to the decision before
the Court. Though admitting that the sources "referred to in the
margin" were not, "technically speaking, authorities," nor did they
contain noteworthy discussion of the "constitutional question
presented," he found that they were "significant of a widespread
belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions she per-
forms in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting
or qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted
to toil. 392 Justice Brewer then discussed the purpose that the
sources cited in the margin, including the foreign sources, might
serve for the Court in deciding a constitutional issue. He stated,
again for a unanimous Court, that such sources could help to
show longstanding beliefs and provide "general knowledge" to the
Court. 93 Specifically, Justice Brewer wrote the following of the
Court's reasons for considering and referring to such information
from the Brandeis brief:
Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a
consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value
of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form hmi-
tations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and
stability to popular government which otherwise would be lack-
ing. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and
debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional limi-
tation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact, a wide-
spread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of con-
sideration. We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general
knowledge.394
The Court's opinion in Muller thus suggests that reference to foreign
sources of law may be appropriate in situations where the reason-
391. Id. (emphasis added).
392. Id. at 420.
393. Id. at 420-21.
394. Id.
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ableness of laws is truly at issue. As we have already mentioned, we
do think the Roper case required that the Court make an assess-
ment of the reasonableness of the juvenile death penalty, and so we
think the citation there to foreign sources of law is supported, at
least in part, by the Muller precedent.
C. Roman Law During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries
In addition to playing an important role in decisions of the early
Supreme Court, Roman law played a role in opinions in the late
1800s and early 1900s, especially opinions written by Justice
Edward D. White.395 One such case of significant importance to the
state-ownership doctrine was the 1896 constitutional case of Geer v.
Connecticut.3" In Geer, the Court employed foreign sources of law
to uphold the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that regu-
lated the killing of game and prohibited its transportation outside
of the state boundaries as an exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause.397 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that from
"the earliest traditions, the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to
possession has been subject to the control of the law-giving
power." '398 The Court extensively analyzed Roman law on the sub-
ject, including Roman law classifications of things as public and
common, in which animals ferae naturae with no owner were consid-
ered to belong "in common to all the citizens of the state. 399
395. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1897); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519, 522-23 (1896); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-55 (1895). For a more detailed
discussion of Roman law in the twentieth-century Supreme Court, see Samuel J. Astorino,
Roman Law in American Law: Twentieth Century Cases of the Supreme Court, 40 DUQ. L.
REv. 627 (2002). Professor Astorino states that American courts' use of Roman law was "an
integral part of the larger jurisprudential process by which American jurists reached back to
find a line of argument to be employed in understanding the case." Id. at 627-28. He also
points out that American courts' use of Roman and Civil law had come to an end by 1920 for
two reasons: (1) World War I had "generated a broad anti-German feeling, thereby closing off
a major source of civil law influence," and (2) the "dramatic decline in language skills,
especially Greek and Latin, among lawyers and jurists." Id. at 628.
396. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
397. Id. at 522-25, 535.
398. Id. at 522.
399. Id. at 522-23. The Court also considered general civil law, specifically the law and
practice of France, as well as "all other civilized countries of Europe." Id. at 524-26 (citation
omitted). The Court then considered the practice of England and cases recognizing the right
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Two other cases from the 1890s, Hovey v. Elliot40 and Coffin v.
United States,4"1 looked to Roman law for foundational principles of
our system of justice. In Hovey, Justice White looked to Roman law
and English doctrines for the principle that a person had the
right to appear and be heard-in this case, for contempt of court. °2
Justice White quoted extensively from Lord Chief Baron Gilbert's
Forum Romanum and Comyn's Digest4 °3 and argued that a right to
be heard in one's defense is a fundamental right of due process.4 °4 In
Coffin, Justice White looked to Roman law as a foundational source
for the principle "that there is a presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused."4 5 In his majority opinion in Knowlton v. Moore,406
Justice White again looked to foreign sources of law as part of a
historical survey of the subject of "death duties.""4 7 In assessing
foreign practice, Justice White noted Roman, French, English, and
German laws on such taxes to demonstrate that death taxes in the
United States rested upon the "same fundamental conception which
has caused the adoption of like statutes in other countries. 4 °8
of American states to control and regulate the common property in game. Id. at 526-29. The
Court considered its "foregoing analysis of the principles upon which alone rests the right of
an individual to acquire a qualified ownership in game, and the power of the State, deduced
therefrom, to control such ownership for the common benefit, clearly demonstrates the validity
of the statute of the State of Connecticut." Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
400. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
401. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
402. Hovey, 167 U.S. at 420-23.
403. Id. at 420-24.
404. Id. at 417 (asking if it can "be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be
heard in one's defence").
405. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453. The Court stated that "there can be no question that the
Roman law was pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal administration." Id. at
454. The Court included several extracts from Roman law for support. Id. The opinion traced
the history of the presumption of innocence from one of its claimed origins in Deuteronomy
to its use in the Roman law and its subsequent adoption in the English common law as well
as the common law of the United States. Id. at 454-58. The Court further discussed an
"anecdote" of Emperor Julian, which illustrated the enforcement of the principle in Roman
law and noted that the Roman rule, "along with many other fundamental and humane
maxims of that system," was "preserved for mankind by the canon law." Id. at 455 (citations
omitted).
406. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
407. Id. at 47-49.
408. Id. Numerous property cases from this time period also looked to Roman law. See, e.g.,
Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 469-70 (1905); United States v. Chavez, 175 U.S.
509, 523 (1899); Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637, 650-51 (1898). Note also the 1890 case
of Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), in which the Court observed that dominion
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D. Other Cases from This Era
There are five other cases from the period between 1890 and 1940
that deserve significant mention. °9 One of these opinions, Palko v.
could be acquired by discovery and occupation under the law of nations "recognized by all
civilized States," and considered the international laws of discovery as stated by foreign
writers, including Vattel. Id. at 212. Justice White wrote for the majority in Hayes, 170 U.S.
at 637, a case which involved a dispute over the title of land gained during the Mexican
cession. Justice White noted that the Spanish law, as well as the Code Napoleon and the
Louisiana Code, all were derived from Roman law. Id. at 650. The Court discussed Roman and
foreign law at length, stating that all commentators on the Roman law agreed that 'Juris error
is never a good foundation for acquiring property." Id. at 649-51. Under Roman law and
systems founded on it, the Court noted, one with no legal title could not convey such a title,
even by means of prescription. Id. at 650. In Chavez, a case also involving property ceded
from Mexico, Justice McKenna wrote of the Roman law, and the codes founded thereupon, as
recognizing the principle of adverse possession. Chavez, 175 U.S. at 522-23. The Court stated
that the general rule of American law, which was one of general jurisprudence and a feature
of Mexican law at the time of the cession due to its derivation from Roman law, was that "a
grant will be presumed upon proof of an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession for
twenty years." Id. at 522.
In Cunnius v. Reading School District, Justice White looked to foreign sources of law in a
Fourteenth Amendment case that addressed the question of whether a Pennsylvania state
statute that provided for the administration of the property of an absentee was "so beyond the
scope of the State's authority as to constitute a want of due process of law within the
intendment of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 469. The Court stated that
it would consider "the general power of government to provide for the administration of the
estates of absentees," and discussed Roman law, as well as the ancient law of France, the
Code Napoleon and the Louisiana Civil Code. Id. at 469-71. The Court also noted the law of
England on the subject of absentees. Id. at 471. After its analysis of these foreign sources, the
Court upheld the statute and concluded that as
the right to regulate the estates of absentees, both in the common and civil law,
has ever been recognized as being within the scope of governmental authority,
it must follow that the proposition that the State of Pennsylvania was wholly
without power to legislate concerning the property of an absentee, is without
merit.
Id. Finally, the Court looked to Roman law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in cases involving navigable waters. In Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission,
241 U.S. 351 (1916), for example, the Court considered Roman and other foreign sources of
law in deciding whether a riverbank owner could interrupt the natural flow of the river. Id.
at 363-66. In an opinion by Justice White, the Court devoted three pages to an analysis of
Roman law, as well as the Code Napoleon and the laws of Europe, and noted the
contemporaneous laws of France, Scotland, and England on the topic of riparian rights. Id.
Roman law, as well as the law of those systems that developed from it, was found to hold that
there was a duty not to "unduly deflect or change" the unrestrained flow of rivers and streams
except in the cases of "accidental and extraordinary floods." Id. at 366.
409. In addition to these cases, other cases from this era making reference to foreign
sources include Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (Gray, J.) (stating that international
law "in its widest and most comprehensive sense ... is part of our law, and must be ascertained
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Connecticut,41 ° is illustrative of the role that foreign law played in
the discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, 41' and is foreshadowed by the discussion of
Hurtado above.412 Two of the four other cases that made reference
to foreign sources of law between 1890 and 1940 involve, rather
surprisingly, tax-related issues.41 3 In both of these cases, the
Court arguably looked to foreign law as a means of providing
additional support for the decision reached by the majority by
showing that other nations had reached similar results in similar
circumstances.4 4 The fourth and fifth cases from this era, involving
the constitutionality of the military draft and an emergency rent
control measure, respectively, also looked to foreign law to provide
further support for the decisions of the Court.415
1. Palko v. Connecticut
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that a Connecti-
cut statute allowing the State to appeal in a criminal case did not
deny an individual petitioner due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment.41 6 The Court found that because the retrial
resulting from the appeal was done so that the trial would remain
"free from the corrosion of substantial legal error," rather than to
harass the petitioner,1 7 it did not violate "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and politi-
cal institutions. 41 8 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo,
stated that while certain measures, such as the right to trial by jury,
are of "value and importance," they are "not of the very essence of
and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in
litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination"), and Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908) (discussing the "fundamental conditions" of
jurisdiction and notice of and opportunity for a hearing which "seem to be universally
prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries").
410. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
411. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 22, at 83-84.
412. See supra Part II.C.2.
413. See infra Part III.D.2-3.
414. See infra Part III.D.2-3.
415. See infra Part III.D.4-5.
416. 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1957).
417. Id.
418. Id. (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
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a scheme of ordered liberty. '419 Thus, Cardozo opined, the abolition
of these rights would not violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.' 42 °
The Court noted that immunity from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion was a measure of the sort that could "be lost, and justice still be
done. 42' Indeed, the Court stated that "today as in the past there
are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a
mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or
destroy it altogether. 422 In a footnote to this comment, Justice
Cardozo referred to foreign law, stating that "[c]ompulsory self-
incrimination is part of the established procedure in the law of
Continental Europe. Double jeopardy too is not everywhere for-
bidden. 423 Cardozo thus implied that, just as Hurtado had noted,
the right to grand jury indictment was not fundamental because
European civil law countries did not recognize it, and so, too, the
right against self-incrimination might not be fundamental for the
same reason. Palko thus, like Hurtado, is a direct example of the
Court relying on foreign law to find that a right is not protected by
the U.S. Constitution, and thus upholding a state statute and prac-
tice.
Justice Scalia might dismiss Palko and Hurtado by saying that
looking to foreign law in criminal cases to confirm the absence of a
right is less offensive than looking to foreign law in order to cre-
ate a new constitutional right, as in Lawrence or Roper. Such a
distinction seems to us to be a bit forced; however, we would tend to
dismiss Palko and Hurtado on the ground that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights and does not, as those
Courts thought, require that the states adopt a reasonable law of
criminal procedure.
419. Id. at 325.
420. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The Court said that
"[flew would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without them." Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 325-26.
423. Id. at 326 n.3 (citations omitted).
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2. United States v. Perkins
The issue in the 1896 case of United States v. Perkins42 4 was
"whether personal property bequeathed by will to the United States
is subject to an inheritance tax under the laws of New York." 25
Justice Brown, writing for the Court, found the case to present two
questions, the first of which was "[w]hether it is within the power of
the State to tax bequests to the United States." 26 In holding in the
affirmative, Justice Brown stated:
While the laws of all civilized States recognize in every citizen
the absolute right to his own earnings, and to the enjoyment of
his own property, and the increase thereof, during his life, ex-
cept so far as the State may require him to contribute his share
for public expenses, the right to dispose of his property by will
has always been considered purely a creature of statute and
within legislative control.427
Justice Brown considered the common law of England on the issue
of the disposition of property by will, as well as the Statute of Wills
enacted in 1540 during the reign of Henry VIII.418 Strikingly, he
then addressed testamentary practices in the foreign countries of
France and Italy:
By the Code Napoleon, gifts of property, whether by acts inter
vivos or by will, must not exceed one half the estate if the testa-
tor leave but one child; one third, if he leaves two children; one
fourth, if he leaves three or more. If he have no children, but
leaves ancestors, both in the paternal and maternal line, he may
give away but one half of his property, and but three fourths if
he have ancestors in but one line. By the law of Italy, one half a
testator's property must be distributed equally among all his
children; the other half he may leave to his eldest son or to
whomsoever he pleases. Similar restrictions upon the power of
disposition by will are found in the codes of other continental
424. 163 U.S. 625 (1896).
425. Id. at 625-26.
426. Id. at 627. The second question presented was whether "the United States are a
corporation exempted by law from taxation." Id.
427. Id. (emphasis added) (emphasis in original omitted).
428. Id.
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countries, as well as in the State of Louisiana. Though the gen-
eral consent of the most enlightened nations has, from the earli-
est historical period, recognized a natural right in children to
inherit the property of their parents, we know of no legal princi-
ple to prevent the legislature from taking away or limiting the
right of testamentary disposition or imposing such conditions
upon its exercise as it may deem conducive to public good.429
Perkins is thus another majority opinion that takes cognizance of
foreign legal practice in upholding a statute and determining what
might be reasonable practice in the United States. Though Perkins
did not involve the recognition of a new constitutional right, it
clearly referred to and relied upon foreign law in reviewing, and
ultimately upholding, a state statute.
3. O'Malley v. Woodrough
In 1939, in the well-known judicial compensation case of O'Malley
v. Woodrough,43° the Supreme Court referred to foreign law and
precedents in reaching the conclusion that applying a general in-
come tax to federal judicial salaries was not unconstitutional. The
majority, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, gave a negative
answer to the question of whether "Congress exceeded its constitu-
tional power in providing that United States judges appointed
after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the
incidences of taxation to which everyone else within the defined
classes of income is subjected." '431 The Court in O'Malley thus upheld
429. Id. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
430. 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
431. Id. at 279. Justice Frankfurter described the issue of the case earlier in the opinion
as follows:
Is the provision of § 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 169, 178), re-enacted
by § 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1648, 1657), constitutional insofar
as it included in the "gross income," on the basis of which taxes were to be paid,
the compensation of "judges of courts of the United States taking office after
June 6, 1932."
Id. at 278-79. The Court cast doubt on the 1920 case of Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),
with its O'Malley opinion. In Evans, the Court had previously held that a provision requiring
that the compensation received by United States judges be included in "gross income" for tax
purposes, even though merely a part of a general, nondiscriminatory taxing measure that
applied to all citizens earning income, was "contrary to Article III, § 1, of the Constitution
which provides that the 'Compensation' of the 'Judges' 'shall not be diminished during their
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a congressional statute by finding that applying a nondiscrimina-
tory tax laid generally on net income to a federal judge is not a
diminution of his salary within the meaning of the Article III's
prohibition. 432 Rather, the Court found that subjecting federal
judges to a general tax is "merely to recognize that judges are also
citizens, and that their particular function in government does not
generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the
material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws
they are charged with administering. 433
In explaining the reasons for its movement away from the rea-
soning of a prior case, Evans v. Gore,43 4 which had come to the oppo-
site conclusion, the O'Malley Court noted that Evans had been met
with "wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and
professional opinion," and was "rejected by most of the courts before
whom the matter came after that decision. '43' The Court stated that
the meaning that Evans "imputed to the history which explains
Article III, § 1, was contrary to the way in which it was read by
other English-speaking courts."436 In a footnote to this state-
ment, Justice Frankfurter noted the foreign Australian judgment
in Cooper v. Commissioner of Income Tax,43 v which interpreted a
portion of the Queensland Constitution Act of 1867 that prohib-
ited reduction or diminution of judicial salaries, as well as the
foreign Canadian judgment in Judges v. Attorney-General of
Continuance in Office."' O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 280. Justice Holmes had written in dissent in
Evans, and it was this position that many in the 1930s viewed as "cut from the same cloth as
his dissents in Lochner v. New York and Abrams v. United States," which Frankfurter adopted
in the O'Malley majority opinion. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official
Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 521 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
432. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 282. Although it never stated that its opinion overruled Evans,
the Court in O'Malley did state that Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), a similar case, was
overruled "to the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with" Miles. O'Malley,
307 U.S. at 282-83.
433. Id. at 282. In 2001, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Evans, citing O'Malley and
stating that it was overruling Evans, "insofar as it holds that the Compensation Clause
forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of
federal judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment of the tax." United
States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001).
434. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
435. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 281 (footnotes omitted).
436. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
437. (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1304 (Austl.).
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Saskatchewan,43 which construed a portion of the British North
America Act requiring that judicial salaries be fixed and provided
by the Canadian Parliament.439 In another footnote to this portion
of the opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[p]articular atten-
tion should be called to the decision of the Supreme Court of South
Africa" in Krause v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue,44 ° which
construed a section of the South Africa Act that was identical to the
clause in Article III, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution.44'
In dissent, Justice Butler, again foreshadowing Justice Scalia's
position in Lawrence and Roper, took issue with the majority's cita-
tion of foreign cases, both because of their status as such and
because of their factual situations. Justice Butler wrote:
Now the Court cites, as if entitled to prevail against those well-
sustained opinions and the deliberate judgments of this Court,
opposing views-if indeed upon examination they reasonably
may be so deemed-of English speaking judges in foreign coun-
tries. It refers, footnote 6, to the decision of the Privy Council in
Judges v. Attorney-General of Saskatchewan (1937), 2 D. L. R.
209, construing income tax statutes of Saskatchewan. Neither
the Dominion nor the Province has any law forbidding diminu-
tion of compensation of judges while in office and that decision
has nothing to do with the question before us. The Australian
and South African cases cited, footnotes 6 and 8, involved con-
struction of income tax statutes under constitutions or charters
created by legislative enactments and subject to authoritative
interpretation or change by the local or British parliament. They
shed no light upon the issue in this case.442
The O'Malley case is thus another example of the Court citing for-
eign law to illuminate the meaning of U.S. law. But, as Justice
Scalia might note, it is not really analogous to a case of the Court
finding a new right for gays or juvenile capital defendants based on
such sources and, arguably, O'Malley is thus not precedent for the
Court's holdings in Roper and Lawrence.
438. [1937] D.L.R. 209 (P.C.).
439. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 281 n.6.
440. 1929 A.D. at 286 (S. Afr.).
441. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 281 n.8.
442. Id. at 298 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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4. Selective Draft Law Cases
In the 1918 Selective Draft Law Cases,443 the Supreme Court
found that a 1917 Act passed by Congress with intent to "supply
temporarily the increased military force which Was required by the
existing emergency, the war then and now flagrant 444 was constitu-
tional. The Court found that the power to raise an army in conjunc-
tion with the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution
authorized a compulsory draft. Specifically, the Court stated:
The possession of authority to enact the statute must be found
in the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress power "to
declare war; ... to raise and support armies, but no appropriation
of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
... to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces." And of course the powers conferred by these
provisions like all other powers given carry with them as pro-
vided by the Constitution the authority "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers." As the mind cannot conceive an army without
the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objec-
tion that it does not give power to provide for such men would
seem to be too frivolous for further notice.445
The Court then looked to foreign law for evidence that compelled
military service is not repugnant to a free government.446 Writing
for the Court, Justice White cited Vattel's Law of Nations for the
proposition that the "very conception of a just government and its
duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to
render military service in case of need and the right to compel it.
447
The Court further wrote that it was "absolutely unnecessary" to do
more than state this proposition, as it was illustrated by the "almost
universal legislation to that effect" then in force.448 In a footnote, the
443. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
444. Id. at 375.
445. Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
446. Id. at 378-79.
447. Id. at 378 (citing to VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, Book III, chs. 1-2 (1879)).
448. Id.
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Court supported its statement that there was virtually universal
legislation enforcing military service by providing a broad survey of
the contemporary practices of foreign nations, noting governments
who enforced military service, such as the Argentine Republic,
Bolivia, Columbia, China, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Turkey.449
The Court also noted English practice, where the "duty of the
great militant body of the citizens was recognized and enforcible"
before the Norman conquest, and the contemporaneous English
Military Service Act of 1916, which exemplified the right of the
English Parliament to "impose compulsory duty upon the citizen to
perform military duty wherever the public exigency exacted,
whether at home or abroad."45 The Court next considered American
history-both before and after the separation from England-
regarding the right to enforce military service.451 Summarizing its
review of both foreign and domestic sources, the Court stated:
449. Id. at 378-79 n.1. The footnote, in its entirety, reads as follows:
In the argument of the Government it is stated: 'The Statesman's Year-book for
1917 cites the following governments as enforcing military service: Argentine
Republic, p. 656; Austria-Hungary, p. 667; Belgium, p. 712; Brazil, p. 738;
Bulgaria, p. 747; Bolivia, p. 728; Colombia, p. 790; Chile, p. 754; China, p. 770;
Denmark, p. 811; Ecuador, p. 820; France, p. 841; Greece, p. 1001; Germany, p.
914; Guatemala, p. 1009; Honduras, p. 1018; Italy, p. 1036; Japan, p. 1064;
Mexico, p. 1090; Montenegro, p. 1098; Netherlands, p. 1119; Nicaragua, p. 1142;
Norway, p. 1152; Peru, p. 1191; Portugal, p. 1201; Roumania, p. 1220; Russia,
p. 1240; Serbia, p. 1281; Siam, p. 1288; Spain, p. 1300; Switzerland, p. 1337;
Salvador, p. 1270; Turkey, p. 1353." See also the recent Canadian conscription
act, entitled, "Military Service Act" of August 27, 1917, expressly providing for
service abroad (printed in the Congressional Record of September 20, 1917, 55th
Cong. Rec., p. 7959); the Conscription Law of the Orange Free State, Law No.
10, 1899, Military Service and Commando Law, sections 10 and 28, Laws of
Orange River Colony, 1901, p. 855; of the South African Republic, "De Locale
Wetten en Volksraadsbesluiten der Zuid-Afr. Republiek," 1898, Law No. 20, pp.
230, 233, article 6, 28; Constitution, German Empire, April 16, 1871, Art. 57, 59,
Dodd, 1 Modern Constitutions, p. 344; Gesetz, betreffend Aenderungen der
Wehrpflicht, vom 11 Feb. 1888, No. 1767, Reichs-Gesetzblatt, p. 11, amended by
law of July 22, 1913, No. 4264, RGBI., p. 593; Loi sur le recrutement de l'arm6e
of 15 July, 1889 (Duvergier, vol. 89, p. 440), modified by act of 21 March, 1905
(Duvergier, vol. 105, p. 133).
Id.
450. Id. at 379 (citing Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 1 (Eng.); Military
Service Act Amendment, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 15, § 1 (Eng.)).
451. Id. at 379-87.
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Thus sanctioned as is the act before us by the text of the Consti-
tution, and by its significance as read in the light of the funda-
mental principles with which the subject is concerned, by the
power recognized and carried into effect in many civilized coun-
tries, by the authority and practice of the colonies before the
Revolution, of the States under the Confederation and of the
Government since the formation of the Constitution, the want of
merit in the contentions that the act in the particulars which we
have been previously called upon to consider was beyond the
constitutional power of Congress, is manifest.5 2
In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Court thus again looked to
foreign law as a part of its rationale for upholding a congressional
statute-in this instance, one enforcing the military draft. The
Selective Draft Law Cases, like the Legal Tender Cases, are a major
instance of the Supreme Court relying on foreign law to expand the
powers of the national government.
5. Block v. Hirsh
In the post-World War I rent control case of Block v. Hirsh,453 the
Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Holmes, noted foreign prac-
tice in upholding a District of Columbia law that created residential
rent control terms during post-wartime emergency.454 The Court
stated that, as the emergency declared by Congress in passing the
statute was assumed to exist,455 the question for the Court was
whether "Congress was incompetent to meet it in the way in which
it has been met by most of the civilized countries of the world."'456
The Court upheld the congressional statute, noting that such an
emergency was sufficient to clothe "the letting of buildings in the
452. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
453. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
454. Id. at 158.
455. The Court noted that Congress stated "a publicly notorious and almost world-wide
fact" as justification for the statute. Id. at 154. Congress stated that the statute was passed
to impose rent control in the District in response to "emergencies growing out of the war,
resulting in rental conditions in the District dangerous to the public health and burdensome
to public officers, employees and accessories, and thereby embarrassing the Federal
Government in the transaction of the public business." Id.
456. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
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District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify
regulation by law. 457
The Court also considered whether the statute was a taking with-
out due process of law. In that respect, the Court stated as follows:
All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of
public control are present. The only matter that seems to us
open to debate is whether the statute goes too far. For just as
there comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves
only that of eminent domain, it may be conceded that regula-
tions of the present sort pressed to a certain height might
amount to a taking without due process of law.458
The Court found the statute not to be a taking, especially due to its
temporary nature and its provision of "[m] achinery" to "secure to the
landlord a reasonable rent."'459 The Court also found acceptable the
preference the statute gave to the tenant in possession, as it found
this to be an almost necessary component of the statute, and noted
that such a preference is "traditional in English law."46 Justice
Holmes concluded the Court's opinion by addressing the relevance
of the legitimacy of the statute, in light of the practices in other
nations, as follows:
Assuming that the end in view otherwise justified the means
adopted by Congress, we have no concern of course with the
question whether those means were the wisest, whether they
may not cost more than they come to, or will effect the result
desired. It is enough that we are not warranted in saying that
legislation that has been resorted to for the same purpose all
over the world, is futile or has no reasonable relation to the relief
sought.461
457. Id. In regard to the preference the statute gave to the tenant in possession, the Court
stated that this was "an almost necessary incident of the policy and is traditional in English
law." Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
458. Id. at 156.
459. Id. at 157.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 158 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Thus, Justice Holmes 412 in Block, much like Justice Harlan in
Lochner and Justice Brewer in Muller, looked to foreign law and
practice as evidence of the reasonableness of an American statute.
Block followed the Selective Draft Law Cases and the Legal Tender
Cases in using foreign law to expand the power of the national
government.
IV. CASES INCLUDING FOREIGN SOURCES OF LAW FROM 1940 TO
THE PRESENT
During the years from 1940 to the present, the Supreme Court
has greatly accelerated the number of references it has made to
foreign law in constitutional cases. This Part of our Article will dis-
cuss some of the most significant citations of foreign law the
Court has made over the past sixty-five years. It does not, however,
address every instance in which the members of the Court have
looked to such sources. 463 The trend during these years has been
toward a dramatic increase in the frequency with which the Court
462. It deserves mention that Justice Holmes was also a Harvard professor prior to his
service on the Supreme Court. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
LAW AND THE INNER SELF 198-202 (1993).
463. For some additional cases decided from 1940 to the present that invoke foreign sources
of law, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that
the view that detention of inadmissible aliens incident to removal "cannot be justified as
punishment nor can the confinement or its conditions be designed in order to punish ...
accords with international views on detention of refugees and asylum seekers" and citing to
the report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Comm. on
Human Rights [UNCHR] Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4
(Dec. 28, 1999), as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines
on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention on Asylum-Seekers (Feb. 10,
1999)); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,828 (1997) (holding that individual members of Congress
did not have standing to maintain a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item
Veto Act, and stating, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that there would be nothing
irrational about a system that would grant standing in such a case, as "some European
constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of such a regime," but pointing out
that the American "regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts"); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 n.21 (1964) (discussing the practice of
foreign nations, including England and civil law nations, regarding the act of state doctrine);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute at
issue in the case, which proscribed criminal penalties for using contraceptive drugs or devices,
involved "what, by common understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be
granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most basic
sense"); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (noting that certain actions may be shocking
to a "universal sense of justice").
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turns to foreign law, especially in the area of criminal law, and in
progressively more controversial and groundbreaking cases. There
has also been, as those familiar with the current debate are keenly
aware, much more public and vigorous disagreement among the
members of the Court regarding the relevance of foreign law in
recent years than in the past. Much of the disagreement has been
played out in majority and dissenting opinions. More recently,
members of the Rehnquist Court have begun to speak publicly of
their views on this subject.4"
For ease of discussion, we have organized the recent cases in
which the Supreme Court has considered foreign law into four
groups. The first and fourth groups include cases in which either
Justice Felix Frankfurter or Justice Stephen Breyer made the
foreign reference, as these two Justices have frequently looked to
foreign sources of law for guidance during this period and have ad-
vocated their use. Both Justices were professors at Harvard Law
School early in their careers, 465 as well as Supreme Court Justices,
and both make significant references to foreign sources of law in
some of the opinions for which they are most well known. We con-
sider below two famous comparative judicial opinions by Justice
Frankfurter, 466 and in a later section we discuss two important
comparative opinions by Justice Breyer.467 We think it is no accident
that three former Harvard Law School professors, Justices Story,
Frankfurter, and Breyer, would end up being by themselves almost
a cottage industry for Supreme Court citation of foreign sources of
law. It is not surprising that former academics who become
Justices will be more knowledgeable about foreign law than are
other justices, and it is also not surprising that such justices will
thus be tempted to cite what they know. Indeed, the harder phe-
nomenon to explain may be why Harvard graduate and former
comparative law professor Antonin Scalia has been as resistant to
reliance on foreign sources of law as he has been.
The second group of cases in which the Court looked to foreign
law for guidance during this period includes criminal law cases
in determining the evolving meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
464. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
465. 2 DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 992, 1023 (4th ed. 2004).
466. See infra Part IV.A.
467. See infra Part IV.D.
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We have arranged the criminal law cases chronologically to
demonstrate how the modern Supreme Court has considered such
sources in criminal matters more frequently since the Warren
Court's plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles.4" That opinion began the
current inquiry into foreign law and opinion under the "evolving
standards of decency" framework of the Eighth Amendment, and
culminated in the landmark opinion striking down the juvenile
death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.469
The third group of cases in which the Supreme Court refers to
foreign sources of law includes cases related to major social issues,
including the revolutionary decision in Roe v. Wade47 ° where the
reference made to foreign law is often overlooked.
A. Opinions of Justice Frankfurter
Strikingly, Justice Frankfurter, who was born in Vienna,
Austria,47' often wrote of the "notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples" '472 and of the practices of "the English-speaking world. 473
In addition to the two famous Frankfurter opinions discussed be-
low, Adamson v. California474 and Wolf v. Colorado,475 Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurrence in Smith v. California,476 considered
foreign law to show the importance of including certain forms of
evidence in a trial for violation of obscenity laws.477 Justice Frank-
furter asserted that there was a due process right to introduce evi-
dence regarding the prevailing literary standards and moral criteria
by which books are deemed obscene. He stated that the "importance
of this type of evidence in prosecutions for obscenity has been im-
468. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
469. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
470. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
471. HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 4 (1960).
472. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,67-
68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
473. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
474. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
475. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
476. 361 U.S. 147, 160-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
477. Justice Frankfurter also looked to foreign law in two footnotes of his majority opinion
for the Court in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 n.4, 583 n.5 (1946). In New
York, Justice Frankfurter noted the laws of Argentina, Canada, and Australia in upholding
Congress's right to tax the State of New York on sales of mineral waters. Id.
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pressively attested by the recent debates in the House of Commons
dealing with the insertion of such a provision in the enactment of
the Obscene Publications Act."478
1. Adamson v. California
Justice Stanley F. Reed wrote the Supreme Court's majority opin-
ion in the highly controversial 1947 case of Adamson v. Califor-
nia.479 The case involved the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited the state of California from allowing a prose-
cutor or a court to comment upon, and the jury to consider, a crimi-
nal defendant's failure to testify in proceedings against him.4"' The
majority held that such commentary by state prosecutors and courts
was not unconstitutional.48'
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion that provided the
fifth and decisive vote for the majority in this hotly contested case,
agreed with the Court that the Fifth Amendment was not made
effective against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.482
Rather, Justice Frankfurter argued that the relevant question in
478. Smith, 361 U.S. at 166 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
479. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
480. Id. at 48-49.
481. Id. at 50-51. Justice Reed wrote:
It is settled law that the clause of the Fifth Amendment, protecting a person
against being compelled to be a witness against himself, is not made effective by
the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection against state action on the ground
that freedom from testimonial compulsion is a right of national citizenship, or
because it is a privilege and immunity secured by the Federal Constitution as
one of the rights of man that are listed in the Bill of Rights.
Id.
482. Justice Frankfurter believed that any
construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into
a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would, as has been
noted, tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the several States, and
would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for
extending the area of freedom.
Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Adamson reflected a long-standing conflict of ideology
(and personality) between Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black, who penned an adamant
dissent to the majority opinion. Id. at 68-92. Commentators have noted that the five-to-four
decision in Adamson was Justice Frankfurter's last major "victory" on the Court. Richard L.
Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1197, 1224 (1995). For more discussion regarding Justice Frankfurter and his
Adamson concurrence, see generally id.
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reviewing the due process claim in Adamson was "whether the crim-
inal proceedings which resulted in conviction deprived the accused
of the due process of law to which the United States Constitution
entitled him.'483
Judicial review in this instance, Justice Frankfurter argued, im-
posed a duty of judgment on the Court to determine if the proceed-
ings "offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses. 48 4 In so stating, Justice
Frankfurter was offering his own version of the Hurtado and Palko
Courts' reasonableness in criminal procedure test, although, unlike
those prior Courts, Frankfurter was measuring reasonableness
in criminal procedure by the practice in other common law instead
of civil law jurisdictions. Justice Frankfurter stated that, as the
standards of English-speaking peoples "are not authoritatively
formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a phar-
macopoeia," judges must be restrained by accepted notions of justice
in determining what is decent and fair.4"5 He explicitly said that
those notions of fairness should derive not only from the American
people, but from all "English-speaking peoples.""4 6
Just a few years later in Rochin v. California,48 ' a case which held
that using capsules that were forcibly pumped from a defendant's
stomach as evidence against him in a criminal trial violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,488 Justice
Frankfurter used the same language regarding the "notions of jus-
tice of English-speaking peoples" in his opinion for the Court.4"9 In
these cases, Justice Frankfurter clearly made reference to foreign
sources of law by suggesting that the content of American criminal
procedural rules could be divined by references to the practices of
English-speaking peoples. Frankfurter thus put himself in line with
the more liberal Justices on the current Court with respect to reli-
ance on foreign law.
483. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
484. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
488. Id. at 172.
489. Id. at 169.
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2. Wolf v. Colorado
The 1949 majority opinion written by Justice Frankfurter in Wolf
v. Colorado490 not only referred to the opinions of foreign jurisdic-
tions regarding illegally obtained evidence, it also included an entire
table compiling relevant decisions from Australia, Canada, England,
India, and Scotland.49' In 1914 in Weeks v. United States,4 92 the
Court ruled that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal
criminal trials.493 However, thirty-five years later in Wolf the Court
held that the Weeks exclusionary rule was not incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, it was
not a rule imposed upon the states.494 In so holding, Justice Frank-
furter once again looked to the practices of the states and the
"English-speaking world,' 495 as he had done two years earlier in his
Adamson concurrence.
Justice Frankfurter first referred to "English-speaking peoples"
when stating that the "security of one's privacy against arbi-
trary intrusions by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society. ' 496 He explained:
It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by
night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but
solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commen-
tary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the
conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the
basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.497
However, the Court found that the methods of "enforcing such
a basic right raise questions of a different order."'4 9 Justice
490. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
491. Id. at 30, 39.
492. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
493. Id. at 392.
494. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33.
495. Id. at 29.
496. Id. at 27.
497. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
498. Id. at 28.
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Frankfurter stated that the Weeks exclusionary rule was not de-
rived explicitly from the Fourth Amendment's requirements or
Congressional legislation; rather, the Weeks decision was "a matter
of judicial implication. ' 49' Thus, the immediate question before the
Court was "whether the basic right to protection against arbitrary
intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically relevant
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure because,
in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be excluded.""5 °
In reaching the decision on the issue at hand, the Court pointed
out that "[a] s a matter of inherent reason," men entirely devoted to
protecting the right of privacy might arrive at differing answers.50 '
Justice Frankfurter then stated that "[wihen we find that in fact
most of the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to
such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must
hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of the
right."50 2 Justice Frankfurter examined the practices of other na-
tions, stating that "[o]f 10 jurisdictions within the United Kingdom
and the British Commonwealth of Nations which have passed on the
question, none has held evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure inadmissible."" The Court also included a table, Table J,
that compiled the decisions of these foreign nations, finding that
evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure was admis-
sible evidence in a criminal trial.50 4 The table the Court included
follows:
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 28-29.
502. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter first examined the practices of forty-
seven states that had passed on the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure, concluding that thirty-one states had rejected the Weeks exclusionary doctrine, while
sixteen agreed with it. Id. The Court also included tables further demonstrating the
breakdown of the states in their decisions regarding the Weeks doctrine. See id. at 33-39
tbls.A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H & J.
503. Id. at 30.
504. Id. at 39 tbl.J.
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TABLE j. 505
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELD ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
AUSTRALIA Miller v. Noblet, [1927] S.A.S.R. 385.
CANADA
ALTA. Rex v. Nelson, [1922] 2 W.W.R. 381, 69 D.L.R. 180.
MAN. Rex v. Duroussel, 41 Man. 15, [1933] 2 D.L.R. 446.
ONT. Regina v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 347.
SASK. Rex v. Kostachuk, 24 Sask. 485, 54 Can. C.C. 189.
ENGLAND See Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K.B. 164.
INDIA
ALL. Ali Ahmad Khan v. Emperor, 81 I.C. 615 (1).
CAL. Baldeo Bin v. Emperor, 142 I.C. 639.
RANG. Chwa Hum Htive v. Emperor, 143 I.C. 824.
SCOTLAND See Hodgson v. Macpherson, [1913] S.C. (J.) 68, 73.
Wolf v. Colorado thus stands along with Frankfurter's concurrence
in Adamson and with the Court's prior opinions in Hurtado and
Palko in support of the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the states to have reasonable rules of criminal procedure,
and that the reasonableness of such rules can be divined by look-
ing to foreign law. We disagree with this construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but we note that there are provisions of
the Constitution that do require reasonableness, such as the Fourth
Amendment in its ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and
the Eighth Amendment in its ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments. We think that, as to those amendments, reasonableness
review in light of foreign sources of law is supported by the
Adamson, Wolf, Hurtado, and Palko line of cases.
505. Id.
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B. Criminal Cases
The second significant set of cases that relies on foreign sources
of law during the last sixty-five years includes cases involving issues
of criminal law. While the use of foreign law is not isolated to just
recent criminal law cases, the trend of considering such sources in
criminal cases seems to have accelerated rather significantly in
recent years beyond its simple origin in cases like Hurtado and
Palko. In fact, there is scarcely a prominent Eighth Amendment
case decided during the last sixty-five years that does not at least
mention foreign legal opinion and practice. Other criminal cases
that did not involve the Eighth Amendment, such as Miranda v.
Arizona, also made lengthy references to foreign law.5 °6
1. Trop v. Dulles
Much of the modern Court's citation of foreign law in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence traces its roots to the plurality opinion
in Trop v. Dulles. 7 and before that to Wilkerson v. Utah, 8 an 1879
Eighth Amendment case that briefly mentions foreign law. The Trop
opinion started the Court down the path of looking to foreign
sources of law to determine what are evolving standards of decency
in evaluating what punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual." 9 Justice Kennedy himself wrote in Roper v. Simmons that
"at least from the time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has
referred to the laws of other countries and to international authori-
ties as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments."'510 Trop is also a
very significant case as it is the first instance we have found in the
Supreme Court's history in which the Court turned to foreign
506. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see infra Part IV.B.2.
507. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988)
(stating that the Court has "previously recognized the relevance of the views of the
international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual" and
citing Trop v. Dulles).
508. 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879). See Jackson, supra note 10, at 109 n.3.
509. See, e.g., Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 199
(1998).
510. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) (emphasis added).
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sources of law in the course of a decision that struck down, rather
than upheld, an existing statute. There can be no question then of
the seminal importance of Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion
in Trop v. Dulles.
The question in Trop was whether forfeiture of citizenship as
punishment for a conviction by court-martial for wartime desertion
was constitutional.5" A plurality of the Court, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, first concluded that "citizenship is not subject to the
general powers of the National Government and therefore cannot be
divested in the exercise of those powers." '512 However, the plurality
did not stop at this, although Chief Justice Warren stated that "[o]n
this ground alone the judgment in this case should be reversed."5"
Rather, the plurality continued to examine whether, if the govern-
ment did have the innate power to divest citizenship, divestiture of
citizenship for commission of a crime violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment."4 In conclud-
ing that the "Eighth Amendment forbids Congress to punish by
taking away citizenship,""5 5 the plurality examined the philosophy
and history of the proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Chief Justice Warren wrote:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual"
has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy
reflected in these words is firmly established in the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition of criminal justice.... The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civi-
lized standards.516
The Court then recognized the imprecise nature of the words of the
Eighth Amendment, and stated, famously, that the Amendment
511. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
512. Id. at 92.
513. Id. at 93.
514. Id. at 93-104.
515. Id. at 103.
516. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."51
In considering the constitutionality of divestiture of citizenship
as a criminal sanction, the plurality did not limit itself solely to
American norms. Rather, it considered international standards of
punishment as well.518 Considering the effects of divestiture of
citizenship on the convicted criminal, Chief Justice Warren found
the punishment to be "offensive to cardinal principles for which the
Constitution stands," '519 in part because the individual "may be sub-
ject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people" and
because he becomes stateless, "a condition deplored in the interna-
tional community of democracies."52 In support of these statements,
Chief Justice Warren cited directly a United Nations study on state-
lessness.52" '
The plurality reviewed foreign law and opinion regarding divesti-
ture of citizenship as a punishment, including looking to a United
Nations survey. Chief Justice Warren stated that:
The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is
517. Id. at 100-01. One author has suggested that the use of comparative law to decide
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment can be traced back to Justice Goldberg's
dissent from a denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), which built
off of the "evolving standards of decency" language in Trop v. Dulles. David Fontana, Refined
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 539, 546 n.31 (2001). Justice
Goldberg asserted that the Court should consider whether the execution of rapists violated
the Eighth Amendment, "[iun light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world
against punishing rape by death." Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-90 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Justice Goldberg also pointed to a United Nations survey on the "laws, regulations and
practices relating to capital punishment throughout the world" and noted that all but five of
the nations responding to the survey, Nationalist China, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
Republic of South Africa, and the United States, no longer permited the imposition of the
death penalty for rape." Id. at 889 n. 1.
518. See, e.g., Consuelo Alden Vasquez, Note, Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving
Standards of Decency: The Resurrection of the Chain Gang, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
221, 251 (1995).
519. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
520. Id. (emphasis added).
521. Id. at 102 n.35. Chief Justice Warren cited a United Nations study on statelessness,
U.N. Dep't of Social Affairs, A Study on Statelessness, U.N. Doc. No. E/112, U.N. Sales No.
1949.XIV.2 (1949), and he also cited two other sources in this footnote: (1) CATHERYN
SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES (1934),
and (2) EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD § 262, § 334
(1915). Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 n.35.
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true that several countries prescribe expatriation in the event
that their nationals engage in conduct in derogation of native
allegiance. Even statutes of this sort are generally applicable
primarily to naturalized citizens. But use of denationalization as
punishment for crime is an entirely different matter. The United
Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world
reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey,
impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.52 2
The plurality concluded that "[iun this country the Eighth
Amendment forbids this to be done. 523
Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Burton, Clark, and Harlan. 4 Frankfurter, like the plural-
ity Justices, also discussed the views of "civilized nations" regarding
divestiture of citizenship as punishment for certain prohibited
behaviors, but he characterized these foreign laws differently than
the majority.525 The dissent did not, however, take issue with the
possible relevance of international opinion to the decision before the
Court. Considering the response of other nations to deprivation of
citizenship, Frankfurter stated:
Many civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for indulgence
in designated prohibited activities. Although these provisions
are often, but not always, applicable only to naturalized citizens,
they are more nearly comparable to our expatriation law than to
our denaturalization law. Some countries have made wartime
522. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
523. Id. at 103. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision that it was unconstitutional to
divest an individual of his citizenship as punishment for the crime of wartime desertion, but
he pointed to international response as a justification for expatriating citizens who vote in
foreign political elections, which was held constitutional in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958). Justice Brennan stated:
Whatever the realities of the situation, many foreign nations may well view
political activity on the part of Americans, even if lawful, as either expressions
of official American positions or else as improper meddling in affairs not their
own. In either event the reaction is liable to be detrimental to the interests of
the United States.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 106 (Brennan, J., concurring).
524. Trop, 356 U.S. at 114 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
525. Id. at 126.
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desertion result in loss of citizenship-native-born or natural-
ized.526
Following the assertion that some countries divested citizenship for
wartime desertion, Justice Frankfurter cited as an example the
Philippine Commonwealth Act.527 He also referred to a United
Nations report on Laws Concerning Nationality.52 In a footnote to
these statements, Justice Frankfurter pointed out a difference in
the theory of expatriation between the United States and other
nations, stating that "[iln the United States, denaturalization is
based exclusively on the theory that the individual obtained his
citizenship by fraud; the laws of many countries making naturalized
citizens subject to expatriation for grounds not applicable to
natural-born citizens do not relate those grounds to the actual
naturalization process." '529 In support of this statement, Justice
Frankfurter gave as an example the British Nationality Act.53°
Thus, both the plurality and dissenting opinions in Trop v. Dulles
used foreign law to support their positions.
2. Miranda v. Arizona
Supreme Court reference to foreign law in criminal cases since
Trop has not, however, been confined to the Eighth Amendment
area.531 The 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona,5 32 one of the most
526. Id. (citations omitted).
527. Id. (citing Philippine Comm. Act No. 63 § 1(6) (Oct. 21, 1936), as amended by Rep. Act
No. 106 (June 2, 1947)).
528. Trop, 356 U.S. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The citation given for the United
Nations report was "Laws Concerning Nationality, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (July
1954)." Id.
529. Trop, 356 U.S. at 126 n.6 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
530. Id. (citing British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 20(3)).
531. One should also consider Justice Jackson's pre-Trop concurring opinion in Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949), in which he distinguished American criminal
conspiracy laws from the laws of other nations. Justice Jackson stated that the doctrine of
conspiracy "does not commend itself to jurists of civil-law countries, despite universal
recognition that an organized society must have legal weapons for combatting organized
criminality." Id. He noted that the doctrine was "utterly unknown to the Roman law" and not
a part of modern continental codes. Id. at 450 n. 14. Justice Jackson further stated that most
other nations had "devised what they consider more discriminating principles upon which to
prosecute criminal gangs, secret associations and subversive syndicates." Id. at 450.
532. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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prominent and influential cases decided during the sixteen-year
span of the Warren Court, strikingly cited foreign law in support of
its revolutionary holding. The Court in Miranda, for the first time,
"extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by
the police." '533
In making its determination that requiring the interrogational
safeguard of a Miranda warning would not place too high a burden
on law enforcement officials," 4 the Court, in its majority opinion
authored by Chief Justice Warren, looked at the laws and experi-
ences of other countries, including England, Scotland, India, and
Ceylon.5"5 The Court stated that the "experience in some other coun-
tries also suggests that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on
interrogation is overplayed."53 The Court first discussed contempo-
raneous English law:
The English procedure since 1912 under the Judges' Rules is
significant. As recently strengthened, the Rules require that a
cautionary warning be given an accused by a police officer as
533. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). Since the Miranda decision, police
have been required, as a prerequisite to any custodial interrogation, to inform a criminal
suspect that (1) he has the right to remain silent, (2) anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, and (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
534. The Court stated that "[iln announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the
burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481. The Court, however, found that requiring that suspects be
appraised of their Fifth Amendment rights was necessary as a procedural safeguard of the
privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 478-79, and that these limits "should not constitute
an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement," id. at 481.
535. Id. at 486-90. The Court also discussed the history and sources of the privilege against
self-incrimination, id. at 458-60, noting that thirteenth-century scholars found an "analogue
to the privilege grounded in the Bible," id. at 458 n.27. The Court also discussed the trial of
John Lilburn, a "vocal anti-Stuart Leveller," in 1637, at which he stated that "no man's
conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself
in matters criminal, or pretended to be so." Id. at 459 (quoting THE LEVELLER TRACTS 1647-
1653, at 454 (William Haler & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944)). The Court noted that after the
Lilburn trial, Parliament abolished its Court of Star Chamber (which required an oath
binding one to answer all questions posed to him) and the "lofty principles" to which Lilburn
had appealed to were accepted in England. Id. 'These sentiments," stated the Court, "worked
their way over to the Colonies and were implanted after great struggle into the Bill of Rights."
Id.
536. Id. at 486.
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soon as he has evidence that affords reasonable grounds for sus-
picion; they also require that any statement made be given by
the accused without questioning by police. The right of the indi-
vidual to consult with an attorney during this period is expressly
recognized.53 7
In a footnote, the court quoted the relevant portions of the English
Judges' Rules and stated that "[d]espite suggestions of some laxity
in enforcement of the Rules and despite the fact some discretion as
to admissibility is invested in the trial judge, the Rules are a signifi-
cant influence in the English criminal law enforcement system. 538
The Court then addressed the safeguards present in Scottish law,
saying that they "may be even greater than in England."53 9 Scottish
judicial decisions do not allow the use in evidence of "most confes-
sions obtained through police interrogation."54 0 In a footnote to this
text, the Court quoted Lord Justice General's summation of the
theory behind the Scottish safeguards in Chalmers v. H.M. Advo-
cate:
The theory of our law is that at the state of initial investigation
the police may question anyone with a view to acquiring infor-
mation which may lead to the detection of the criminal; but that,
when the stage has been reached at which suspicion, or more
than suspicion, has in their view centred upon some person as
the likely perpetrator of the crime, further interrogation of that
person becomes very dangerous, and, if carried too far, e.g., to
the point of extracting a confession by what amounts to cross-
examination, the evidence of that confession will almost cer-
tainly be excluded. Once the accused has been apprehended and
charged he has the statutory right to a private interview with a
solicitor and to be brought before a magistrate with all conve-
nient speed so that he may, if so advised, emit a declaration in
presence of his solicitor under conditions which safeguard him
against prejudice.54 '
537. Id. at 486-88 (footnotes omitted).
538. Id. at 488 n.57.
539. Id. at 488.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 488 n.59 (citing Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate, [1954] J.C. 66, 78).
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Moving on to other countries, the Court noted that both India and
Ceylon provide procedural safeguards for the custodial interrogation
setting.542 Considering India, the Court stated that, since 1872, the
rules of evidence have excluded "confessions made to police not in
the presence of a magistrate. 543 The Evidence Order of Ceylon, the
Court noted, has since 1895 contained a provision identical to that
in India. 544 The Court also pointed out that these provisions were
similar to those of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in our own
country, as it has "long provided that no suspect may be interro-
gated without first being warned of his right not to make a state-
ment and that any statement he makes may be used against him. 545
Looking at the experiences of these other nations, the Court
observed that there was no apparent "detrimental effect on criminal
law enforcement in these jurisdictions" due to the rules safeguard-
ing the criminal interrogation environment. 546 The Court then
concluded its discussion of foreign law by drawing a parallel be-
tween the United States criminal justice system and the criminal
justice systems existent in the previously described foreign nations.
The Court found its discussion of foreign laws relevant because
[c]onditions of law enforcement in our country are sufficiently
similar to permit reference to this experience as assurance that
lawlessness will not result from warning an individual of his
rights or allowing him to exercise them. Moreover, it is consis-
tent with our legal system that we give at least as much protec-
tion to these rights as is given in the jurisdictions described.547
542. Id. at 488-89.
543. Id. In 1872, India operated under British law. Id. at 489. In a footnote, the Court
quoted the Indian Evidence Act § 25 as stating that "[n]o confession made to a police officer
shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." Id. at 489 n.60. Indian Evidence
Act § 26 states that "[n]o confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against
such person." Id.
544. Id. at 489.
545. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1964)).
546. Id.
547. Id. at 489. The Court continued, stating that we "deal in our country with rights
grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whereas other
jurisdictions arrived at their conclusions on the basis of principles ofjustice not so specifically
defined." Id. at 489-90.
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This reference to foreign law in Miranda v. Arizona has not gone
unnoticed or unheeded by subsequent Courts. In her concurring
opinion in New York v. Quarles, Justice O'Connor stated that in
Miranda, "the Court looked to the experience of countries like
England, India, Scotland, and Ceylon in developing its code to regu-
late custodial interrogations." '548 Justice O'Connor concluded that
because the "learning of these countries" was important to the
development of the initial Miranda rule, it should therefore be "of
equal importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda
exclusionary rule." '549 As a result, Justice O'Connor looked to the
experiences of these nations to provide support for her conclusion in
Quarles that a gun retrieved based upon a defendant's questioning
prior to receiving his Miranda warnings should not be excluded
because of its nontestimonial nature and that it was unjustified to
recognize a "public safety" exception to the Miranda requirement
that was established in the majority opinion. 550
The questionable decision in Miranda, then, could support the
Court's more recent invocations of foreign law in Lawrence55 and
Roper.5 2 Justice Scalia would no doubt respond that Miranda, like
548. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 672 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
549. Id. at 673.
550. Id. at 672. Reviewing the laws of England, India, Scotland, and Ceylon, Justice
O'Connor found that
[t]hose countries had also adopted procedural rules to regulate the manner in
which police secured confessions to be used against accused persons at trial.
Confessions induced by tricky or physical abuse were never admissible at trial,
and any confession secured without the required procedural safeguards could,
in the courts' discretion, be excluded on grounds of fairness or prejudice. But
nontestimonial evidence derived from all confessions "not blatantly coerced" was
and still is admitted. Admission of nontestimonial evidence of this type is based
on the very sensible view that procedural errors should not cause entire
investigations and prosecutions to be lost.
Id. at 673 (citations omitted). Note that neither the majority nor the dissent in Quarles
referred, in any way, to Justice O'Connor's reference to foreign laws. See id. at 651-60
(majority opinion); id. at 674-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). One author has argued that Justice
O'Connor's Quarles concurrence misinterpreted the Court's use of foreign law in Miranda.
David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
805, 863 (1992). Wollin proposes that the Miranda Court did not look to foreign law to develop
the scope and boundaries of the warning requirement, but rather "as a way of ascertaining
whether its own new restrictions would have an adverse impact on criminal law enforcement."
Id.
551. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
552. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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Dred Scott 553 and Reynolds, 514 is an example of the Court making
social policy, and controversial policy at that. He would likely argue
that Miranda's use of foreign law shows that the Court was on
shaky ground-a fact further revealed by the continuing controversy
that has swirled around the Court's opinion.
3. Coker v. Georgia
The Court next cited foreign law in a criminal case again involv-
ing the Eighth Amendment. In Coker v. Georgia,5' the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, held that a sentence
of death was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for
the crime of rape.55 Thus, imposing the death penalty for rape was
a cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.557 In a footnote to this opinion, the Court pointed to the legis-
lative determinations of foreign nations and stated:
Because the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for
rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment even though it may measurably serve
the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid
for its failure to do so. We observe that in the light of the legisla-
tive decisions in almost all of the States and in most of the coun-
tries around the world, it would be difficult to support a claim
that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the
States' criminal justice system.55s
The Court also examined prior Eighth Amendment cases, such as
Gregg v. Georgia,"' as well as the trend in the sentences that state
legislatures were imposing for the crime of rape."6 After canvassing
553. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
554. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
555. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
556. Id. at 592.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 592 n.4 (emphasis added).
559. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court in Gregg sustained the imposition of the death penalty
and "firmly embraced the holdings and dicta from prior cases ... to the effect that the Eighth
Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are
'excessive' in relation to the crime committed." Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (discussing Gregg).
560. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-96.
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state laws, the Court stated that the "current judgment with respect
to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state
legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of re-
jecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman."561 In a footnote to this text, the Court invoked Trop v.
Dulles562 to justify its looking to international opinion, stating:
In Trop v. Dulles ... the plurality took pains to note the climate
of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particu-
lar punishment. It is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 ma-
jor nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the
death penalty for rape where death did not ensue. 3
The Court in Coker thus again considered foreign sources of law in
striking down a state criminal statute, as it had first done in Trop
v. Dulles. Coker v. Georgia therefore stands as direct precedent
for the majority's and Justice O'Connor's use of foreign law in
Roper-the juvenile death penalty case.
4. Enmund v. Florida
The Supreme Court looked to the "climate of international opin-
ion" in 1982 in yet another Eighth Amendment capital punishment
case, Enmund v. Florida.5' At issue in Enmund was the constitu-
tionality of imposing the death penalty as a sentence for vicarious
felony murder in a case where the defendant participated in a
robbery in which another robber committed murder.565 The majority
of the Court held that a sentence of death in this situation was
561. Id. at 596.
562. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
563. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (citing U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968)). The dissent, written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justice
Rehnquist, argued that the Georgia statute authorizing a sentence of death for the crime of
rape in certain situations was constitutional. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent,
however, contained absolutely no mention of the majority's use of foreign law, neither by way
of disagreement with this manner of using such laws nor by pointing toward foreign laws that
would indicate the propriety of the dissent's position. See id. at 604-22.
564. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
565. Id. at 787. Justice White, the author of the majority opinion, framed the issue as
"whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who
neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life." Id.
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inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 66 The
majority looked to the fact that only eight U.S. states authorized the
imposition of the death penalty in such circumstances and, in a
footnote, referred to foreign views on the issue of vicarious felony
murder, noting the practices of Canada, England, India, and conti-
nental Europe." 7 In this respect, the Court stated:
"[Tihe climate of international opinion concerning the acceptabil-
ity of a particular punishment" is an additional consideration
which is "not irrelevant." It is thus worth noting that the doc-
trine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India,
severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Common-
wealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.568
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor addressed the practice relating
to felony murder that was used in England until 1957 and its im-
pact on American law. Justice O'Connor wrote:
[T]he felony-murder doctrine, and its corresponding capital pen-
alty, originated hundreds of years ago, and was a fixture of Eng-
lish common law until 1957 when Parliament declared that an
unintentional killing during a felony would be classified as man-
slaughter. The common-law rule was transplanted to the Ameri-
can Colonies, and its use continued largely unabated into the
20th century, although legislative reforms often restricted capi-
tal felony murder to enumerated violent felonies. 69
However, Justice O'Connor also made it clear that contemporary
English law may have been quite different from the law of American
states. She stated that the "English attitude toward capital punish-
ment, as reflected in recent legislation, differs significantly from
American attitudes as reflected in state legislation."'57 Enmund v.
566. Id. at 788. Justice White wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 783. Justice Brennan filed a concurring
opinion stating his view that the death penalty is "in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment." Id. at 801 (Brennan, J., concurring).
567. Id. at 796 n.22.
568. Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10).
569. Id. at 816-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
570. Id. at 816 n.29. Justice O'Connor noted that England abolished the death penalty for
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Florida thus provides an additional example of the citation of for-
eign sources of law in an Eighth Amendment case and the use of
such sources in striking down a state criminal statute.
5. Thompson v. Oklahoma
Once again, the Court addressed the issue of reliance on foreign
sources of law in the Eighth Amendment context with respect to
the constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile murderers
younger than sixteen. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,57' the Supreme
Court moved its consideration of foreign law from the footnotes,
where it had often been relegated in previous Eighth Amendment
cases, to the text of the plurality opinion written by Justice
Stevens.572 The Court found support for its conclusion that such
executions are in conflict with civilized standards of decency in its
consistency with the judgments of other nations. The Court stated:
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of de-
cency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have
been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the
leading members of the Western European community....
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in
the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in
Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is
available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries
may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abol-
ished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and
all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for excep-
tional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Swit-
zerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet
Union.573
all murders in 1965. Id.
571. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
572. Id. at 830-31. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall joined Justice Stevens's
plurality opinion. Id. at 818. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment and made no
mention of foreign law. Id. at 848-59. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, wrote in dissent. Id. at 859. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision.
Id. at 838.
573. Id. at 830-31 (citations omitted).
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In a footnote at the beginning of this discussion, the Court
harkened back to the fact that it had "previously recognized the
relevance of the views of the international community in determin-
ing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual." '574 Other footnotes
in this discussion refer to additional statements of international
sentiment. The Court quoted from the American Law Institute
commentary to the Model Penal Code: "[C]ivilized societies will not
tolerate the spectacle of execution of children." '575 The Court also
stated that "three major human rights treaties explicitly prohibit
juvenile death penalties:" the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War.576 Thus, the Court in Thompson revisited
foreign sources of law in striking down a state criminal statute, a
practice that seemingly began in the 1958 decision in Trop v. Dulles.
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, took issue with the plurality's consideration of inter-
national laws and viewpoints, stating that it is the views and prac-
tices of the States that are determinative, not the practices of the
world community. 77 Justice Scalia wrote that:
When the Federal Government, and almost 40% of the States,
including a majority of the states that include capital punish-
ment as a permissible sanction, allow for the imposition of the
death penalty on any juvenile who has been tried as an adult,
which category can include juveniles under 16 at the time of the
offense, it is obviously impossible for the plurality to rely upon
any evolved societal consensus discernible in legislation -or at
least discernable in the legislation of this society, which is assur-
edly all that is relevant.57
Justice Scalia added to this critique a footnote directly responding
to the plurality's citation of foreign opinion that clearly expressed
574. Id. at 830 n.31. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 & n.35 (1958)).
575. Id. at 830 n.33 (emphasis added) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 5 at 133
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)).
576. Id. at 831 n.34.
577. Id. at 868-69 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
578. Id. at 868.
2005] 859
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
his views on considerations of and citations to foreign laws. He
stated:
The plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account
of what it pronounces.. .to be civilized standards of decency in
other countries ... is totally inappropriate as a means of estab-
lishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation. That 40% of our
States do not rule out capital punishment for 15-year-old felons
is determinative of the question before us here, even if that posi-
tion contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding. The practices of other na-
tions, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to deter-
mining whether a practice uniform among our people is not
merely a historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty" that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well. But
where there is not first a settled consensus among our own peo-
ple, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon
Americans through the Constitution. In the present case, there-
fore, the fact that a majority of foreign nations would not impose
capital punishment upon persons under 16 at the time of the
crime is of no more relevance than the fact that a majority of
them would not impose capital punishment at all, or have stan-
dards of due process quite different from our own.579
Thompson is, thus, yet another Eighth Amendment decision that is
founded upon foreign sources of law.
6. Atkins v. Virginia
The recent Eighth Amendment capital punishment case of Atkins
v. Virginia58 ° highlights not only the differences in opinions of the
Rehnquist Court Justices regarding the execution of the mentally
retarded, but also regarding the Supreme Court's citation and use
of foreign laws. In Atkins, the issue before the court was whether
executions of mentally retarded criminals were "cruel and unusual
579. Id. at 868 n.4 (citations omitted).
580. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.58' The major-
ity, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that such executions were
prohibited, noting that the practice had become "truly unusual" and
finding that a national consensus had developed against the prac-
tice.5"2 In a footnote to the Court's statement that a national consen-
sus had developed against executing mentally retarded offenders,
the Court looked to evidence of a consensus on the issue that went
well beyond our nation's borders. It stated:
Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative judgment
reflects a much broader social and professional consensus. For
example, several organizations with germane expertise have
adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death
penalty upon a mentally retarded offender. In addition, repre-
sentatives of widely diverse religious communities in the United
States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist tra-
ditions, have filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even
though their views about the death penalty differ, they all "share
a conviction that the execution of persons with mental retarda-
tion cannot be morally justified." Moreover, within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes com-
mitted by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disap-
proved.... Although these factors are by no means dispositive,
their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further
support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those
who have addressed the issue. s3
Thus, the Court in Atkins again pointed to foreign law in the course
of striking down a state statute regulating capital punishment.
581. Id. at 307. This same question had been answered in the negative thirteen years
earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). The Court had previously held, in the
1986 case of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
the execution of an insane prisoner, id. at 409-10. In Ford, the Court noted the "natural
abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his
own conscience or deity." Id. at 409.
582. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
583. Id. at 316 n.21 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted). In citation, the Court
noted that Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988), had considered the views of
"respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community." Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 316 n.21.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent,584 separately from
Justice Scalia, to highlight his objection to the Court's reliance on
the views of foreign nations, as well as to its consideration of the
views of religious and professional organizations and public opinion
polls.585 Chief Justice Rehnquist said:
The Court's suggestion that these sources are relevant to the
constitutional question finds little support in our precedents
and, in my view, is antithetical to considerations of federalism,
which instruct that any "permanent prohibition upon all units
of democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative
acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have ap-
proved."5"
Explicitly addressing the majority's use of foreign law and opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that he failed to see "how the views
of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide
any support for the Court's ultimate determination. '8 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that, in his opinion, only two sources, "the work
product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations," were
relevant to determining contemporary notions of decency in America
under the Eighth Amendment.588 While he conceded that some of
the Court's prior opinions had looked to foreign law,589 he said that
the Court had since "explicitly rejected" the idea that other nations'
sentencing practices had any bearing on whether the American
people accepted a particular practice.59 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist
also refuted the majority's use of precedent to bolster its citation of
foreign legal views by stating that the past cases citing to foreign
opinion "rely only on the bare citation of international laws by the
Trop plurality as authority to deem other countries' sentencing
584. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
585. Id. at 322.
586. Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion))
(alteration in original).
587. Id. at 325.
588. Id. at 324.
589. Id. at 325 (observing the Court's reference to the "climate of international opinion" in
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)).
590. Id.
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choices germane."59' Chief Justice Rehnquist then pointed to the fact
that the Trop citation was found not in a majority opinion, but in a
plurality opinion, and the "plurality-representing the view of only
a minority of the Court-offered no explanation for its own citation,
and there is no reason to resurrect this view given our sound rejec-
tion of the argument in Stanford."'592
Justice Scalia, also writing in dissent,593 set forth a scathing com-
mentary on the majority's reference to foreign law and the views of
professional and religious organizations. Justice Scalia expressed
his view that the notions of justice in foreign nations will not always
be aligned with those of the United States and thus should not be
considered in situations involving the determination of a national
consensus.594 Justice Scalia chastised the majority, stating:
But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
"national consensus" must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated
to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious
organizations, members of the so-called "world community," and
respondents to opinion polls. I agree with the Chief Justice that
the views of professional and religious organizations and the
results of opinion polls are irrelevant. Equally irrelevant are the
practices of the "world community," whose notions of justice are
(thankfully) not always those of our people. 'We must never
forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America
that we are expounding.... [W]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them
to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitu-
tion." 95
591. Id.
592. Id. (referring to Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion), which
held the juvenile death penalty constitutional).
593. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 337
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
594. Id. at 347-48.
595. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2005] 863
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
7. Roper v. Simmons
As noted above, in reaching its controversial holding that the
juvenile death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old murder-
ers is unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Roper
v. Simmons59 included a considerable and lengthy discussion of the
laws and practices of foreign nations as well as international opin-
ion and agreements. Justice Kennedy stated that the majority
considered the views of the world at such length because the "opin-
ion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclu-
sions." ' Thus, the majority claimed that it acknowledged foreign
law in striking down the state statute allowing for juvenile execu-
tions as a way of providing additional support for its arguments and
demonstrating that its conclusion that the juvenile death penalty
is a cruel and unusual punishment was logical and supported by
reason, as many other nations had reached similar conclusions in
abolishing the juvenile death penalty within their own countries.
The majority began its detailed consideration of foreign law by
stating that the Court's determination that "the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirma-
tion in the stark reality that the United States is the only country
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty."59 Although the majority acknowledged that inter-
national "reality" was not controlling of the Court's decision, Justice
Kennedy declared that, "at least from the time of the Court's deci-
sion in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries
and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments."'599 The Court specifically noted that the United States stood
alone as an executor of juvenile offenders, as each of the seven na-
tions that had executed juveniles since 1990-Iran, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
596. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. at 1187.
597. Id. at 1200.
598. Id. at 1198.
599. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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China-had since "either abolished capital punishment for juveniles
or made public disavowal of the practice. '0°
The majority also considered the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles under eighteen years of age.6"' The Court
noted that the Convention on the Rights of the Child had been rati-
fied by every nation in the world "save for the United States and
Somalia., 6 2 The Court's discussion of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child perhaps demonstrates the pressure some members
of the current Court may feel to avoid construing the Eighth
Amendment, with the intrinsic flexibility of the "evolving standards
of decency" analysis, in such a way that the United States would be
very much out of line with the rest of the world in its treatment of
criminal offenders.
The Court also specifically considered the practices of the United
Kingdom in regard to the juvenile death penalty, as it argued
that its experience "bears particular relevance here in light of
the historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth
Amendment's own origins," because it was modeled on a parallel
provision in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.603 The Court
stated that decades before the United Kingdom abolished the death
penalty entirely, it "recognized the disproportionate nature of the
juvenile death penalty" and "abolished [it] as a separate matter. 6 °4
Thus, based on the foregoing analysis of the laws of foreign nations
and international agreements and practice, the majority concluded
that it was proper to "acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion as against the juvenile death penalty, resting
in large part on the understanding that the instability and emo-
tional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the
crime.
In response to the majority's detailed analysis of foreign sources
of law, Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
600. Id. at 1199.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 1200.
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and Justice Thomas, 6 wrote a lengthy rebuttal arguing vehemently
against the use of such sources in this type of case. He also rejected
the notion that the majority included the international references
for purposes of "acknowledgment" and simply to support further an
already legitimate decision, instead declaring that the majority used
the foreign sources as a part of the actual basis for the Court's judg-
ment.0 7 In keeping with his other scathing dissents arguing against
the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication, Justice Scalia
contended that the idea that American law should conform with the
rest of the world's laws "ought to be rejected out of hand. 6 °8
In making his case that the Court should not use foreign law in
an attempt to force the United States to conform with the laws of
other nations, Justice Scalia pointed out that in "many significant
respects the laws of most other countries differ from our law," in-
cluding explicit constitutional provisions, such as the right to jury
trial, and interpretive decrees, such as the exclusionary rule.6 9 He
also cogently argued that the majority's use of foreign law in this
instance is rather opportunistic, as these sources serve to affirm
"the Justices' own notion of how the world ought to be. 610 In many
other instances, he argued, the Court has felt free to remain "oblivi-
ous" to the views of foreign nations,6 ' such as in interpreting the
Establishment Clause, an area in which most other nations "do not
insist on the degree of separation between church and state that
this Court requires." '' Justice Scalia also pointed out that the
Court's abortion jurisprudence differs dramatically from that of the
rest of the world, as the United States is "one of only six countries
that allow[s] abortion on demand until the point of viability.6 3
Justice Scalia also found indefensible the majority's "special reli-
ance on the laws of the United Kingdom. ' 61 4 He argued that the
Court's consideration of them was not the proper contemplation of
English law because it was not a consideration of "18th-century
606. Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
607. Id. at 1229.
608. Id. at 1226.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 1229.
611. Id. at 1227.
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id.
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English law and legal thought," and the Court had already long ago
rejected a purely originalist approach to the Eighth Amendment. 15
He stated that the Court had instead undertaken the "majestic task
of determining (and thereby prescribing) our Nation's current stan-
dards of decency" and found it "beyond comprehension" why the
Court should look "to a country that has developed, in the centuries
since the Revolutionary War ... a legal, political, and social culture
quite different from our own." '616
Justice O'Connor wrote separately in dissent, in part to make
clear her disagreement with Justice Scalia's contention "that foreign
and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence." '617 Considering both the history of referring to foreign
sources in this area of the law, as well as the benefits of considering
such sources, Justice O'Connor wrote as follows:
Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consis-
tently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its
assessment of evolving standards of decency. This inquiry re-
flects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as
the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from the
maturing values of civilized society. Obviously, American law is
distinctive in many respects, not least where the specific provi-
sions of our Constitution and the history of its exposition so dic-
tate. But this Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds
with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary,
we should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic
and international values, especially where the international
community has reached clear agreement- expressed in interna-
tional law or in the domestic laws of individual countries-that
a particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamen-
tal human rights. At least, the existence of an international
consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness
of a consonant and genuine American consensus. 8'
615. Id. at 1228.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 1215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
618. Id. at 1215-16 (citations omitted).
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However, because Justice O'Connor found that no domestic consen-
sus existed against the imposition of the juvenile death penalty, it
was her opinion that the "recent emergence of an otherwise global
consensus" was not enough to overcome or "alter that basic fact. 619
C. Social Issue Cases
In the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has decided three
key social issue cases that refer to and cite foreign sources of law:
Roe v. Wade,62° Washington v. Glucksberg,62' and Lawrence v.
Texas.622 Most famously, Roe v. Wade contains considerable discus-
sion of English statutory and case law from the years after the sign-
ing of the Declaration of Independence, when England was a foreign
country. Roe also contains substantial references to the factual expe-
riences of other nations that allowed legalized abortion as a medical
procedure. The assisted suicide case, Washington v. Glucksberg, also
made extensive reference to foreign law and practice to provide
factual evidence of the harmful consequences of a legal rule allowing
assisted suicide, paying a great deal of attention to the experiences
of the Netherlands, where assisted suicide led rapidly to involuntary
euthanasia. Finally, Lawrence's reliance on foreign sources of law
has been especially controversial because it differs in some respects
from the way in which the Court used such sources in Roe and
Glucksberg. Setting aside the Roe Court's discussion of English law,
the two earlier social issue cases in this time period primarily
looked to foreign nations for factual evidence of the consequences of
a particular legal rule. The references to foreign law were thus pri-
marily empirical efforts to determine what the consequences of
particular legal rules had been when they were employed by a for-
eign legal culture. In contrast, the Lawrence Court looked at foreign
sources of law for moral guidance as to what the content of Ameri-
can law ought to be. This is inevitably a far more controversial use
of foreign law, and one which we think is much more appropriately
open to criticism.
619. Id. at 1216.
620. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
621. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
622. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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1. Roe v. Wade
In 1973, in its landmark abortion case, Roe v. Wade, the Burger
Court held that the Constitution protects a woman's right to have
an abortion in certain situations. The Court's opinion in Roe has
its roots in Griswold v. Connecticut624 which was foreshadowed by
Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman.62 Strikingly, in
Poe Justice Harlan said that the statute at issue, which prescribed
criminal penalties for using birth control, involved "what, by com-
mon understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must
be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy
of the home in its most basic sense." '626 Harlan's dissent in Poe,
which gave rise to Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas, thus specifi-
cally referred to foreign conceptions of law throughout the English-
speaking world as the source for the right to privacy.
The Court's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade was written by Jus-
tice Blackmun, and it summarily stated that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ... or ... in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy."627 In finding that a woman has a "fundamental
right" to an abortion,62 8 the Court reviewed five "aspects" of the
history of abortion in order to gain such "insight as that history may
623. Specifically, the Court held that state criminal abortion statutes that exempt "from
criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy
stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. The Court held that there can
be no state regulation of first trimester abortion. Id. During the second trimester, the state
may regulate abortion only to the extent that such regulation promotes the health of the
mother. Id. (stating that regulation must be "reasonably related" to maternal health). In the
third trimester, the stage "subsequent to viability," the State may regulate and proscribe
abortion except where necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id.
at 164-65.
624. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
625. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
626. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
627. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
628. See id. at 152. The Court stated that zones of privacy existed under the Constitution
and that prior decisions made it clear that "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy." Id. (citation omitted).
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afford":629 (1) ancient attitudes toward abortion,63 ° (2) the signifi-
cance of the Hippocratic Oath,63' (3) the common law's treatment of
abortion,632 (4) the treatment of abortion under English statutory
law,633 and (5) the historical treatment of abortion in American
law.
6 34
While the Court's historical exegesis has been widely criticized,6 35
far less attention has been paid to the fact that an entire section of
the Court's historical analysis actually refers to foreign law, specifi-
cally English statutory law during the nineteenth and, twentieth
centuries.636 Justice Blackmun began this section of his opinion in
Roe by stating that England's first criminal abortion statute was
adopted in 1803.637 This statute, known as Lord Ellenborough's Act,
629. Id. at 129.
630. Id. at 130. While the Court found that ancient attitudes were "not capable of precise
determination," it reviewed the criminalization of abortion by the Persian Empire, the fact
that abortion was practiced ("resorted to without scruple") during Greek and Roman times,
Soranos's (an Ephesian and the "greatest of the ancient gynecologists") opposition to Rome's
free-abortion practices, and the fact that "[aincient religion did not bar abortion." Id.
631. Id. at 130-32. The Court stated that the Hippocratic Oath, which is a long-standing
ethical guide for the medical profession, includes the command not to "give to a woman a
pessary to produce abortion." Id. at 131. The Court then noted, however, that the Hippocratic
Oath was "not uncontested, even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of
philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand,
commended abortion, at least prior to viability." Id.
632. Id. at 132-36. The Court stated that it is "undisputed that at common law, abortion
performed before 'quickening-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero,
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy-was not an indictable
offense." Id. at 132 (footnote omitted). The Court said this "absence of a common-law crime
for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier
philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins." Id. at 132-33.
The Court then reviewed the foundations for such concepts. Id. at 133-36.
633. Id. at 136-38. In this section, the Court considered English statutory law from 1803
through 1967, a time period well after the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776;
thus, the Court was considering foreign law.
634. Id. at 138-41.
635. See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Linton, Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation,
15 AM. J.L. & MED. 227,228 (1989) (published as part of a series of articles under the heading:
The Webster Amicus Curiae Briefs: Perspectives on the Abortion Controversy and the Role of
the Supreme Court) (stating that the "Court's examination of the history of abortion regulation
was seriously flawed and failed to take into account the state of medical technology in which
the law of abortion evolved").
636. Again, it should be stressed that for the purposes of this Article, all citations to
English law established after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, in 1776, are
considered foreign law.
637. Roe, 410 U.S. at 136.
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made abortion of a "quick fetus ' a capital crime, but it provided
'lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and
thus preserved the 'quickening' distinction" of the common law.639
The Roe Court then went on to discuss a "seemingly notable"640
development in English law, the 1939 case of Rex v. Bourne,"'
which held that an abortion performed to save the life of the mother
was exempted from the criminal penalties of the Offenses Against
the Person Act of 1861.642 The Court then discussed Judge
Macnaghten's conclusion that England's 1861 Act, like its 1929 Act,
contained an exception for abortions performed to preserve the life
of the mother and noted the judge's broad construction of what it
meant to preserve the mother's life as including "a serious and per-
manent threat to the mother's health.""3 The Court concluded its
survey by summarizing the English Abortion Act of 1967:
The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion
where two other licensed physicians agree (a) "that the continu-
ance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the preg-
nant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated," or (b) "that there is a
substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handi-
capped." The Act also provides that, in making this determina-
tion, "account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or
reasonably foreseeable environment." It also permits a physi-
cian, without the concurrence of others, to terminate a
pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion
638. See id. at 132 (stating that quickening was the first recognizable movement of the
fetus in utero); see also supra note 632.
639. Roe, 410 U.S. at 136. The Roe Court noted that the English distinction between
abortions before and after quickening disappeared from 1837 until 1861, and failed to
reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, which formed the "core of English
anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967." Id. According to Justice Blackmun,
England passed another related Act in 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, which made
it a felony to destroy '"the life of a child capable of being born alive,"' but made an exception
for abortions "done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."' Id.
at 136-37.
640. Id. at 137.
641. [1939] 1 KB. 687 (C.C.C.).
642. Roe, 410 U.S. at 137.
643. Id.
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"is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the preg-
nant woman."'
The Roe Court clearly believed that this 1967 English statute bol-
stered its own case that the U.S. Constitution created a right to an
abortion, even though the Court never explained why foreign law
ought to control the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court moved beyond examining abortion practices and laws
in England and also looked to the experiences of other foreign coun-
tries that had legalized abortion to rebut the argument that abor-
tion, as a medical procedure, "was a hazardous one for the
woman." 45 The Court stated that
[miortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where
the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the
rates for normal childbirth. Consequently, any interest of the
State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous
procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to
forgo it, has largely disappeared. 6
The assertion that modern medical advances had led to low abortion
mortality rates was supported, in a footnote, by citation to summa-
ries of the experiences of England, Wales, Japan, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary.6 41 Accordingly, Roe v. Wade relied significantly on
foreign sources of law in the process of fashioning new constitutional
rights for Americans out of the vague constitutional guarantee
against being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Roe is
controversial on so many grounds that its references to foreign
sources of law have been largely overlooked, but the references are
there for all to see.
644. Id. at 137-38.
645. Id. at 148-49 & n.44.
646. Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
647. Id. at 149 n.44.
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2. Washington v. Glucksberg
Washington v. Glucksberg4 required the Supreme Court to deter-
mine whether Washington State's "prohibition against 'caus[ing]' or
'aid[ing]' a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." 9 Both the majority opinion in Glucksberg and
an individual concurrence are inundated with references to the laws
and practices of other nations. Most prominently, in the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four other Justices, in-
cluding most strikingly Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,650 dis-
cussed at great length the laws and experiences of the Netherlands
with legalized euthanasia. In holding that the Washington State
statute was not unconstitutional, or in other words, that there is no
"right to die," '' the Court began, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "as we do in all due process cases, by examining our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." '52 However, the
Court's examination of the issue was not limited only to American
law and history. Immediately after asserting what the Court was
about to examine, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that in "almost
every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a
crime to assist a suicide." '53 In a footnote to this statement, he cited
a 1993 case from the Supreme Court of Canada, which stated that
a 'blanket prohibition on assisted suicide ... is the norm among
western democracies."'654 The case, Rodriguez v. British Columbia,
648. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
649. Id. at 705-06 (alterations in original).
650. Along with Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Id. at 704. Justice Scalia spoke about joining the
decision in spite of its references to foreign law:
I have also joined an opinion dealing with the question of whether there is a
constitutional right to assisted suicide that discussed, in a footnote, the fact that
"[o]ther countries are embroiled in similar debates"-citing materials from
Canada, England, New Zealand, Australia, and Colombia. I have no problem
with reciting such interesting background, so long as the laws of those countries
are not asserted to be relevant to the interpretation of our Constitution. (In the
case I mentioned, they were not.)
Scalia, supra note 7, in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 305, 307 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted).
651. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709.
652. Id. at 710.
653. Id. (emphasis added).
654. Id. at 710 n.8 (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342,404
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as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, discussed assisted-suicide provi-
sions in the laws of Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and France.655
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion stated that the
Anglo-American common law tradition has typically "punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide."6"' The
Court, in considerable detail, addressed the early English views
against suicide and assisted suicide and their adoption into early
American laws and practices.657 The Court considered the changes
in American attitudes toward and legal responses to suicide since
the country's founding... and found that, although it is an issue
of present debate, American "voters and legislators continue for
the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting
suicide." '659 The Court also pointed out that the United States is not
alone in questioning the legal and moral position of assisted sui-
cide. Rather, it noted, "[o]ther countries are embroiled in similar
debates."66 The Court again referred to foreign sources of law in a
footnote, where it reviewed the practice of other nations with re-
spect to the issue of assisted suicide:
The Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected a claim that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a funda-
mental right to assisted suicide; the British House of Lords Se-
lect Committee on Medical Ethics refused to recommend any
change in Great Britain's assisted-suicide prohibition; New Zea-
land's Parliament rejected a proposed "Death With Dignity Bill"
that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide in August
1995; and the Northern Territory of Australia legalized assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia in 1995. As of February 1997,
three persons had ended their lives with physician assistance in
(Can. 1993)).
655. Id. (citing Rodriguez, [1993] 107 D.L.R. (4th) at 464).
656. Id. at 711.
657. Id. at 711-15.
658. The Court noted that, over time, the American colonies abolished harsh common law
penalties against the families of those who committed suicide. Id. at 713. However, the Court
noted that this movement away from the harsh punishments of the common law did not
signify an acceptance of suicide; rather the "change reflected the growing consensus that it
was unfair to punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing." Id.
659. Id. at 716.
660. Id. at 718 n.16.
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the Northern Territory. On March 24, 1997, however, the Aus-
tralian Senate voted to overturn the Northern Territory's law.
On the other hand, on May 20, 1997, Columbia's Constitutional
Court legalized voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill people.66'
Later in the opinion, to highlight the rationality of the states'
concern over the possibility that permitting physician-assisted
suicide may lead to voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia,66 2
the Glucksberg Court brought its detailed discussion of foreign laws
out of the footnotes and into the text of the opinion by addressing
specifically the sorry experience of the Netherlands with legalized
physician-assisted suicide and so-called voluntary euthanasia.663
Specifically, the Court pointed to a Dutch government survey that
revealed possible problems with the country's regulation of the
practice of assisted suicide.664 The survey showed "that in 1990,
there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as 'the de-
liberate termination of another's life at his request'), 400 cases of
assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without
an explicit request." '665 The study also found "an additional 4,941
cases where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses
without the patients' explicit consent." '666 The majority found this
conclusion suggestive of the fact that,
despite the existence of various reporting procedures, euthana-
sia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent, termi-
nally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that
regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in
cases involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled
neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia.667
Observing that the experience of the Netherlands is evidence that
there is a close link between assisted suicide and euthanasia, the
661. Id. (citations omitted).
662. Id. at 732-33. The Court was thus faced with determining whether the Washington
State statute was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
663. Id. at 734.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. Id.
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Glucksberg Court found that 'Washington, like most other States,
reasonably ensures against this risk by banning, rather than regu-
lating, assisted suicide."66
Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, also discussed the expe-
riences of the Netherlands at some length.669 He did so in order to
address the respondent's claim that improper degeneration of as-
sisted suicide into involuntary euthanasia could be achieved by
careful legislative draftsmanship.67 ° Justice Souter stated:
[A]t least at this moment there are reasons for caution in pre-
dicting the effectiveness of the teeth proposed. Respondents'
proposals, as it turns out, sound much like the guidelines now in
place in the Netherlands, the only place where experience with
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia has yielded empirical
evidence about how such regulations might affect actual prac-
tice. Dutch physicians must engage in consultation before pro-
ceeding, and must decide whether the patient's decision is volun-
tary, well considered, and stable, whether the request to die is
enduring and made more than once, and whether the patient's
future will involve unacceptable suffering. There is, however, a
substantial dispute today about what the Dutch experience
shows. Some commentators marshal evidence that the Dutch
guidelines have in practice failed to protect patients from invol-
untary euthanasia and have been violated with impunity.... The
day may come when we can say with some assurance which side
is right, but for now it is the substantiality of the factual dis-
agreement, and the alternatives for resolving it, that matter.
They are, for me, dispositive of the due process claim at this
time. 71
Justice Souter thus referred to the Dutch practice, much as the first
Justice Harlan referred to European practice in his Lochner dissent,
to shed empirical light on the consequences of a particular legal
668. Id. at 734-35.
669. Id. at 785-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
670. Id. Such proposed legislation could include a requirement of confirmation of a patient's
diagnosis, prognosis, and competence by two qualified physicians; mandate that repeated
requests by the patient be witnessed by at least two others over a specified timespan; and
impose reporting requirements and criminal penalties for coercive acts. Id. at 785.
671. Id. at 785-86 (citations omitted).
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regulatory regime. Glucksberg is thus yet another case in the long
line of cases that referred to and was influenced by foreign law.
3. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas,6" the case that initially gave rise to much
of the current controversy and debate regarding the Supreme
Court's reliance on foreign sources of law, the Court considered such
sources in striking down a Texas statute that criminalized sodomy
or "deviate sexual intercourse" between adults of the same sex.673
In so holding, the majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,"4 a seventeen-year-old
decision on the same issue, and gave substantial consideration to
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.675 Justice
Kennedy stated that almost five years before the Bowers decision,
the European Court of Human Rights had held in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom676 that laws forbidding consensual homosexual
conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights.677 The majority also declared that the European decision in
Dudgeon had been followed in more recent years.67 Justice Kennedy
described the impact of this adherence as follows:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. Other nations, too, have taken
action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as
an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.
There has been no showing that in this country the governmen-
672. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
673. Id. at 563.
674. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Lawrence Court not only overruled Bowers, it also criticized
the case as being wrong when it was originally decided, stating "Bowers was not correct when
it was decided, and it is not correct today." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
675. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 573, 578.
676. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981).
677. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 52).
678. Id. at 576.
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tal interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
679legitimate or urgent.
The Court also noted that the British Parliament had received rec-
ommendations to repeal laws punishing homosexual conduct in
1957 and enacted those recommendations ten years later.68 °
Justice Scalia, in a biting dissent joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, squarely took issue with the major-
ity's reliance on foreign sources of law and practice, arguing that
"[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence ... because
foreign nations decriminalize conduct." '' He further criticized the
majority's consideration of these foreign sources, adding that the
"Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the
many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy)
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this
Court ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Ameri-
cans."'
682
Thus, three key modern social issue cases of the last thirty-five
years-Roe v. Wade, Washington v. Glucksberg, and Lawrence v.
Texas-refer to and rely upon foreign sources of law just as six of
the nine Justices did in Dred Scott and as the Court did in Reynolds
during the nineteenth century. All of these decisions have been
bitterly controversial, and we agree with Justice Scalia that efforts
679. Id. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
680. Id. at 572-73.
681. Id. at 586, 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
682. Id. at 598 (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari)). In his keynote address to the American Society of
International Law, Justice Scalia again took issue with the Court's selective citation to foreign
law, pointing out the large number of nations that prohibit sodomy. Justice Scalia stated as
follows:
In Lawrence, the Court cited European law to strike down sodomy laws. But of
course Europe is not representative: Zero out of fifty countries in Europe
prohibit sodomy (not necessarily because of the democratic preference of fifty
countries but because of the uniformity imposed by the European Court of
Human Rights). But thirty-three out of fifty-one countries in Africa (65 percent)
prohibit it; eight out of forty-three countries in the Americas (19 percent) now
prohibit it; twenty-seven out of forty-seven Asian Pacific countries (57 percent)
prohibit it; and eleven out of fourteen countries in the Middle East (79 percent)
prohibit it. Thus, the rest of the world aside from Europe is almost evenly split
(seventy-nine prohibit, seventy-six do not). Moreover, nine countries that
prohibit sodomy authorize the death penalty for it.
Scalia, supra note 7, in 98 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 305, 309.
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to impose foreign morals on the American people in the guise of
interpreting the Constitution and elaborating on substantive due
process rights are both illegitimate and unwise.
D. Opinions of Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, as is widely known, has argued vigorously for
reference to foreign sources of law both in his opinions and public
speeches. Justice Breyer has argued in favor of using foreign law to
provide "points of comparison," and he has claimed that the
"comparativist" view he and several other Justices hold will "carry
the day." '683 In his recent debate with Justice Scalia at American
University, Justice Breyer stated that what he believed to be at
issue in the debate over the use of foreign sources of law is the "ex-
tent to which you might learn from other places facts that would
help you apply the Constitution of the United States."6" He argued
that, in the modern world, "where experiences are becoming more
and more similar," foreign sources of law can provide "something to
learn about how to interpret this document." '685 This section will
examine two notable opinions in which Justice Breyer made consid-
erable reference to foreign sources of law.6"6
1. Printz v. United States
Perhaps former Harvard professor and current Justice Stephen
Breyer's biggest foray into reliance upon foreign sources of law came
683. Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 2003), in 97 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003).
684. Scalia & Breyer Discussion, supra note 11.
685. Id.
686. Justice Breyer has cited foreign law in additional opinions not comprehensively
addressed in detail in this Article. In his concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, Justice Breyer pointed out that the balancing of interests approach employed by the
Court in complex First Amendment cases "is consistent with that of other constitutional
courts facing similarly complex constitutional problems" and then cited decisions of the
European Commission of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court. 528 U.S. 377,403
(2000). In his dissent in Miller v. Albright, Justice Breyer noted foreign laws regarding the
acquisition of citizenship through parentage. 523 U.S. 420,477 (1997). Justice Breyer pointed
out that "Roman citizenship was acquired principally by parentage" and cited a comparative
study of nationality which discussed "citizenship laws throughout the world and not[ed] the
'widespread extent of the rule ofjus sanguinis."' Id.
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in his dissent in the 1997 case of Printz v. United States.68 7 This
decision illustrates well the tension on the Rehnquist Court sur-
rounding the consideration and use of foreign laws and practices in
constitutional interpretation. At issue in Printz was the constitu-
tionality of interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (Brady Act),6"' which, in part, commanded state and
local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers.8 9 The majority, in an opinion
delivered by Justice Scalia, held that the interim provisions were
unconstitutional because the "[flederal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivi-
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. '"690
Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion,691 but
also wrote separately to point to the experiences of other nations as
"empirical confirmation" of why and how the creation and expansion
of a federal gun-law bureaucracy could better promote both state
sovereignty and individual liberty.692 In making this argument,
Breyer was advancing a similar claim to that made in the majority
opinions in the Legal Tender Cases and the Selective Draft Law
Cases. Justice Breyer added:
687. 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
688. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). The Brady Act amended the Gun Control
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
26 U.S.C.), which established a federal scheme governing the distribution of firearms. Printz,
521 U.S. at 902.
689. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902. The petitioners objected to "being pressed into federal service"
and argued that the Brady Act's compelling of state officers to execute federal laws was
unconstitutional. Id. at 905.
690. Id. at 935. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion as well as Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Thomas. Id. at 900.
691. Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
provisions were constitutional, as Congress "may impose affirmative obligations on executive
and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as ordinary citizens." Id. Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the dissenting opinion. Id.
692. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (responding to a question posed by Justice Stevens
in dissent: "Why, or how, would what the majority sees as a constitutional alternative-the
creation of a new federal gun-law bureaucracy, or the expansion of an existing federal
bureaucracy-better promote either state sovereignty or individual liberty?"). Justice Stevens
joined Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion. Id. at 976.
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[T]he United States is not the only nation that seeks to reconcile
the practical need for a central authority with the democratic
virtues of more local control. At least some other countries, fac-
ing the same basic problem, have found that local control is
better maintained through application of a principle that is the
direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the
silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland,
Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that
constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves
implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees en-
acted by the central "federal" body. They do so in part because
they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with
the independent authority of the "state," member nation, or
other subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual
liberty as well.
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those
of other nations, and there may be relevant political and struc-
tural differences between their systems and our own. But their
experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the conse-
quences of different solutions to a common legal problem-in
this case the problem of reconciling central authority with the
need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller
constituent governmental entity.693
Justice Breyer drew from this evidence of foreign constitutional law
and stated that, "[a]s comparative experience suggests, there is no
need to interpret the Constitution as containing an absolute princi-
ple-forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any
state official. 694
Justice Scalia's opinion made note of the majority's strong dis-
agreement with Justice Breyer's comparative reference to foreign
legal systems. Justice Scalia wrote in a footnote:
Justice Breyer's dissent would have us consider the benefits that
other countries, and the European Union, believe they have
derived from federal systems that are different from ours. We
think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite rele-
vant to the task of writing one.... The fact is that our federalism
693. Id. at 976-77 (citations omitted).
694. Id. at 977.
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is not Europe's. It is "the unique contribution of the Framers to
political science and political theory." '95
Justices Breyer and Scalia clearly crossed swords in Printz and,
although Justice Scalia's was the majority opinion in that case,
Justice Breyer was soon to win over two key allies, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor. Justice Breyer's Printz dissent thus fore-
shadowed what was to be a highly effective campaign in favor of
references to foreign law by the Court.
2. Knight v. Florida
Justice Breyer also famously referred to foreign law in his dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida,696 a case that
would have required the Court to consider whether it was unconsti-
tutional, under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment, to execute prisoners who had spent nearly
twenty years on death row.697 In his opinion, Justice Breyer looked
to foreign law on the issue, not as binding authority, but as "useful"
because foreign courts had "considered roughly comparable ques-
tions under roughly comparable legal standards."' 8 Justice Breyer
first stated that a "growing number of courts outside the United
States-courts that accept or assume the lawfulness of the death
penalty-have held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful
death penalty renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading, or
unusually cruel." '99 He then discussed several foreign court deci-
sions, including a decision of the Privy Council of the United
Kingdom, which held that the execution of two prisoners held for
fourteen years after sentencing was forbidden by Jamaica's
Constitution unless the delay was entirely the fault of the accused,
and a decision of the Supreme Court of India, which held that an
appellate court must take into account the issue of delay when de-
ciding whether to impose a death penalty."' Justice Breyer also
695. Id. at 921 n.1 1 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
696. 528 U.S. 990, 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
697. Id. at 993.
698. Id. at 997-98.
699. Id. at 995.
700. Id. at 995-96.
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noted that the European Court of Human Rights found that the
European Convention on Human Rights forbids the six-to-eight-year
delays that often accompany death sentences. °1
Perhaps the most astounding part of Justice Breyer's dissent was
his discussion of the holding of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe
that "delays of five and six years were 'inordinate' and constituted
'torture or ... inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment."'702 This reference to Zimbabwe is one that Justice
Breyer later expressed some hesitation about in his debate with
Justice Scalia. He stated that he considered the citation to be a
"tactical error" as Zimbabwe is, as he belatedly recognized, certainly
"not the human rights capital of the world. 70 3
Justice Breyer did point out that "[n]ot all foreign authority
reaches the same conclusion" as those cases he first addressed.0 4 He
also admitted that foreign authority was not binding, but argued
that the "Court has long considered as relevant and informative the
way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly compa-
rable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances. 7 5 Justice Breyer stated that the "[willingness to
consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising
in a Nation that from its birth has given a 'decent respect to the
opinions of mankind."'706
701. Id. at 996.
702. Id. (citing Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney-General, [1993]
1 Zimb. L. R. 242, 251, 282 (S)).
703. Scalia & Breyer Discussion, supra note 11.
704. Knight, 528 U.S. at 996. Justice Breyer noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had
held that Canadian constitutional standards did not bar extradition to the United States and
that the United Nations Human Rights Committee had written that a ten-year delay in
imposing the death penalty did not necessarily violate the standards of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Id. However, Justice Breyer qualified both of these opinions
by stating that "one cannot be certain what position those bodies would take in respect to
delays of 19 and 24 years." Id. It should also be pointed out that two majority opinions of the
Court do actually mention the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 4, 13 n.13 (1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963).
705. Knight, 528 U.S. at 996-97.
706. Id. at 997.
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V. THEMES IN THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF FOREIGN SOURCES OF
LAW THROUGHOUT HISTORY
An overview of the Supreme Court's actual practice in referring
to foreign sources of law reveals several common themes that
have emerged over the past 216 years. We see five thematic
categories as being particularly significant given the Court's
practice we have described. First, the Supreme Court has often
referred to foreign law for guidance in cases that arguably involve
the Court in a determination of reasonableness. °7 Second, and
closely related to the first category, are cases where the Supreme
Court turns to foreign law to aid in making sense of an ambiguous
phrase. °8 Third, we find it striking that so many of the Court's
historical references to foreign law are made in criminal law
cases more generally. Fourth, we think the Court often cites foreign
law to provide logical reinforcement for its decisions. These are
cases where the Court refers to foreign law to place the United
States in the context of international practice as a way of demon-
strating that the laws of our nation or the decisions of the Court are
in fact logical and are supported by foreign legal practice. The
Court's references to foreign sources of law in these cases are simi-
lar to Blackstone's references to Roman law to prove that the Eng-
lish common law embodied a logical structure."9 Fifth, we think the
Supreme Court has referred to foreign sources of law to provide
empirical support for assertions that are made about the likely con-
sequences of legal reforms that are being advocated for the United
States. We think this explains most of the references to foreign
sources of law in the cases dealing with legalizing assisted suicide710
707. See Calabresi, supra note 36 and accompanying text. The initial determination of
whether reasonableness is an appropriate inquiry should be set aside for purposes of this
Article. In many cases in this category, the Court, or an individual Justice, has already
determined, or assumed, that the reasonableness of the statute or constitutional construction
is a relevant inquiry.
708. In a way, this is a subcategory of the first, as defining ambiguous phrases, such as
"cruel and unusual," or determining exactly what body of law is encompassed by the phrase
"law of nations" is, at least in part, based upon a determination of reasonableness. This would
be most strikingly apparent if the ambiguous phrase before the Court is a determination of
what exactly constitutes an "unreasonable search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.
709. See, e.g., Lobban, supra note 69.
710. In Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the primary example of the Court's
use of foreign law for this purpose, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked to the laws of the
[Vol. 47:743
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or abortion.7 ' Finally, we would note that there are at least some
kinds of cases where the Supreme Court has not often referred to
foreign sources of law. These include cases where the decision of the
Court depends primarily on an interpretation of the original mean-
ing of the Constitution, or where the decision depends upon our coun-
try's own distinctive structure of government and unique form of
federalism.712
A. Cases Requiring a Determination of Reasonableness
1. Substantive Due Process Cases
One context in which the Supreme Court has referred to foreign
sources of law has been in cases in which the Court thought
-rightly or wrongly-that it was faced with the problem of deter-
mining whether a particular law was "reasonable" '713 under one of
the Due Process Clauses. For example, the Court clearly thought
such determinations of the reasonableness of state exercises of the
police power were within its cognizance during the Lochner-era.
"Reasonableness" review with reference to foreign sources of law
might have seemed appropriate to the Lochner Court, either as to
the substance of laws, as in Lochner itself, or as to the reasonable-
Netherlands and that country's experiences with assisted suicide as evidence of the
consequences of legalizing the practice. Id. at 734.
711. As previously mentioned, the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), looked to the
experiences of several other countries to support the assertion that modern medical advances
had led to low abortion mortality rates. Id. at 149 & n.44.
712. There are historical cases in the preceding research that present exceptions to this
general analysis, such as the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), involving
the taxing of judicial salaries. However, the bulk of the Court's citation to foreign law does fall
within one or more of the previously mentioned categories. It is perhaps the notion that
certain areas are more amenable to foreign legal references than others, including the idea
that cases within this category are not appropriate for inclusion of foreign sources of law,
which led to the intense reaction against Justice Breyer's citation of the practices of the
federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union in Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997). See infra Part V.F.
713. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1104 (2004) (stating that one "context in which foreign
court judgments might be relevant is when one is interpreting provisions of the U.S.
Constitution that provide open-ended considerations of 'reasonableness"'). In this Article,
considerations of reasonableness are divided into two categories, those evaluating overall
reasonableness considerations and those presenting the problem of interpreting ambiguous
phrases or legal principles.
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ness of state rules of criminal procedure, as in Hurtado v.
California714 and Palko v. Connecticut.715 Today, the Supreme Court
has mostly foresworn reasonableness review under the Due Process
Clauses, as the Court has evaluated the substance of governmental
exercises of the police power under a rational basis test and, as to
state rules of criminal procedure, it has incorporated the substance
of the Bill of Rights against the states. Thus, today's Supreme Court
does not, for the most part, interpret the Due Process Clauses as
imposing a requirement of reasonableness on government. The two
striking exceptions, however, where the Court did, in essence, im-
pose a reasonableness requirement on the states are Roe v. Wade
716
and Lawrence v. Texas, 7 in which the Court did find state exercises
of the police power to be unreasonable. It is noteworthy that in both
of these cases the Court referred to foreign law.718
The first example of Supreme Court Justices referring to foreign
law for evidence of the reasonableness of an interpretation of
American law was in the Dred Scott case. Here, the issue was
whether a slave who had sojourned with his master in free territory
and then returned to his native slave dominion remained a slave.
Several of the Justices in Dred Scott referred to foreign legal prac-
tices to try to answer the question posed by the case as a matter of
American law.71 9 We see Dred Scott as an example of members of
the Court trying to justify the reasonableness of their construction
of U.S. law by appealing to foreign law. Another nineteenth century
example of Supreme Court reasonableness review can be found
similarly, in Reynolds v. United States.720 There, the Court at-
tempted to show that the federal statute prohibiting polygamy was
not an outlandish or unreasonable statute by placing it in the con-
text of foreign legal practice.721 The Court observed that "[p]olygamy
has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was
714. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
715. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
716. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
717. See 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
718. See id. at 576-77; Roe, 410 U.S. at 137-38.
719. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also discussion supra
Part II.A.1.
720. 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see also discussion supra Part II.A.2.
721. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African peo-
ple., 722 From this, the Court concluded that facially neutral laws
that banned polygamy did not infringe on the rights of Mormons to
the free exercise of their religion but were valid exercises of the
police power.723
In the twentieth century, Justice Harlan's dissent in Lochner v.
New York used foreign law as evidence of the reasonableness of a
state exercise of the police power.7 24 Placing the New York statute
restricting labor to ten hours a day in context of the average daily
working hours of laborers in other countries, Justice Harlan
responded to the majority's assertion that the New York statute
restricting the hours of labor to ten hours per day was without rea-
sonable ground. 725 By comparing New York's ten-hour restriction to
average working days from around the world, Justice Harlan sought
to show the reasonableness of New York's law, as it was not extreme
or exceptional but rather occupied "a middle ground in respect of the
hours of labor., 72
6
A few years later, the Court in Muller v. Oregon727 looked again
to foreign law for evidence of the reasonableness of a state statute.
Determining that it was, in fact, reasonable to restrict the working
hours of women, but not men, due to differences between the
sexes, 72 8 the Court noted foreign (European) laws as "significant of
a widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the func-
tions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation
restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be
permitted to toil. '729 This is then another example of a Supreme
Court opinion referring to foreign law as evidence of the reasonable-
ness of an American state's exercise of its police power.
722. Id.
723. Id. at 166-68.
724. 198 U.S. 45, 71 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see discussion supra Part III.B.1.
725. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. Justice Peckham, writing for the majority of the Court,
stated that there was "no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the
right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker." Id.
726. Id. at 71-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
727. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see discussion supra Part III.B.2.
728. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419-20 n.1; see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
729. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420. The Court considered the legislation of the states and reports
from the United States as significant to this effect, as well. Id. at 419-20 n.1.
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Lastly, and most recently in Lawrence v. Texas,73 ° we think the
Court conducted a review of the reasonableness of Texas's morals
law banning gay sodomy. 3' The Court looked to foreign sources of
law to weigh the reasonableness of Texas's exercise of its police
power, and without finding a fundamental right of gays or anyone
else to engage in sodomy, the Court struck down Texas's exercise of
its police power as being inherently unreasonable.732 The Court's
reliance on foreign law in Lawrence was a surefire indication that
it was not asking whether a constitutional right was deeply rooted
in American history or tradition but rather whether American prac-
tices were "reasonable" in light of foreign practice on the same issue.
From Dred Scott to Muller v. Oregon to Lawrence, therefore, a
majority of the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to foreign law
in substantive due process cases for evidence as to whether an
American exercise of the police power was or was not reasonable. It
is a misconstruction of the Fourteenth Amendment to read it as
imposing a reasonableness requirement on the states.7"' However,
were reasonableness a proper inquiry in the case of substantive due
process, there are, as we have pointed out, several significant histor-
ical examples of the Court employing foreign law as a guide to rea-
sonableness.
2. Criminal Law Cases Involving a Reasonableness
Requirement
In addition to substantive due process cases, there are also a
number of criminal law and procedural due process cases where the
Court assesses the reasonableness of state laws and codes of crimi-
nal procedure. This practice started in Hurtado v. California,734
when the Court found that the requirement of indictment by a
grand jury was not a necessary element of a civilized nation's code
of criminal procedure.735 The Court in Hurtado referred to the ab-
sence of a requirement of grand jury indictment in civil law coun-
730. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
731. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1107-18.
732. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
733. See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1107-15.
734. 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
735. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
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tries, and concluded that such a requirement was not essential to a
civilized system of criminal procedure.7"' The Court reached a simi-
lar conclusion in Palko v. Connecticut,737 where it held that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was also not necessar-
ily a part of a reasonable system of criminal procedure because it,
too, was a right that was not recognized by civil law countries on the
European continent.73 In both Hurtado and Palko, then, the Court
found that a reasonable code of criminal procedure need not include
all of the procedural protections of the Federal Bill of Rights, based,
at least in part, upon a consideration of what other, foreign nations
included in their own codes.
The Court conducted the same analysis more recently in Wolf v.
Colorado.739 Justice Frankfurter's opinion referred to foreign law as
an indicator of reasonableness in addressing the question of
whether the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States
would apply in a state criminal trial. Justice Frankfurter stated
that as "matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to be an
issue as to which men with complete devotion to the protection of
the right of privacy might give different answers."740 The Court then
looked at the entire "English-speaking world" for evidence that the
federal exclusionary rule was not "an essential ingredient of the
right"'41 to be free from arbitrary intrusion by the police.742 The
Court specifically pointed to the fact that out of ten "jurisdictions
within the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of
Nations which had passed on the question, none had held that
evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was inadmissible." '743
Thus, just as Hurtado and Palko looked to the civil law world for
confirmation of the reasonableness of the states' rules of criminal
procedure, 44 so too did Justice Frankfurter, in Wolf, look to other
736. Id.
737. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see also discussion supra Part III.D.1.
738. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326-28.
739. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
740. Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
741. Id. at 29.
742. Id.
743. Id. at 30. The Court included an entire table, Table J, citing to case law in of each of
the ten jurisdictions that held that evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was not
inadmissible. Id. at 39. Of course, the Court also considered the similar judgment made by
many states as relevant to the issue. Id. at 29, 34-38.
744. Id. at 30.
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common law jurisdictions to figure out whether the exclusionary
rule was necessary to protect against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." '745 Wolf is thus further support for the notion that the
Court tends to consult foreign sources of law when it thinks that
American constitutional law calls for an assessment of the reason-
ableness of a state practice.
Finally, it should be mentioned that foreign law also played a role
in the Court's questionable decision in Miranda v. Arizona746 that
requiring the interrogational safeguard of a Miranda warning was
in fact not an unreasonable burden to place on law enforcement
officials.747 The Court looked to the laws of England, Scotland, India,
and Ceylon for evidence of the existence of such a requirement and
discussed the experiences of those foreign jurisdictions as support
for its holding.74 Of course, the Court's lengthy examination of for-
eign laws to reach the conclusion that that there was no apparent
"detrimental effect on criminal law enforcement in these jurisdic-
tions" '749 was in some sense a factual inquiry, it provided factual
evidence as to the consequences of a legal rule. But the foreign laws
relied upon in Miranda also provided support for the Court's finding
that the burden of the warning requirement on law enforcement
would not be so unreasonable as to outweigh the benefits of the warn-
ing's protective function. In much the same way that Justice Harlan
looked to empirical evidence from foreign nations in his dissent in
Lochner to show the reasonableness of the New York baker statute,
the Miranda Court looked to both the existence and consequences
of foreign laws, as evidence of the reasonableness of the rule laid
down by the Court requiring interrogational Miranda warnings. We
thus, again see reliance on foreign sources of law in one of the cases
where the Supreme Court was examining reasonableness, as well
as notoriously engaging in policymaking.
Additional evidence of the Court looking to foreign sources of law
in criminal cases for evidence of reasonableness can be found in
Justice Frankfurter's consideration of the "notions of justice of
745. See id.
746. See 384 U.S. 436, 486-90 (1966).
747. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
748. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486-90.
749. Id. at 489.
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English-speaking peoples"75 in due process cases, such as in his
majority opinion in Rochin v. California,7 51 and in his concurring
opinion in Adamson v. California.752 Frankfurter referred to the
legal judgments and values of foreign nations in these cases to
weigh the reasonableness of state laws. By looking to the "notions
of justice of English-speaking peoples," Justice Frankfurter tried to
show that he was not simply applying his own personal beliefs as to
the issues raised by the cases, but that he was applying the gen-
eral legal rules of English-speaking peoples everywhere. Thus,
Frankfurter stated that the "judicial judgment in applying the Due
Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal judgment." '753
3. Assessments of Reasonableness in Eighth Amendment Cases
A third context in which the Supreme Court has most often con-
sulted foreign sources of law to evaluate the reasonableness of
American legal practices is in determining whether American crimi-
nal law punishments violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel
and unusual punishments." '754 In this criminal law context, Justice
Scalia has argued vehemently, although in our view unpersuasively,
that the Eighth Amendment does not, as an original matter, require
that punishments be proportionate to the crime for which they are
imposed.755 We think that the Eighth Amendment does specifically
750. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
751. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). In the case, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the
proceedings (resulting in a conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even towards those charged with the most heinous
offenses.
Id.
752. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter said
that under the Fourteenth Amendment the Court had the duty of determining if the
proceedings before the Court offended "those canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses." Id.; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
753. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68.
754. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
755. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1126-27. Professor Calabresi has previously sketched out
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enact a proportionality rule, that its use of the word "unusual" is
essentially a synonym for the word "unreasonable" in the Fourth
Amendment, and that it thus constitutes a textual invitation to
jurists to consider the practice of all civilized nations in assessing
the validity of a punishment. We thus view the citation of foreign
sources of law in the Eighth Amendment as a means of considering
the reasonableness of criminal law punishments and are supportive
of the Supreme Court's practice of referring to these sources of law
in Eighth Amendment cases since Trop v. Dulles.756 This view is
based, in part, on the fact that the clause at issue in these cases is
"worded at a high level of abstraction and w[as] arguably intended,
as an original matter, to have some evolving content." '57
In Trop, the Court used foreign sources-including a United
Nations survey of law-to determine the evolving standards of de-
cency that should be used to evaluate which punishments are un-
constitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 58
The fact that so many other nations refused to impose the punish-
ment helped guide the Court in determining that divestiture of
citizenship was disproportionate, unreasonable, and, therefore, a
cruel and unusual punishment.759 It is very important to point out
again that Trop is the first instance we have found in the Supreme
Court's history in which the Court turned to foreign sources of law
in the course of a decision that struck down, rather than upheld, an
existing statute.
Since Trop, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has
been replete with references to foreign law. Coker v. Georgia,6 '
the argument as to why the text of the Eighth Amendment (unlike the text of the Fourteenth)
seems as a matter of its plain meaning to contemplate a proportionality rule for all criminal
sanctions. Id. at 1125-30. The Eighth Amendment specifically enacts a proportionality rule
when it bans "excessive" bail or fines in criminal cases. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311
(2002). The Amendment then goes on to ban "cruel and unusual punishments" more generally,
and we think that that ban is best read as doing for deprivations of life and liberty what the
ban on "excessive" bail and fines does for deprivations of property. Calabresi, supra note 36,
at 1126.
756. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
757. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1104.
758. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-03 (1958).
759. See id. at 102-03. The Court in Trop stated that it "had little occasion to give precise
content to the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 100.
760. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the Court determined that international practices
regarding the death penalty for rape were relevant to its "evolving standards" analysis. Id.
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Enmund v. Florida,761 Thompson v. Oklahoma,762 and Atkins v.
Virginia76 3 are noteworthy examples of this trend.764 Recently, Roper
v. Simmons referred in-depth to foreign law in striking down the
juvenile death penalty.765 The Court focused more on the determina-
tion of a "national consensus," rather than "evolving standards of
decency"; however, it still discussed foreign law based on the.Trop
precedent.766 The majority considered the laws and practices of for-
eign nations as well as international covenants and found it
"proper" to "acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty."'767 Justice O'Connor also
concurred in the legitimacy of the Court's reliance on foreign law in
Eighth Amendment cases even though she disagreed with the Court
that the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional. With so many
of the nine justices committed to looking at foreign law in Eighth
Amendment cases,76 the question is no longer whether but how the
Court will rely upon foreign law in these cases in the future. We are
at 596 n.10.
761. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, the Court noted that "the doctrine of felony murder
has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other
Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe." Id. at 796-97 n.22 (citation
omitted).
762. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The Court in Thompson evaluated the Eighth Amendment's
"civilized standards of decency" in part by looking at prohibition of the execution of minors by
the Soviet Union and nations of Western Europe. Id. at 830-31. In addition, both the plurality
and Justice O'Connor's concurrence found it significant that three major international
human rights treaties explicitly prohibited juvenile death penalties. Id. at 815 n.34, 851.
763. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Atkins Court, in finding the execution of mentally retarded
offenders unconstitutional, noted that such a practice was "overwhelmingly disapproved" by
the "world community." Id. at 316-17 n.21.
764. Other examples are not hard to find, however. In Patterson v. Texas, Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from denial of certiorari in a case challenging Texas's
execution of a juvenile offender, noting that "the issue has been the subject of further debate
and discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations," which had produced an
"apparent consensus ... among the States and in the international community against the
execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender." 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer dissented to the denial of certiorari in Foster v.
Florida, which involved the issue of whether prolonged incarceration on death row constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, noting that courts "of other nations have found that delays
of 15 years or less can render capital punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel" and citing
foreign case law. 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
765. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-2000 (2005).
766. Id.
767. Id. at 1200.
768. Id. at 1215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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inclined to believe that it is legitimate in a few contexts for the
Court to look to foreign law, but that does not mean that the Court
ought to cite foreign law in substantive due process cases. Where
the plain text of the Constitution actually does impose a reasonable-
ness requirement-as it does, in our view, in the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments-we think it is appropriate for the Court to look to but
not slavishly follow foreign law. But, where the constitutional text
protects unenumerated rights only to the extent that they are
deeply rooted in American history or tradition-as does section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the substantive due process
cases that rely on it-the Court ought not to look to foreign law for
guidance. In taking this position, we follow Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent in Roper and take a middle ground position that is more faith-
ful to the text of the Constitution than are the more absolutist posi-
tions maintained by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Scalia.
B. Cases Requiring the Interpretation of Ambiguous Phrases or
Where the Law on the Issue at Hand Is Ambiguous or
Contradictory
If the first big category of cases where the Supreme Court relies
on foreign sources of law are those in which the reasonableness of
a law is drawn into question, the second large category of such cases
are those where an ambiguous legal term must be interpreted and
applied. We think this category explains the Court's practice in
cases where it had to determine either the "law of nations" or a rule
of admiralty law on a particular issue. Historically, the meaning of
the phrase "the law of nations" is steeped with ambiguity, which has
led the Court to rely on foreign law to determine precisely the con-
tours and governing principles of that phrase.
Two excellent examples of this practice are seen in cases dealing
with constitutional questions. First is Justice Story's lengthy refer-
ence to foreign law and legal writing on the definition of the crime
of piracy in United States v. Smith.769 Writing for the majority,
Justice Story chose to look at foreign law to understand the meaning
of the law of nations' definition of the crime of piracy. Justice Story
stated that a workable definition might "be ascertained by consult-
769. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 157 (1820); see also discussion supra Part I.D.1.
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ing the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recog-
nising and enforcing that law."7 Even though American law pro-
vided no clear definition of the crime of piracy, Justice Story found
it acceptable because foreign law made it crystal clear that piracy
was essentially robbery upon the high seas.77' Thus, the Court re-
ferred to foreign law to clarify the ambiguous definition of the crime
of piracy in the statute whose constitutionality was actually before
the Court. Second, in Brown v. United States.. both Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Story, in their respective majority and dissent-
ing opinions, turned to the opinions of foreign jurists for guidance
on the laws of war and their implications for the seizure of enemy
property. 73 Justice Story also took into account the practices of
other nations, including France and England, in reaching his con-
clusion that the Court had jurisdiction over matters of prize.7 The
laws of war were, like the law of nations, ambiguous in their scope
and meaning and were not directly defined under the Constitution
or federal law. This lack of definition led the Court to go outside the
bounds of American law and to refer to foreign sources of law in
order to give concrete meaning to the law of war.7 5
Other examples of the Court referring to foreign law to resolve an
ambiguity in the meaning of the law of nations are not difficult to
find. In The Rapid, Justice Johnson looked to the teachings of the
civil law as well as the practice of "enlightened ... commercial na-
tions" to guide him in ascertaining a doctrine of prize law, another
part of the law of nations.776 And in the famous case of The Antelope,
Chief Justice Marshall looked to the practices of both Europe and
770. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61. Recall that Justice Livingston took issue with
this decision, arguing that it was the duty of Congress to define the important terms in its
statutes. Id. at 182-83 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
771. Id. at 159-62.
772. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
773. Id. at 131-35, 139-45; see also discussion supra Part I.C.3.
774. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 137-38.
775. It should be reiterated that, in 1875, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
review issues of "the general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations," where they had
not been modified or suspended by the "constitution, laws, treaties, or executive
proclamations, of the United States." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87
(1875).
776. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 162 (1814); see also supra Part I.E.1.
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America to determine the validity of the slave trade under the law
of nations.777
Another set of cases where the early Supreme Court looked to
foreign sources of law for guidance includes those cases where the
legal principles that should govern the dispute are unclear or in
controversy. In Rose v. Himley, the Court addressed whether it
could "examine the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal." '778 Because this
was a question of "serious difficulty," '779 upon which there did not
appear to be any particular federal law or precedent, Chief Justice
Marshall considered the position taken by the courts of England on
the matter °.7 " He looked at several contemporaneous English cases
that supported the right of English courts to examine the jurisdic-
tion of foreign tribunals to guide the Court in determining the
proper legal rule to dictate the outcome of the case.78' After exami-
nation of the foreign cases, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the
Court considered the law of England to be aligned with "the uniform
practice of civilized nations" and thus adopted the law of England
"as the true principle which ought to govern in this case." '782 It
could certainly be argued that it was unnecessary for Chief Justice
Marshall to consider foreign law in this case. Early on in his opin-
ion, Chief Justice Marshall stated the principle that the Court
thought resolved the case, which was that "the capacity of the court
to act upon the thing condemned, arising from its being within, or
without their jurisdiction, as well as the constitution of the court,
may be considered by that tribunal which is to decide on the effect
of the sentence." '' Even though the Court could have reached an
outcome simply based upon the above principle, the Court found it
necessary to pass "from principle to authority""7 4 by addressing
several decisions English courts rendered well after American inde-
pendence.
777. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121-22 (1825); see also supra Part I.C.4.
778. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 268 (1808) (emphasis omitted). The issue in
Rose was the French condemnation of a cargo of coffee. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.2.
779. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 269.
780. Id. at 270-71.
781. Id.
782. Id. at 271.
783. Id. at 269.
784. Id. at 269-70.
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Justice Story also looked to foreign sources of law when the
American case law on an issue was in conflict and not readily rec-
oncilable. Thus, in Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby,
Justice Story found that American law presented "conflicting adjudi-
cations" on the topic of the general average."8 5 It was, therefore, the
duty of the Court to examine and weigh opposing views on the
general average, including those of foreign nations and jurists, to
determine the "true principle which ought to govern" the Court.786
The Court in Ashby thus turned to foreign law in a case where there
were no immediately clear-cut legal rules to apply.
Thus, cases where the meaning of an American term of art, like
"the law of nations" or "admiralty law," is ambiguous and foreign
law can help lend meaning to the term compose a second group of
cases where the Court historically looked to foreign law over the last
two centuries. In these cases, unlike in Lawrence, reference to for-
eign law as it was understood in 1789, could conceivably help to
limit the range of judicial discretion. Reference to the meaning of
international law, as it is understood today, however, would likely
lead to the opposite result of unbridled judicial activism because
the scope of the phrase "the law of nations" had a much narrower
meaning in 1789 than does the phrase "international law" today.
C. Criminal Law Cases
We have already seen that the open-ended nature of phrases
such as the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments" has led the Supreme Court to refer to foreign law
most often in cases arising in a criminal law context. Most of these
criminal law cases have already been discussed in other contexts,
but it is worth emphasizing the fact that a highly disproportionate
number of the cases discussed in this Article involved criminal law
issues.
Beyond the Eighth Amendment cases, many other criminal cases
also referred to foreign law-most recently, Lawrence v. Texas,
which it should be recalled, involved a statute criminalizing homo-
785. Columbian Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331, 337 (1839).
786. Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.D.2.
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sexual sodomy. 78 7 Reynolds v. United States, another so-called "mor-
als" case, involved a criminal statute prohibiting polygamy, and also
led the Court to refer to foreign law.78 United States v. Smith fits
into this category because it involved defining the crime of piracy.789
In addressing the relative importance of criminal indictment by
grand jury in Hurtado v. California, the Court noted that it could
draw "inspiration from every fountain of justice."79 The Court re-
ferred to foreign sources of law in the case of the forcible kidnapping
of a criminal defendant in Ker v. Illinois.79' More recently, Miranda
v. Arizona792 made numerous references to the laws and practices of
foreign nations, including England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon.79'
The Court's consideration of foreign law in Miranda led Justice
O'Connor to include similar foreign references in her concurring
opinion in New York v. Quarles.794
The increasing use of foreign law in criminal law cases over time
may be partially a product of the shrinking world in which we live,
one in which globalization affects not only our economy, but also our
perceptions of crime and the laws regulating it. The modern devel-
opment of bodies such as the International Criminal Court has led
to greater American awareness of foreign opinion regarding certain
crimes and punishments, as well as the implications of the way a
nation defines and punishes crime for its relationships with the
broader world. Recent international agreements, such as the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,79' have brought to
light differences in the way nations punish specific crimes, such as
those committed by juveniles. This, in turn, has highlighted the fact
that, in certain areas, the punitive practices of the United States
may not be all that well aligned with those of the rest of the
world.79' Just as Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court should
787. 539 U.S. 558, 563, 576 (2003).
788. 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878).
789. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-62 (1820); see also discussion supra Part I.D.1.
790. 110 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1884); see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
791. 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); see also discussion supra Part II.C.4.
792. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
793. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486-90; see supra Part IV.B.2.
794. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
795. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. AfRes/44/25 (Dec. 12, 1990).
796. In striking down the juvenile death penalty as unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons,
the majority stressed that the "United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its
face against the juvenile death penalty." 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005). Other Justices, such
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not lightly admit to a construction of the Constitution "which would
give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not pos-
sess elsewhere," '797 today's Court may feel something of a similar
pull to avoid construing the Constitution, especially the Eighth
Amendment, in such a way that the United States would be very
much out of line with the rest of the civilized world in its criminal
law sanctions. The Court may thus look to foreign law in criminal
cases to avoid friction with the rest of the world and to give credence
to the principle, which developed from the Charming Betsy Canon,798
that wherever fairly possible the laws of the United States are "to
be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States." '799 Technically, there
is no conflict between American allowance of the juvenile death
penalty and foreign condemnation of it, but it is certainly the case
that construing the ambiguous Eighth Amendment to outlaw that
penalty reduces conflict between American and foreign law.
D. Logical Reinforcement Cases
A fourth group of cases where the Supreme Court has for 216
years looked to foreign law might be called "logical reinforcement"
cases. These cases are those in which the Court looks to foreign law
and practice to demonstrate that its decisions are logical and sup-
ported by reason. For example, the Court made clear that its use of
foreign law in developing its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
served to supply additional support for its own conclusions when it
stated in Roper v. Simmons that the opinion of the world community
provided "respected and significant confirmation for our own conclu-
sions."' However, the use of such sources in this manner is not a
new development. Reliance on foreign law to provide logical rein-
as Justice Scalia, would likely respond that such misalignment should not matter to the
Supreme Court, as it is charged with interpreting the United States Constitution and thus
the practices of other nations are irrelevant. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1226-29
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
797. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814).
798. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
799. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1987); see Bodansky, supra note 22, at 427.
800. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200 (emphasis added).
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forcement for the Court's decision has taken place throughout its
216-year history.
The origin of such a use of foreign law harkens back to the early
years of the Court and is exemplified by the writings of Justice Jo-
seph Story. Justice Story believed that the approval of an American
rule of law by respected foreign jurists and scholars was a very im-
portant recommendation of that law."1 Accordingly, he often re-
ferred to the views of foreign legal scholars and to the legal princi-
ples of foreign nations in his opinions. In Columbian Insurance Co.
of Alexandria v. Ashby, 2 Justice Story disagreed with the view put
forth by Emerigon, a leading French authority on commercial law
at that time, that in order to require shared liability for a ship that
had been voluntarily ran ashore to protect the ship and its cargo the
ship must be "got afloat again."0 3 Justice Story did not simply state
his and the Court's own disagreement with the opinion of Emerigon.
Rather, he pointed out that Valin, another foreign jurist, also did
not support the view of Emerigon, nor did the Roman law. 0 4 By
calling attention to these foreign sources of law as also disagreeing
with Emerigon, Story more powerfully demonstrated that his dis-
agreement with Emerigon's principle was logical and justified.0 5
Other Marshall Court opinions also referred to foreign sources of
law to provide logical reinforcement for the Court's rulings. In
Brown v. United States, Chief Justice Marshall held that a seizure
of British property was improper and laid down the rule that "tangi-
801. Helmholz, supra note 66, at 1681-82 (citing Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 19 F. Cas.
98, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 10,905)).
802. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331 (1839).
803. Id. at 340; see also supra Part I.D.2.
804. Id. at 340-42.
805. Chief Justice Marshall also referred to foreign sources of law to provide logical
reinforcement of the Supreme Court's decisions. In ruling that the books of a merchant were
admissible evidence in M'Coul v. Lekamp's Administratrix, Marshall summarily stated that
the specific commercial books at issue in the case were admissible evidence. MrCoul v.
Lekamp's Admx, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 111, 117 (1817); see also supra note 125. In a footnote,
however, Marshall provided further support for his ruling by referring to the laws of other
nations regarding the admissibility of such evidence. M'Coul, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 117-18 n.a.
Chief Justice Marshall stated that, "by the codes of the nations of the European continent,"
it was certain that the books of merchants and traders were admissible evidence against those
with whom they dealt. Id. He further noted that this rule was supported by the specific
practice of France, and cited directly to the French Code de Commerce and the writings of the
French jurist Pothier. Id. Pointing to other nations gave Chief Justice Marshall support for
the soundness of the Court's ruling in M'Coul sustaining the admission of merchant books.
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ble property belonging to an enemy and found in the country at the
commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confiscated. '0 6
In support, Marshall stated that this decree was correct not only as
to current American law, but that it was also "the opinion of all who
have written on the jus belli, that war gives the right to confiscate,
but does not itself confiscate the property of the enemy."' ' By refer-
ring to the opinions of foreign jurists and scholars whose views sup-
ported the rule laid down by the Court in Brown, Marshall provided
confirmation that the rule he announced was well reasoned, was
based upon logical principles, and was not an erroneous decision of
the Court."0 '
Similarly, in the 1886 case of Ker v. Illinois..9 the Court found no
restriction in the "Constitution, or laws, or treaties, of the United
States" against the forcible kidnapping of a defendant in another
country (and his transfer to the United States) that would permit a
defendant to resist trial in a State court."0 Justice Miller referred
to "authorities of the highest respectability" for support of the
Court's view, citing two English cases, decided in 1829 and 1858, as
standing for the same proposition."' Referring to these English
cases, then, was a means by which the Court could show that not
only did it believe its decision and rationale to be logical, but
that other learned and respectable judges in a foreign nation had
reached the same decision. The Court also used the practices and
laws of foreign nations as reinforcement for the proposition that
806. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814); see also supra Part I.C.3.
807. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125. The Court had considered the writings of several
famous foreign jurists and writers. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
808. Chief Justice Marshall's lengthy discussion of the practices of European nations
regarding Native Americans during the discovery and colonization of the American continent
in Johnson v. M'Intosh provides yet another example of the use of foreign sources for logical
reinforcement. See supra note 157. The references to the practices of European nations can
be seen as an attempt by the Court to provide additional justification and validation for its
decision that Indian tribes held no valid title to American lands, at least as against the United
States government. During the same time period, the opinion of Justice Johnson in The
Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814), is another example of Supreme Court reliance on
foreign sources of law as support for the decision of the Court. See supra Part I.E.1. Justice
Johnson stated that his decision in The Rapid did "not rest upon abstract reason," but rather
was "supported by the practice of the most enlightened (perhaps we may say of all)
commercial nations." The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 162.
809. 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
810. Id.
811. Id.
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compelled military service is not repugnant to a free government to
support its decision in the Selective Draft Law Cases that a congres-
sional statute enacting a compulsory military draft was constitu-
tional.812
The increasing willingness of the Supreme Court at the start
of the twentieth century to consider Brandeis briefs, which often
included citations of the laws of other nations, provides another
example of references to foreign law as logical reinforcement for the
Court's decisions. Muller v. Oregon exemplifies this reinforcement
because the Court turned to social science evidence, including laws
and data from foreign nations, to provide logical reinforcement
for its decision."' One commentator has argued that when the
Court turns to social science data, as it did in Muller, it does so
not because the information is necessary to reach a decision, "but
because a decision which took this data into account would be
better-more defensible as a matter of public policy, and responsive
to the growing public expectation that decisions by all branches of
government would reflect the growing body of social science knowl-
edge as well as logical reasoning. ' The same desire to support its
decisions sometimes seems to drive the Court to refer to foreign law
as a way of better defending a decision by showing the outcome that
has also been reached by other jurists in foreign countries.
Finally, citing foreign law as providing logical reinforcement for
the validity of the Court's rulings also seems to be partially behind
the current Court's reference to foreign law in many recent Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment cases. For example, in
Atkins v. Virginia,81 when the Rehnquist Court, in a majority opin-
ion written by Justice Stevens, ruled that the execution of mentally
retarded individuals was cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, the Court referred to the overwhelming
disapproval of the "world community" of execution of retarded
murderers to support its conclusion that "there is a consensus
[against the execution of the mentally retarded] among those who
have addressed the issue.' '816 Referring to the worldwide support
812. 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918); see also supra Part III.D.4.
813. 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 n.1 (1908).
814. Davis, supra note 384, at 423.
815. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
816. Id. at 316 n.21.
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for the Court's decision was an attempt to draw upon the legitimacy
of the laws of foreign nations as reinforcement and additional cor-
roboration for the proposition that executing mentally retarded
offenders is truly cruel and unusual and is an unacceptable form of
punishment.
E. Use of Foreign Sources of Law To Provide Empirical Support
for the Court's Factual Assertions
The Supreme Court has also often looked to foreign law to provide
empirical support for its factual assertions. As Justice Breyer has
explained, the Court sometimes looks to foreign law because the
experiences of other nations may "cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem."81 '
Washington v. Glucksberg provides a primary example of the Court's
use of foreign law to provide empirical support to determine the
effect a particular legal rule or decision might have if it were
adopted in the United States.818 In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
famously looked to the Dutch experience with assisted suicide to
help answer the question whether a Washington State law banning
physician-assisted suicide was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 819 One of the reasons Washington State had put forth
for banning physician-assisted suicide was its fear that permitting
the practice might start the state "down the path to voluntary and
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia," a practice to which the state
was strongly opposed. 2° In order to determine if this fear was a
rational one, the Court in Glucksberg looked to the experiences of
the Netherlands, which had chosen to legalize physician-assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia in certain circumstances, and was
"the only place where experience with physician-assisted suicide
and euthanasia has yielded empirical evidence."82' The Court looked
at data from a Dutch government study which revealed that, despite
various reporting requirements, the practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands had not been limited to only "competent, terminally ill
817. United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
818. See 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997); see also supra Part IV.C.2.
819. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734.
820. Id. at 732.
821. Id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring).
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adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that regulation of
the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving yul-
nerable persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly
persons suffering from dementia." '822 Using the Dutch experience for
empirical evidence of the real world consequences of legalizing
physician-assisted suicide, the Court provided a factual basis for
finding that Washington State's ban on assisted suicide was not
irrational, but rather rationally related to the governmental interest
in preventing euthanasia.
Roe v. Wade provides another example of the Court looking to the
practices of foreign nations for empirical evidence of the
consequences of reaching a certain legal result.823 In Roe, the Court
looked to the experiences of countries that had legalized abortion for
empirical evidence to rebut the argument that abortion, as a medi-
cal procedure, "was a hazardous one for the woman." '24 Looking at
summaries of empirical evidence from nations such as England,
Wales, Japan, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the Roe Court found
that, in nations where abortion was legal, mortality rates for women
having early abortions were as low as the rates for normal child-
birth.825 Considering these facts, the Court stated that "any interest
of the State in protecting the women from an inherently hazardous
procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to
forgo it, has largely disappeared." '826
Finally, the Court's reliance on foreign laws and practice in
Miranda v. Arizona is another instance in which the Court looked
outside of the United States for empirical evidence of the conse-
quences of adopting a proposed rule.827 Empirical evidence tending
to show that requiring Miranda warnings in custodial interroga-
tions would not be too burdensome for law enforcement was an
important tool for the Miranda Court in demonstrating that such a
requirement was in fact reasonable. The Court looked to the laws of
England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon, as their experience suggested
"that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is
822. Id. at 734.
823. See 410 U.S. 113, 148-49 & n.44 (1973); see also discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
824. Roe, 410 U.S. at 148-49 & n.44.
825. Id. at 149.
826. Id.
827. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see supra Part IV.B.2.
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overplayed. ' 28 One commentator has argued that this assessment
of the practice in foreign countries was, for the Court, "a way of
ascertaining whether its own new restrictions would have an ad-
verse impact on criminal law enforcement. ' 29
F. Areas Where Reference to Foreign Sources of Law Typically
Does Not Occur
In addition to discussing the five contexts above in which the
Supreme Court has referred to foreign sources of law over the last
216 years, we should also address the many contexts in which the
Court has not made such references. It may be noteworthy that the
Court generally has not cited or relied on the cases of either the
European Court of Human Rights or of other countries' constitu-
tional courts, as obligatory sources of American law.83° Instead, the
Court has usually looked to foreign sources of law mostly in order to
learn from the experiences of other nations, as Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg have both argued is proper. There are some areas of the
law where the Supreme Court has been especially likely to cite for-
eign sources of law, and there are other areas of law where citation
to foreign sources almost never occurs.83 ' For example, the Court
has historically been quite unwilling to rely on foreign sources of
law in cases in which the decision of the Court depends primarily on
an interpretation of an original meaning of relatively unambiguous
and non-evolving constitutional text. Thus, the Court has been re-
luctant to refer to foreign sources of law when it is trying to expli-
cate the United States' distinctive structure of government and form
of federalism, although foreign law was cited in the Legal Tender
Cases and the Selective Draft Law Cases. Many clauses of the
Constitution-for example, the Contracts Clause and the Vesting
Clauses of Articles II and III-have not proved to be as amenable to
borrowing from foreign court decisions or legal rules as the ambigu-
ous and developing Eighth Amendment has proved to be. And, while
828. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486.
829. Wollin, supra note 550, at 863.
830. See Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries
Think?, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2098559/.
831. See Ginsburg, supra note 15 and accompanying text; Scalia & Breyer Discussion,
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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a textbook on issues of criminal law might be satiated with cases
referring to foreign sources of law, a legal textbook on the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts or on the federal government's separation
of powers would be quite lacking in such references.832
This historical unwillingness of the Supreme Court to look to
foreign sources of law in structural constitutional cases may help
explain why the majority in Printz v. United States133 rejected as
irrelevant Justice Breyer's references to the federal systems of Swit-
zerland, Germany, and the European Union. Justice Breyer argued
in Printz that "there is no need to interpret the Constitution as
containing an absolute principle-forbidding the assignment of
virtually any federal duty to any state official, '8 34 but Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor, who are quite willing to invoke foreign sources
of law in the Eighth Amendment context, proved to be quite unwill-
ing to refer to it in this federalism case. 35
The Printz example may help to show why the Court rarely cites
foreign sources of law in structural constitutional cases. American
constitutional structures of federalism and separation of powers are
in some respects unique to this country's constitutional history.
Those structures reflect intricate compromises made over two centu-
ries, and the meaning of the relevant constitutional texts is rarely
revealed by examining foreign practices with respect to structural
constitutional rules. Thus, federalism and separation of powers
832. However, the previously discussed case of Rose v. Himely does address the power of
the federal courts to review the jurisdiction of foreign courts, so citation of foreign sources of
law has not been entirely absent in this area of the law, just far less prevalent. See supra Part
I.C.2.
833. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
834. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
835. Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Printz, which stated the foreign references in Justice
Breyer's dissent were "inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution." Id. at 921
n.11. Justice Breyer's reference to foreign practices in Printz can be rejected as illegitimate
not only because it is not relevant to the question of whether the U.S. Constitution gives
Congress the power to commandeer state executives, but also because Breyer failed to take
into account significant differences that exist between the American and European versions
of federalism. Calabresi, supra note 36, at 1105-06. Specifically, Justice Breyer overlooked the
fact that state entities in Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union have powerful
political checks on national legislative action, which no longer exist in the United States in
the wake of the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. Justice Breyer was thus guilty
in his Printz dissent of comparing apples and oranges when he sought to compare American
and European federal systems.
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cases, unlike Eighth Amendment cases, do not seem to involve a
constitutional text which invites direct reference to foreign sources
of law. We dare say that most clauses in the U.S. Constitution are
in this respect more like the structural constitutional provisions
than they are like the Eighth or the Fourth Amendments. It is the
rare American constitutional clause that will invite a reasonable-
ness assessment. The only clause we can think of in the structural
constitutional area which might invite such an assessment is the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and even there, unique historical
compromises on federalism and separation of powers issues make
reference to foreign sources of law quite risky as part of any effort
to determine whether laws are truly necessary or not. Again,
though, even here it must be noted that the Court did rely on for-
eign sources of law in the Legal Tender Cases and the Selective Draft
Law Cases, both of which were big federalism decisions.
CONCLUSION: WHAT Do TWO CENTURIES OF PRACTICE TELL US
THAT IS RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER RELIANCE ON
FOREIGN SOURCES OF LAW?
The Supreme Court's recent opinions in Roper and Lawrence
might suggest that reference to foreign sources of law by the Court
is a wholly new development. This Article proves that that is simply
not the case. References to foreign sources of law have not been
aberrational over the past 216 years. Instead, they have been some-
what commonplace. Thus, the Lawrence and Roper Court's reference
to foreign sources of law reflects an old tradition of such references
which can be found in many nineteenth century Supreme Court
opinions, including opinions written by such historical titans as
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story.
Nevertheless, we do think the pace of the Court's reliance on
foreign sources of law has picked up in the last sixty-five years,
especially since the issuance of the plurality opinion in Trop v.
Dulles. Moreover, many of the cases in which the Court or individ-
ual justices have relied on foreign law are among the most problem-
atic in the Court's history. We think the historical evidence largely
supports Justice Scalia's claim that foreign sources of law generally
are not and should not be relevant to the interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution. Rather, those sources of law are only relevant when
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the Supreme Court takes on a policy-driven writing of a new U.S.
Constitution, which it is deriving in part from controversial foreign
sources of law. Especially in controversial social issue cases, like
Lawrence, we think the Court should not impose secular European
values on the American citizenry in the guise of constitutional inter-
pretation. We are somewhat more sympathetic, however, to the
Court's reliance on foreign sources of law in its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence because at least there we think an argument can be
made that the Constitution really does ask judges for a modern-day
assessment of what punishments are reasonable and proportionate.
We would, therefore, join Justice O'Connor in approving of the
Court's reference to foreign sources of law in the Roper juvenile
death penalty case and would have joined her dissent in that case. 36
This Article does not purport to answer definitively the normative
question of whether the Supreme Court should, as a general rule,
refer to foreign sources of law in its opinions. Rather, this Article
has sought to provide additional information regarding the Court's
actual practice over the last 216 years in referring to foreign law.
We think the evidence we have just discussed shows that neither
Justice Breyer, who seemingly wants to refer to foreign sources of
law in all but the most domestic of cases, nor Justice Scalia, who
finds such sources wholly irrelevant to constitutional adjudication,
are entirely correct in capturing the Court's actual practice over the
last two centuries. As an original matter, there is little support for
the use of foreign sources of law in constitutional cases, as two of the
earliest cases invoking such sources, Schooner Charming Betsy and
United States v. Smith, were decided in 1804 and 1820, respectively,
more than fifteen years after the founding of our nation. Consider-
ing the entire 216-year history of the Court, however, there does
seem to be evidence of a tradition of employing foreign law in all
sorts of cases, including constitutional ones, albeit a tradition that
is only hazily foreshadowed by the opinions of the early Court and
that developed a real foothold only in the era after the Dred Scott
decision. Traditionally, the Court has not hesitated to rely on for-
eign law in at least some cases, such as those involving the criminal
836. Although we would look at foreign law in Roper, we would not give it dispositive
weight in a situation where the states are divided as to a controversial social policy of
executing juvenile murderers.
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law or controversial social issues. At the same time, there are many
important areas where the Justices almost never look to foreign law,
such as ones involving our structural Constitution.
Six Justices on the Rehnquist Court signed on to the conclusion
in Roper that the Court may, at least on some occasions, rely upon
foreign sources of law. We submit, therefore, that such reliance is
not likely to wane anytime soon, even with two new appointments,
and that the real question for the future is not whether but when
the Court will cite foreign sources of law. This is especially true
since reliance upon such sources of law has a self-validating and
snowballing aspect to it, wherein the more significant and wide-
spread the Court's use of foreign sources now, the greater the body
of precedent the Court will have to cite for using foreign sources of
law in the future.
If the Court wants to be faithful to the best aspects of its two
centuries of practice in relying on foreign sources of law, it will only
rely upon those sources in domestic cases where: (1) the reasonable-
ness of an American law or practice is drawn into question; (2) there
is an issue of construing a vague or ambiguous provision of Ameri-
can constitutional law; (3) the case involves the criminal law; (4) the
sources reinforce the logic and support for a position already arrived
at on other grounds; and (5) the Court is looking for empirical evi-
dence in foreign practice of the likely consequences of adopting a
proposed rule. Given the historical evidence we have uncovered, we
would support the Court's continued consideration of foreign sources
of law in deciding Eighth Amendment cases but not in cases involv-
ing substantive due process claims. Because the Court has had a
rather sorry history of considering foreign law in cases such as Dred
Scott and Roe, we believe the Court ought not to have relied on for-
eign law in Lawrence, and that it ought not to rely on such sources
in most cases in the future.
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